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Abstract 
 
 
 
 This dissertation comprises two essays on earnings forecasting accuracy. Chapter 2 
focuses on how management forecasting accuracy is affected by managers’ behavioral biases 
over time and Chapter 3 addresses how analyst portfolio design choices affect cross-sectional 
differences in analyst forecasting accuracy. 
In particular, Chapter 2 examines how CEOs’ overconfidence and their exhibited self-
serving attribution biases affect how they adjust their future earnings forecasts when they 
receive feedback concerning their prior forecasts. I find that overconfident CEOs respond to 
feedback by improving their future forecasting accuracy, but they do so more slowly than their 
less confident peers. I also find that overconfident CEOs learn to improve their future 
forecasting accuracy only when feedback is less ambiguous in the form of forecasting errors. In 
contrast, managers who are less confident respond to both less ambiguous forecasting errors and 
more ambiguous market feedback concerning their prior forecasts.  
Chapter 3 examines analysts’ supply chain coverage portfolio design and their forecasting 
accuracy. I define the relation between a firm and one of the firm’s major customer firms as a 
“supply chain relation”. Further, I define an analyst who issues forecasts for both the firm and 
one or more of the firm’s major customers in the same year as a “supply chain analyst”. I 
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classify all firms followed by the supply chain analyst into one of the three categories in a given 
year: “focal firms”, i.e., firms for which the analyst also covers one or more of the firm’s major 
customers, “major customers” of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all 
remaining firms in the analyst’s portfolio.  
I find that analysts who follow both a focal firm and one or more of the firm’s major 
customers issue significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for both the focal firm and the 
firm’s major customers than the same analysts issue for “other” firms in the same analyst 
portfolio. I also find that these analysts are more accurate in their forecasts for the focal firm and 
the firm’s major customers than other non-supply chain analysts following the same firm, but 
not the firm’s supply chain. I show that the superior forecasting accuracy for supply chain 
analysts for both the focal firm and the firm’s major customers is achieved at the cost of reduced 
forecasting accuracy for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. In explaining the relative 
importance of forecasting accuracy for the firms in the analyst portfolio, I find that focal firms 
and the firms’ major customers are more likely to generate more profitable trading commissions 
and operate in an industry segment that has a greater number of other peer firms than “other” 
firms in the same analyst portfolio. This evidence is consistent with earlier studies and suggests 
when analysts have stronger incentives to generate trading commissions from the stock of a firm, 
the analysts are more likely to spend effort to acquire more precise information about the firm 
(Hayes, 1998). When covering the firm’s supply chains helps analysts produce more precise 
information about the firm, analyst forecasting accuracy improves accordingly. 
 
Key Words:  Management forecast, CEO overconfidence, analyst forecast, supply chain, supply 
chain analyst, analyst portfolio design 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
Earnings forecasts are regarded as providing valuable information to the investment 
community. They are important to investors for determining the underlying value of a firm, 
evaluating a firm’s potential investment opportunities, and for boards of directors in effectively 
designing managers’ compensation contracts (e.g., Givoly and Lakonishok, 1984; Brown, 
Hagerman, Griffin, and Zmijewski, 1987). Prior studies have examined three types of earnings 
forecasts: forecasts issued by managers, by analysts, and forecasts estimated using time series 
earnings models (see, for example, Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010). These studies 
suggest that managers and analysts incorporate general economic news and firm-specific 
information into their forecasts in a particularly timely fashion, and their forecasts are more 
accurate than forecasts produced by time series models (e.g., Brown and Rozeff, 1978; Brown, 
Richardson, and Schwager, 1987; Fried and Givoly, 1982). Therefore, more recent studies, 
including this dissertation, focus on forecasts issued by managers and analysts.   
For earnings forecasts to be valuable prior to the release of earnings reports, they need to 
be informative. Accurate and informative earnings forecasts build managers’ and analysts’ 
credibility and reputation in financial markets, and help analysts enjoy higher annual 
compensation and better career prospects (Williams, 1996; Frankel and Lee, 1998; Mikhail, 
Walther, and Willis, 1999; Hong, Kubik, and Solomon, 2000; Clement and Tse, 2003; Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005; Jackson, 2005).  
Forecasting accuracy is affected by a variety of different factors. These factors are 
mostly related to the quantity or the quality of information used as input to the forecasting task 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Prior studies suggest that managers have private information about their 
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own firms and they are better informed about their firms than analysts; therefore, management 
forecasts concerning the firm’s prospects are more accurate than forecasts issued by analysts 
(Beyer et al., 2010). Likewise, when analysts have better information about a firm, their 
forecasts for the firm are more accurate (Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999).  
Factors that have been documented to affect forecasting accuracy can be broadly 
categorized into three categories: (a) characteristics of the forecast itself, (b) the information 
environment of the firm or the characteristics of the firm for which a forecast is issued, and (c) 
characteristics of individuals who issue the forecast. An example of the characteristics of a 
forecast that affects the forecast accuracy is forecast horizon. Studies have suggested that 
forecasts with longer horizons are generally less accurate than those with shorter horizons 
because of the greater uncertainty associated with longer earnings realization processes (e.g., 
Clement and Tse, 2003).  
Second, characteristics of a firm’s information environment affect forecasting accuracy. 
For example, firms operating in a common-law environment generally have stronger investor 
protection laws and higher-quality financial reporting systems in place than do firms in a civil-
law environment. As a result, the market demand for analyst forecasting accuracy is higher and 
forecasts are generally more accurate in a common-law environment than forecasts in a civil-law 
environment (Barniv et al., 2005). Characteristics of a firm are also important in affecting 
forecasting accuracy. For example, forecasts for a firm are less accurate when the firm is riskier, 
operating at a loss, experiencing information asymmetry, having more complicated operations, 
higher litigation risk, or operating in a more volatile or a less informative environment (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Duru and Reeb, 2002; Rogers and Stocken, 2005).   
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Finally, forecasting accuracy is also affected by the characteristics of the individuals who 
issue the forecast. These characteristics are related to either individual forecaster’s behavioral 
biases or her economic rationality in her forecasting decision. For example, prior studies have 
generally suggested that forecasters’ abilities, experiences, and resources available for 
application to the forecasting task affect their forecasting accuracy (e.g., Trueman, 1986; 
Clement, 1999; Clement and Tse, 2003). Moreover, the psychology literature has extensively 
documented that when individuals make judgments or decisions in an uncertain environment, 
their cognitive biases affect their information processing and decision-making processes 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). This argument suggests that behavioral biases also affect 
individuals’ forecasting accuracy. For example, Hribar and Yang (2009) show that CEOs who 
are subject to overconfidence biases are more likely to subjectively overestimate (underestimate) 
the favorable (unfavorable) effects of their actions or decisions on positive (negative) earnings 
realizations, and they are overly optimistic about the firm’s future earnings prospects. Hilary and 
Menzly (2006) document that analysts become overconfident in their abilities to predict future 
earnings after a series of good predictions, and their subsequent forecasting accuracy is reduced. 
Managers and analysts are distinctly different decision makers, and characteristics 
specific to these individuals also can affect their forecasting accuracy. Unlike managers who 
only issue forecasts for their own firms, analysts provide periodic earnings forecasts for perhaps 
10 to 20 firms based on their analyses of the firms’ financial, operational, and strategic plans. 
Therefore, how analysts organize the firms in their portfolios and how analysts allocate their 
level of effort to different firms in the portfolio would affect the quantity and the quality of 
information they have about each firm in their portfolios and their overall forecasting accuracy 
(Kini, Mian, Rebello, and Venkateswaran, 2009).  
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 This dissertation examines the accuracy of earnings forecasts issued by managers and 
analysts. I focus on factors related to individuals’ characteristics, including individuals’ 
behavioral biases and their economic rationality, which are associated with forecasting accuracy 
for two reasons. First, prior studies have documented the effects of managers’ biases on their 
forecasting accuracy (e.g., Hribar and Yang, 2007; Schrand and Zechman, 2010). These studies 
consider such biases as a fixed parameter that varies cross-sectionally but not over time. 
However, earnings forecasts require multi-period decisions. Individual forecasters will receive 
and process feedback information concerning their prior forecasts when they make their 
forecasting decisions for the next period.1
 Second, while one stream of the literature focuses on the effect of managers’ and analysts’ 
behavioral biases on their forecasting behaviors, the dominant academic paradigm is that 
managers and analysts are economically rational in their forecasting decisions. For example, 
prior studies suggest that analysts are economically rational in deciding the set of firms they 
follow in their portfolios (e.g., Barth et al., 2001; Kini et al., 2009). These studies generally 
 The literature in economics, psychology, and 
management has documented the general efficacy of feedback concerning individuals’ prior 
decisions in facilitating their learning and adaption when they perform the task again (Postman 
and Brown, 1952; Anderson and Berdahl, 2002). This line of research suggests that while 
individuals’ behavioral biases affect how they process feedback information when they make 
subsequent decisions, their behavioral biases are also adjusted as a result of feedback (Camerer, 
1995). Therefore, it is possible that managers’ behavioral biases and their forecasting accuracy 
would vary over time.  
                                                                
1 For example, Feng and Koch (2010) examine how managers’ decisions to issue quarterly earnings guidance in the 
current period are affected by outcomes from their previous earnings guidance. They find that managers are less 
likely to provide guidance in the subsequent year when their past forecasts have been overly optimistic, have 
resulted in earnings disappointments, and were accompanied by high levels of stock price volatility.  
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suggest that when analysts specialize in an industry by including firms from the same industry in 
their portfolios, they gain synergy in information gathering and processing for these firms, and 
their overall forecasting accuracy improves (Kini et al., 2009; De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi, 
2009). At the same time, an examination of analyst portfolio decisions shows that fewer than 40% 
of all analysts in the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) from January 1991 to 
December 2008 followed only firms from a single industry at the one-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code level. It is thus puzzling why a vast proportion of analysts cover more 
than one industry “when less breadth is related to improved forecast accuracy” (Ramnath, Rock, 
and Shane, 2008, p.10). This dissertation seeks to provide some insight to this question. 
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this dissertation examine the effect of managers’ behavioral 
biases on their forecasting accuracy over time and cross-sectional variations in analysts’ 
economic rationality in their portfolio choice on their forecasting accuracy, respectively. In 
particular, Chapter 2 focuses on a combination of managers’ overconfidence biases and self-
serving attribution biases that affect management forecasting accuracy over time. I consider 
overconfidence biases as individuals’ tendency to over-estimate the likelihood of the effect of 
their actions or decisions on positive outcomes and under-estimate the likelihood of the effect of 
their actions or decisions on negative outcomes (Kahneman and Tevesky, 1973). Further, a self-
serving attribution bias occurs when people attribute their successes to internal or personal 
factors but attribute their failures to situational factors beyond their control (Kahneman and 
Tevesky, 1973; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978). I expect that overconfident managers adjust their 
overconfidence biases in their abilities to predict future earnings after receiving negative 
feedback concerning their prior inaccurate predictions. I also expect that the improvement in 
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their subsequent forecasting accuracy is influenced by their overconfidence and self-serving 
attribution biases. 
Using a large sample of management forecasts from the First Call database, I show in 
Chapter 2 that the attribution biases exhibited by overconfident managers affect how they 
respond to feedback information concerning their prior inaccurate forecasts and their subsequent 
forecasting accuracy. I also show that the extent of feedback ambiguity affects how these 
managers respond to feedback. Specifically, overconfident CEOs adjust their initially biased 
forecasts when feedback is less ambiguous in the form of forecasting errors. In contrast, 
managers who are less confident respond to both less ambiguous feedback in the form of 
forecasting errors and more ambiguous market feedback concerning their prior forecasts.   
Chapter 3 proposes a new approach to understanding how some analysts organize their 
coverage portfolios by including both a firm and one or more of the firm’s major customer firms 
in their portfolios in the same year. I term these analysts as “supply chain analysts”. I examine 
the economic consequences for analysts taking such a portfolio approach in terms of costs and 
benefits in analyst forecasting accuracy for the firms in their portfolios. For this purpose, I 
classify all firms followed by a supply chain analyst in a given year into one of the following 
three categories: “focal firms,” i.e., firms for which the analyst also covers one or more major 
customer firms, “major customers” of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which 
include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. I then provide an economically rational 
explanation for analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms. 
Using a comprehensive analyst forecast data from the Institutional Brokers Estimates 
System (I/B/E/S) database, I show in Chapter 3 that an analyst who takes a supply chain 
portfolio approach by covering both a focal firm and one or more of the firm’s major customer 
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firms issue significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm than (1) the same 
analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio, and (2) than other analysts issue who 
only follow the same focal firm but not the focal firm’s major customers. Likewise, I also expect 
that the supply chain analyst issues more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm’s major 
customers than (1) the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio, and (2) 
other analysts who only follow the same major customer firms but none of the major customers’ 
suppliers (focal firms). I find analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms 
reflects analysts’ economic rationality in generating revenue for their brokerage firms.    
Both Chapter 2 and 3 assume that forecasting accuracy is an important objective that 
managers and analysts are concerned about when they issue earnings forecasts. However, other 
studies in the literature suggest that managers and analysts often consider other objectives 
besides forecasting accurately (e.g., Frost, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Ke and Yu, 2006; 
Kini et al., 2009). These studies suggest that managers and analysts may sacrifice their earnings 
forecasting accuracy in order to achieve other conflicting objectives (e.g., Lin and McNichols, 
1998). For example, managers may intentionally overstate their firms’ earnings forecasts to 
exaggerate the profitability of their firms’ investment opportunities in order to attract the limited 
available capital. Analysts, on the other hand, may intentionally forecast optimistically for a firm 
in order to curry favor with the firm’s management and gain the firm’s future investment 
banking business (e.g., Frost, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998). Despite these conflicting 
incentives that may induce managers and analysts to distort their earnings forecasting accuracy, 
prior studies also suggest that managers’ and analysts’ reputation in financial markets serve as a 
disciplinary mechanism to curb their forecasting biases (Williams, 1996; Graham et al., 2005; 
Jackson, 2005; Fang and Yasuda, 2009).  
8 
 
In sum, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 contribute to our understanding of management and 
analyst forecasting accuracy. Specifically, Chapter 2 adds to the management forecasting 
literature by documenting that individuals’ behavioral biases affect their earnings forecasting 
accuracy over time. Findings from Chapter 2 suggest that such biases are not fixed attributes, but 
are adjusted when individuals receive feedback concerning their prior decisions.  
Chapter 3 adds to the analyst forecasting literature by proposing a new approach to 
understanding analyst portfolio design decisions. I show that some analysts may organize the 
firms in their portfolios through a firm’s supply chain relations by covering both a focal firm and 
one or more of the focal firm’s major customer firms. I document that analysts who take such a 
supply chain portfolio approach gain insights concerning future revenue realizations of focal 
firms by also preparing forecasts for the focal firms’ major customers. At the same time, these 
analysts also gain insights concerning the costs to be incurred by the major customers by 
preparing forecasts for the major customers’ suppliers. I document that analysts’choice of focal 
firms and major customer firms is driven by their economic incentives related to their earnings 
forecasts. Specifically, when the stock of a firm has a higher potential to generate more trading 
commissions to the analysts’ brokerage firms, analysts have stronger incentive to acquire more 
precise information about the firm by following the firm’s supply chain. As a result, their 
earnings forecasts for the firm are more accurate.  
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines 
management forecasting accuracy. More specifically, I examine how CEOs’ behavioral biases, 
namely, a combination of CEO overconfidence and self-serving attribution biases, affect how 
CEOs respond to feedback concerning their prior forecasts in improving their future forecasting 
accuracy over time. Section 2.2 first reviews the related literature on CEO overconfidence and 
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management forecasting accuracy, and then develops the related hypotheses. Section 2.3 
describes the research data. Section 2.4 reports empirical results of hypothesis tests, as well as 
results for various robustness tests. Section 2.5 concludes Chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines analyst 
forecasting accuracy. I particularly focus on how analyst portfolio design choices affect their 
forecasting accuracy, and examine the characteristics, antecedents, and consequences of analyst 
portfolio design by including both a focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s major 
customers in the portfolio. Section 3.2 reviews the related literature on the economic 
determinants of analyst forecasting accuracy and the effect of analyst economic objectives in 
their earnings forecasting accuracy. Section 3.3 develops the hypotheses. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 
describe the research design and the data for the empirical tests. Empirical results and various 
robustness tests are presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes Chapter 3. The overall 
conclusion of the dissertation is presented in Chapter 4. 
  
10 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: CEO Overconfidence, Managerial Earnings Forecasts, and Feedback 
 
 
 
This chapter examines management forecasting accuracy. It focuses on how managers’ 
behavioral biases, in particular, a combination of managers’ overconfidence and attribution 
biases, affect how managers respond to feedback concerning their prior forecasts in improving 
their future forecasting accuracy.  
2.1  Introduction 
Management earnings forecasts are one of the most important components of earnings 
forecasts in financial markets. Forecasting accuracy is an important mechanism by which 
managers build positive reputations in capital markets (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005). 
Managers make errors in forecasting earnings for a variety of reasons. While they may have 
some incentives to misrepresent earnings expectations (Noe, 1999; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005), forecasting errors can also reflect the uncertainty underlying the 
earnings generation process. When issuing earnings forecasts, managers subjectively evaluate 
how their own actions or decisions are likely to influence the realization of actual earnings. 
Forecasting errors may thus be due, at least in part, to their overestimation (underestimation) of 
the favorable (unfavorable) effects of their actions or decisions on earnings. Managers who are 
overly optimistic about the firm’s future earnings are referred to as “overconfident.” The degree 
of managers’ optimism concerning the future consequences of their actions will directly affect 
their forecasting decisions. Indeed, prior research suggests that overconfident managers are more 
likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts (Hribar and Yang, 2007).  
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 This study examines the dynamics of the process whereby managers with varying degrees 
of confidence issue earnings forecasts, receive feedback concerning those forecasts, and make 
subsequent forecasts. I posit that managers’ forecasting decisions are shaped by the feedback 
they receive concerning their prior forecasts. The general corrective effect of feedback on 
individuals’ future behavior is well established in the psychology literature, but managers’ 
confidence levels also exert an influence on the way they interpret feedback on their prior 
forecasts. In particular, overconfident managers who receive positive feedback concerning their 
prior forecasting decisions are more likely to attribute this positive feedback to their own ability 
or acumen, while attributing negative feedback to external factors (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; 
Hoch and Loewenstein, 1989).2 This attribution bias is more pronounced when the causal link 
between outcome feedback and prior decisions is more ambiguous. As a result, overconfident 
managers are less likely to respond to noisier negative feedback, and slower to adjust their 
forecasting behavior compared with their less confident counterparts.3
 I examine two prominent forms of feedback following earnings forecasts: forecast errors 
and market reactions.
  
4
                                                                
2 Earlier research has documented managers’ biased causal attribution with respect to their earnings forecasts. For 
example, Baginski, Hassell, and Hillison (2000), Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2004) show that when 
managers voluntarily disclose causal attributions in their forecasts, they are more likely to attribute forecasts of bad 
news to observable external factors, and attribute forecasts of good news to their internal actions. 
 I use these two forms of feedback to test how the attribution biases of 
overconfident managers affect their responses to feedback concerning their prior forecasts. 
Forecast errors and market reactions differ in terms of the information complexity and the 
ambiguity associated with the causal link between feedback and managers’ prior forecasting 
3 Prior research suggests that the direction of feedback can have a different effect on an individual’s subsequent 
behavior. In particular, positive feedback reinforces individuals’ prior decisions, and negative feedback has a 
corrective effect on individuals’ future decisions (Annett, 1969; Ilgen et al., 1979). In this chapter, I mainly focus on 
the negative feedback which has a corrective effect on managers’ subsequent forecasting behaviors because these 
managers start by issuing forecasts containing larger errors, and they have incentives to reduce such errors. 
4 Analysts forecast revision is another form of feedback managers receive concerning their prior forecasts. Baginski 
and Hassell (1990) indicate that security price reactions to management forecasts are useful in predicting 
subsequent analyst forecast revisions. Thus, I would expect that market feedback is a good surrogate for the 
feedback provided by analysts when they revise their forecasts after managers issued their forecasts.  
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decisions. The magnitude of forecasting error, hereafter termed “error feedback,” is the 
difference between forecasted earnings and actual earnings. It is generally more precise and 
verifiable, with a relatively clear causal relation between this feedback and the manager’s prior 
decisions. The market reaction to the forecast’s release, hereafter termed “market feedback,” 
reflects investors’ immediate perception of the credibility of the forecast (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Hutton and Stocken, 2009).5 Market feedback is relatively noisy because it reflects a more 
complex set of factors which may simultaneously affect stock prices. 6
 Prior research has shown that when the causal link between feedback and managers’ prior 
decisions is noisier, the corrective effect of feedback on individuals’ learning is weaker (Hoch 
and Loewenstein, 1989) and managers’ attribution bias is not mitigated. This suggests that 
overconfident managers are less likely to respond significantly to market feedback, and that 
market feedback has a weaker effect on the improvement of managers’ forecasting accuracy. 
However, when the causal link between feedback and managers’ prior decisions is clearer, the 
corrective effect of feedback can mitigate managers’ attribution bias. As a result, overconfident 
managers are more likely to respond to error feedback by improving their future forecasting 
accuracy. By contrast, less confident managers, who are less subject to attribution bias, are less 
    
                                                                
5 McNichols (1989) provides evidence that the market is efficient in incorporating the ex-post credibility of 
management forecasts. McNichols (1989) shows that the short-window stock return surrounding a management 
forecast release provides a good prediction of the forecasting error. This association is consistent with investors’ 
responding differently to forecasts that are ex post optimistic or pessimistic. This evidence suggests that 
management earnings forecasts contain information not previously reflected in the stock prices. At the same time, 
stock prices also reflect information about earnings beyond that in management forecasts. Consistent with this, 
Jennings (1987) proposes that forecast credibility is as important as news in the forecasts in measuring the 
information content of management forecasts. Based on this argument, stock returns following the release of 
management forecasts provide managers with immediate market feedback concerning investors’ perceptions of the 
credibility of the forecasts.  
6 Forecasting errors may be noisy feedback to managers concerning their prior forecasting behavior because of the 
uncertainty involved in the earnings generation process. However, forecasting errors and market reactions to the 
forecasts provide useful but different information to managers concerning their prior forecasts. In particular, 
forecasting errors provide managers with a signal about the magnitude of their prior forecasting errors, and market 
reaction to the forecasts provide a signal on the market preferences with respect to the direction of managers’ 
forecasting errors. For example, market reaction following a forecast may suggest that the market rewards managers 
for issuing pessimistic rather than optimistic forecasts. 
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likely to attribute feedback to external factors. I expect these managers to respond to both error 
feedback and market feedback by improving their subsequent forecasting accuracy.  
 To examine the effect of managers’ confidence levels on the dynamics of the managerial 
learning process, I used a sample of 2,482 quarterly management earnings forecasts from the 
First Call’s Company Issued Guidance (“CIG”) database from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 
2008. This sample represents the forecasting history for 568 managers, of which 283 were 
classified as overconfident based on their initial overly optimistic forecasts. The remaining 285 
were classified as a benchmark group of less confident managers; while they made forecasting 
errors of the same absolute magnitude as the overconfident managers, their forecasts 
underestimated actual earnings. I then compared the learning rates, i.e., the pattern of forecasting 
errors over time, for the two groups of managers. 
 My results indicated that over time both groups of managers appeared to learn and to 
adjust their initial forecasting errors; that is, forecasts issued by overconfident managers became 
less optimistic (more accurate), while forecasts issued by less confident managers became less 
pessimistic (more accurate). However, overconfident managers improved their subsequent 
forecasting accuracy more slowly than less confident managers. The rate of improvement of 
forecasting accuracy is measured by the amount of experience (time) required by a manager to 
react to prior feedback by issuing his or her first more accurate forecast. I found that, on average, 
overconfident managers learnt more slowly, requiring 0.3 additional forecasts, or 0.5 additional 
quarters, to issue their first more accurate forecast than their less confident counterparts. The 
slower learning rate is consistent with the notion of managers’ overconfidence biases which 
inhibit their learning and the improvements of their subsequent forecasting accuracy.   
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 I also found that, consistent with overconfident managers’ attribution bias weakened the 
corrective effect of feedback on their learning behavior, when the causal relationship between 
feedback and the managers’ prior decision was more ambiguous, overconfident managers did 
not respond significantly to the noisier market feedback when making subsequent forecasts. This 
result held after controlling for potential self-selection in managers’ voluntary earnings 
forecasting decisions using a two-stage procedure. This is in contrast to less confident managers 
who did respond significantly to market feedback. However, when the causal link was less 
ambiguous, as in the case of error feedback, both overconfident and less confident managers 
responded to the feedback by improving their subsequent forecasting accuracy. 
 These findings have two implications. First, they suggest that feedback can effectively 
mitigate managers’ cognitive overconfidence bias, but only when the feedback mechanism is 
verifiable and unambiguous in the causal link between the feedback outcome and managers’ 
prior decisions.7
 
 Second, they suggest that managers’ attribution biases affect the way they 
respond to feedback in their subsequent forecasting behavior. To test the robustness of this 
analysis, I also used alternative CEO overconfidence measures developed by Malmendier and 
Tate (2005, 2008), and classify CEOs as overconfident if, in addition to their initial overly 
optimistic forecasting behavior, they also either overinvest in their own firms or are portrayed by 
the press as overconfident. The results of the analyses using these two alternative CEO 
overconfidence measures were consistent with those using the measure based on initial 
forecasting decisions alone, as described above. 
                                                                
7 An alternative explanation for the improvement of forecasting accuracy documented above is the effect of 
regression to the mean. To the extent that the improvement of forecasting accuracy for both overconfident and less 
confident managers is purely a mean reversion effect, we would expect this effect to work equally in either direction 
for overconfident and less confident managers. This is obviously not the case based on the evidence I will present in 
the chapter.  
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 This chapter contributes to both the management forecasting literature and to the emerging 
research on the effect of managers’ overconfidence on corporate disclosure decisions. While 
much of the existing literature on management forecasts has focused primarily on cross-
sectional causes and the consequences of management forecasting errors, less attention has been 
paid to the dynamics of management forecasts (Hirst et al., 2008). This study adds to the multi-
period dimension of the literature by documenting the dynamics of the management forecasting 
process whereby overconfident managers respond, albeit slowly, to feedback by adjusting their 
behavioral bias. In addition, I find that overconfident managers’ future forecasting behavior is 
affected by their attribution biases and I describe how they respond to feedback. I also find that 
the extent of feedback’s ambiguity and verifiability affects the rate of learning for managers with 
different confidence levels. The chapter also contributes to the emerging literature on how 
managers’ overconfidence bias affects firms’ decision making. The findings of the study suggest 
that managers’ overconfidence bias is not a fixed attribute, but is conditioned by the feedback 
they receive. This conclusion sheds light on how firms can mitigate the negative effect of 
managers’ overconfidence on corporate decision making by effectively evaluating managers’ 
prior decisions. 
 The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the background 
literature used for the development of my hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the sampling 
procedures and provides empirical results. I then provide various robustness tests and additional 
tests in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents conclusions. 
2.2  Background literature and hypotheses development 
 Earnings forecasts are an important disclosure mechanism by which managers may seek 
to establish or alter market earnings expectations, preempt litigation concerns, discourage entry 
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into their industry, or influence their reputation for transparent and accurate reporting (e.g., 
Jennings, 1987; Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1997; Frost, 1997; Bamber and 
Cheon, 1998; Graham et al., 2005; Hutton and Stocken, 2009). However, to leverage the 
potential benefits associated with management forecasts, they need to be credible. Credible 
forecasts help managers build a positive forecasting reputation, which ultimately affects firm 
value (Graham et al., 2005).  
 While managers may introduce bias in their forecasts in response to incentives, such as to 
avoid a negative earnings surprise (Matsumoto, 2002), to increase their stock-based 
compensation, and/or to gain from insider trading (Noe, 1999; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005), forecasting errors also arise because of the uncertainty involved in 
the forecasting process. In an uncertain environment, managers’ personal judgment biases will 
influence their assessment of the effectiveness of their decisions or actions on the probability of 
high (or low) future earnings outcomes.  
 One such bias documented in the existing literature is CEO overconfidence (Roll, 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008). Management overconfidence has been offered as an 
explanation for various economic phenomena, including merger and acquisition decisions (Roll, 
1986),  premiums paid for acquisitions (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997), corporate financing 
decisions, and dividend payout decisions (Ben-David et al., 2007). In many cases, overconfident 
CEOs overestimate their own acumen relative to that of others (Larwood and Whittaker, 1977; 
Svenson, 1981). Thus, when presented with information comprising both favorable signals 
associated with a greater likelihood of good news (for instance, higher earnings) and 
unfavorable signals associated with a greater likelihood of bad news (for instance, lower 
earnings), overconfident CEOs are more likely to overestimate the probability that their own 
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decisions or actions will yield higher earnings for the firm and underestimate the corresponding 
probability of yielding lower earnings. This suggests that overconfident managers are more 
likely to issue optimistic earnings forecasts (Hribar and Yang, 2007).  
 Prior research has focused primarily on demonstrating that managerial overconfidence can 
significantly affect managerial decisions, yet few studies examine the evolution of individual 
managers’ overconfidence bias, with the exception of Billett and Qian (2008).8
 However, managers’ overconfidence bias affects the way they interpret the causality of the  
 The related 
literature in economics, psychology and management has documented the general efficacy of 
feedback for individuals’ learning (e.g. Arrow, 1962; Anderson, 1983; Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1978; Huber, 1991; Bonner, Libby, and Nelson, 1997). This line of research has shown that 
feedback on the outcome of individuals’ prior decisions affects their confidence in their ability to 
assess future performance when they perform the task again (Postman and Brown, 1952; 
Anderson and Berdahl, 2002). Studies have demonstrated that when tasks are clearly specified 
and when feedback is negative, many individuals display learning patterns generally consistent 
with Bayesian updating (Camerer, 1995). This is because, unlike positive feedback that 
reinforces individuals’ prior decisions, negative feedback has a corrective effect on individuals’ 
future decisions (Annett, 1969; Ilgen et al., 1979). To the extent that overconfident managers 
respond to feedback and adjust their confidence level in their forecasting behavior, their 
subsequent forecasting accuracy is improved.  
feedback and their subsequent response to it.9
                                                                
8 Billett and Qian (2008) examine the history of mergers and acquisitions made by individual CEOs. They find 
CEOs are more likely to engage in value destructive mergers and acquisitions following positive experiences from 
past acquisitions. They also find an CEO’s net purchase of stock is greater preceding subsequent deals than it is for 
the first deals. Taken together, this evidence suggests that CEOs become overconfident as a result of their self-
attribution biases.  
 Research has found that overconfident individuals 
9 Both the psychology and behavioral economics literatures document that the source of overconfidence comes from 
the self-attribution bias. Hirshleifer (2001, p.1549) explains the link between overconfidence and self-attribution 
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are often strongly influenced by their own attribution bias, i.e., they are inclined to attribute 
favorable outcomes to their own decisions or actions, but unfavorable outcomes to external 
factors or bad luck (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Bettman and Weitz, 1983). This attribution 
bias means that overconfident managers pay less attention to negative feedback than to positive 
feedback. As a result, the corrective effect of negative feedback on managers’ future forecasting 
behavior is mitigated. This is in contrast to less confident managers who are less subject to 
attribution biases, more responsive to negative feedback, and therefore more likely to correct 
their prior behavior. Hence, the attribution bias slows down the rate at which overconfident 
managers improve their forecasting accuracy. Thus, I propose that:  
H1: Overconfident managers improve their forecasting accuracy more slowly than less 
confident managers.  
 
  Although the psychology literature has generally established the effectiveness of 
feedback in facilitating individuals’ learning and the adaptability of their future behavior, Annett 
(1969), Ilgen et al. (1979), and Hogarth et al. (1991) argue that the effectiveness of the 
relationship between feedback and learning is contingent on feedback characteristics. That is, if 
feedback is ambiguous, and the relationship between prior decisions and the feedback received 
is open to different explanations, individuals assign less weight to this feedback when they 
perform the task again. Thus noisier feedback would weaken the effect of feedback on 
individuals’ learning. By contrast, if feedback is relatively straightforward and less ambiguous, 
or if there is a direct causal link between prior decisions and feedback, individuals will give 
more weight on such feedback when they perform the task again.   
 To explore the effect of ambiguity of feedback in the management forecasting setting, I 
examine two prominent forms of feedback: market feedback and error feedback, each of which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
bias as: “overconfidence and biased self-attribution are static and dynamic counterparts; self-attribution causes 
individuals to learn to be overconfident rather than converging to an accurate self-assessment.” 
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have distinctive characteristics with respect to the information complexity involved and the 
strength of the association between the feedback and individuals’ prior decisions. Specifically, 
error feedback provided by actual earnings realization is generally more precise and verifiable, 
with a clearer relationship between feedback and managers’ prior decisions; market feedback 
reflects a combination of both the market’s perception of the credibility of management forecasts 
and other positive/negative signals which may simultaneously affect stock prices. 10
 I expect managers’ responses to feedback concerning how they attribute the feedback to 
internal or external factors to affect how managers improve their subsequent forecasting 
accuracy. In particular, less confident managers will be more likely to improve their forecasting 
accuracy when they respond to the feedback by taking corrective adjustments, even if feedback 
is noisy. By contrast, overconfident managers will respond to feedback and take corrective 
adjustments when the feedback has clear causality, but they would ignore ambiguous feedback 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Hogarth et al., 1991). Therefore, I 
expect overconfident managers will be more likely to ignore market feedback and to respond to 
error feedback, because the latter provides clearer information concerning their prior forecasting 
accuracy. Consistent with this, I propose: 
 Therefore, 
relative to error feedback, market feedback on management forecasts is relatively noisy and 
seldom shows a clear causality. 
 H2: Overconfident managers will respond to error feedback, but not to market feedback. 
 
                                                                
10 The actual earnings realization process is also subject to uncertainty and exogenous shock, which makes the 
causal link between error feedback and managers’ prior forecasts nosier. Here I assume that error feedback is less 
ambiguous relative to market feedback. This is because, unlike market feedback that is subject to a lot of other 
economy-wide and industry-wide forces that managers have no control over, error feedback is dependent on both 
the earnings realization and the reported earnings that are controllable by managers.  
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2.3  Data and empirical results 
2.3.1  Data screening  
Table 2.1 presents the sample screening procedures. The initial sample includes all 
quarterly management forecasts from the First Call database from the first quarter of 1994 to the 
last quarter of 2008. I chose January 1, 1994 as the starting point because the First Call data is 
reasonably complete from 1994 onward (Anilowski et al., 2007). I restricted my sample to point 
and close range forecasts because only these provide the numerical estimates required to get the 
quantitative measures of management forecasts. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Anilowski et 
al., 2007), the following were excluded from my sample: forecasts with confounding events that 
could lead to discontinuity in EPS, such as mergers and acquisition announcements; forecasts 
with missing CUSIPs; duplicate forecasts; forecasts with apparent data errors; and “stale” 
forecasts that occur more than 90 days prior to the actual quarterly earnings announcement. For 
firms that issued multiple forecasts for the same quarter, I retained the first valid management 
forecast after the actual earnings announcement for the previous quarter. Actual earnings and 
analysts’ consensus forecasts for the quarter were also obtained from the First Call. These 
procedures yielded a total of 12,827 firm-quarter management forecasts with the Compustat 
quarterly financial information.  
[Insert Table 2.1] 
  I combined the above quarterly management forecasts with the identity of individual 
managers based on CEO tenure information from the Execucomp database. I assumed that all 
forecasts issued after each individual CEO took up his or her position in the firm (variable 
“becameceo”) and before leaving the position (variable “leftotc”) were issued by that CEO. 
3,659 forecasts without corresponding CEO information were deleted. I deleted 1,116 forecasts 
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when there was more than one CEO in the same firm quarter, due to either dual CEO 
appointments or CEO turnover in the firm quarter. Of the total 8,052 forecasts retained that were 
issued by 1,681 CEOs, 65.19% were pessimistic, 27.02% were optimistic, and the remaining 
7.79% were neutral forecasts. 
I defined CEOs as overconfident (or less confident) based on the first forecast they issued 
for the firm. Specifically, a manager is classified as “overconfident” if the first forecast puts her 
in the top 50% of all optimistic forecasts (defined as forecasted earnings greater than the actual 
earnings) issued in the same quarter. A manager was classified as “less confident” if she made 
the same magnitude of initial forecasting error as the overconfident manager but the forecast 
puts her in the top 25% of all pessimistic forecasts (defined as forecasted earnings smaller than 
the actual earnings) in the same quarter. From this classification, a total of 283 overconfident 
managers and 285 less confident managers were identified. These two groups of managers 
together issued a total of 2,482 forecasts during the sample period. Each forecast was classified 
as either less accurate or more accurate relative to the average forecasting errors using all 
forecasts issued in the same quarter. A forecast was classified as “less accurate” if the error was 
in the top 50% of all optimistic forecasts or in the top 25% of all pessimistic forecasts in the 
same quarter. Forecasts that fell in the remaining range of errors were defined as “more 
accurate”.11
                                                                
11 I classify managers as less confident if the managers’ first one or first two forecasts are pessimistic with the 
forecasting errors in the bottom 25% of all pessimistic forecasts. I choose these asymmetric cut-off points to 
classify overconfident managers and their less confident peers because quarterly management forecasts are 
predominantly skewed toward being pessimistic (e.g. Gong et al., 2009; Cotter et al., 2008) with around 65% (27%) 
of forecasts as pessimistic (optimistic) in my sample. I also use an alternative cut-off point and define managers as 
overconfident if the first one or two forecasts they issue during their tenure puts them in the top 25% of all 
optimistic forecasts issued in the same quarter. The results remained unchanged. 
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2.3.2 Justifications for CEO overconfidence measurement  
I conducted various tests to justify the use of my primary overconfidence measure that is 
based on the forecasting biases contained in the first forecasts managers issued. I first applied 
alternative CEO overconfidence measures used in prior studies to examine the consistency of 
these measures with my primary measure. I then used my CEO overconfidence measure to 
replicate the effect of CEO overconfidence on management corporate decisions documented in 
prior studies (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2007). 
Two alternative measures of CEO overconfidence were adapted from prior research (e.g., 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Jin and Kothari, 2006; Hirbar and Yang, 2007). The first is 
based on a CEO’s decision to overinvest in the idiosyncratic risk of the firm.12 Using Thomson 
Financials TFN Insiders’ Trading data,  I defined a CEO as overconfident if, prior to issuing her 
first forecast, the total value of her purchase of the firm’s stock was greater than the total value 
of her sales of the stock, and coded OC_PUR as 1, and 0 otherwise. The second measure uses 
media perceptions of the manager’s confidence level (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 2008; Jin and 
Kothari, 2006; Hribar and Yang, 2007). I classify a CEO as overconfident if, prior to issuing her 
first forecast, the number of times she was described by the press in “confident” and “optimistic” 
terms exceeded the number of times she was described in less confident terms, such as “frugal”, 
“conservative”, “cautious”, “practical”, “reliable”, and “steady”, and coded OC_MEDIA1 as 1, 0 
otherwise.13
                                                                
12 The rationale for this measure is as follows: CEOs typically receive large grants of stock and options as 
compensation. They cannot trade their options or hedge the risk by short-selling company stock, and the value of 
their human capital is intimately linked to the firm’s performance. Because of this under-diversification, risk-averse 
CEOs should limit their additional investment in equity of their firms. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) translate 
this logic to a measure to classify CEO overconfidence based on whether CEOs consistently increase their holdings 
of company stock.   
 CEOs without press mentions were assigned a value of 0. I also used the continuous 
13 More specifically, I collect all articles  that characterize the sample CEOs within the measurement window that 
describe the CEO in “confident”  terms (including “confident”, “confidence”, “optimistic”, “optimism”) and in 
“cautious” or negative “confident” terms (including “cautious”, “reliable”, “practical”, “conservative”, “frugal”, 
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measure of media perceptions of the CEO based on the frequency with which a CEO was 
described as confident or optimistic (relative to more conservative terms), and computed 
OC_MEDIA2 = [(confident mention-conservative mention)/total mention]. 
In Appendix 2.2, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of overconfident CEOs based on 
the two alternative measures. It suggests that managers who were classified as overconfident 
when their first forecasts were overly optimistic were significantly more likely (p=0.015) to 
overexpose their personal wealth to the idiosyncratic risk of the firm by purchasing their own 
company’s stock (OC_PUR), and were significantly more likely (p=0.035 for OC_MEDIA1 and 
p=0.039 for OC_MEDIA2) to be described by the press in confident terms than in less confident 
terms  This suggests that using the biases contained in managers’ first forecasts is a reasonable 
approach to identify overconfident CEOs. 
I then used my classification of CEO overconfidence to examine the relationship between 
CEO overconfidence and corporate policies, including corporate dividend payout policy and 
financing policy, as documented in prior studies. Results are presented in Appendix 2.2 Panel B. 
Consistent with prior studies (Ben-David et al., 2007), I found that when using managers’ first 
forecasts to classify CEOs confidence levels, firms with overconfident CEOs performed worse 
in future periods after the forecasts were issued (ROA), were less likely to pay out dividends 
(DIV), used more long-term debt (LONG_TERM_DEBT), invested more in research and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
“steady”). Major publications used include The New York Times, Business Week, the Financial Times, The 
Economist, and the Wall Street Journal. A CEO is defined as being overconfident if the cumulative number of 
articles in which the CEO is described in “confident” terms is greater than the number of articles that refers to the 
CEO in less confident terms. I then code OC_MEDIA1 equals 1 for this CEO. The continuous variable of CEO 
overconfidence (OC_MEDIA2) is based on the difference in the number of times a CEO is described in “confident” 
terms and in “conservative” terms. Based on this definition, the OC_MEDIA2 measure ranges from -1 to 1. To be 
consistent with prior research, I use the term “overconfidence” to describe the construct of interest, although the 
measure is actually a relative measure of confidence, and I cannot calibrate an optimal level of confidence to 
differentiate “overconfident” from “confident.”   
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development (RD_RATIO), and were more likely to repurchase their own stock (REPURCHASE) 
than firms with less confident CEOs.   
I also validated the evidence in Hribar and Yang (2007) that overconfident managers are 
more likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts. Results shown in Panel C of Appendix 2.2 
generally support this premise. The dependent variable for the regression in Panel C is 
OPTIMISTICt, which as an indicator variable equals 1 if a forecasted earning is greater than the 
actual earnings (i.e., optimistic forecasts), and 0 otherwise. The independent variable of interest 
is OC_MF, which is an indicator variable equals 1 if the manager who issues the forecast is 
classified as overconfident and 0 otherwise. The regression analyses in examining whether 
overconfident managers are more likely to issue optimistically biased forecasts in Panel C is 
based on all subsequent forecasts issued by each manager after excluding the first forecast she 
issued for the firm. This is because by construction, a CEO is classified as overconfident if their 
first forecast is overly optimistic. The results in both column (1) and column (2) show a positive 
and significant coefficient on OC_MF (coefficient=0.225 and 0.144, P<0.01 and <0.10, 
respectively), which suggests that overconfident managers are more likely to issue optimistic 
subsequent forecasts than other managers, consistent with earlier studies (Hribar and Yang, 
2007). In addition, column (2) shows that firms with good news (NEWS), higher book-to-market 
ratio (BM) are also more likely to issue optimistic forecasts; conversely, firms that are smaller 
(LOG_ASSETS), experience a lower sales growth rate (SALE_GROWTH),  and have a lower 
level of working capital accruals (|WACC|) are less likely to issue optimistic forecasts. Overall, 
the above evidence provides empirical support for using managers’ initial forecasting bias to 
measure their overconfidence bias. 
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2.3.3  Univariate results 
 Panel A of Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics for the first forecast issued by each 
manager, which I used to categorize managers’ confidence levels. By construction, except for the 
direction of the forecasting error (BIASt), I should not expect any significant difference in the 
characteristics of the first forecast managers issued. The results in Panel A of Table 2.2 are 
consistent with this. As shown in Panel A, forecasts issued by overconfident managers and by 
less confident managers are not significantly different in terms of the magnitude of forecasting 
error (ERRORt) (p=0.211), news in the forecasts (NEWSt) (p=0.241), and forecasting horizon 
(HORIZONt) (p=0.315). 
[Insert Table 2.2 Panels A and B] 
 Panel A also shows that overconfident and less confident managers work in firms that 
have similar earnings volatility (STD_EPSt) (p=0.365), size (ASSETSt) (p=0.584), and in 
industries with similar levels of competition (HH_INDEXt) (p=0.131). However, overconfident 
managers are more likely to be employed in firms with lower growth opportunities 
(SALEGROWTHt) (p=0.001), lower valuations (BMt) (p=0.008), less liquidity (ALTMANt) 
(p=0.009) and lower discretionary working capital (|WACCt|) (p=0.032).  
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for forecasts issued by the 168 
overconfident managers and 201 less confident managers.14
                                                                
14 Of the 283 managers I initially categorized as overconfident and the 285 managers I initially categorized as less 
confident, 115 overconfident and 84 less confident managers are dropped because these managers never issued 
subsequent forecasts. My analysis focuses on the forecasts issued by the remaining 168 overconfident managers and 
201 less confident managers who continued providing management forecasts. 
 It shows that overconfident 
managers issued a mean (median) of 5.3 (5) forecasts versus 5.08 (4) forecasts by less confident 
managers during their tenure.   
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Results in Panel B suggest that for their subsequent forecasts, overconfident managers are 
more optimistic (BIASt, p=0.010), less accurate (ERRORt, p=0.05), and issue forecasts with 
longer horizons (HORIZONt, p=0.020) than less confident managers. 
[Insert Table 2.2] 
 To show that both overconfident and less confident managers improve their subsequent 
forecasting accuracy, Table 2.3 reports forecasting errors based on the sequence of the forecasts 
issued by each CEO during their tenure with the firm. The results show that, in general, as 
managers issue more forecasts for their firms, their forecasting accuracy improves. Panel A of 
Table 2.3 shows that overconfident managers reduce their forecasting error from the initial error 
of 0.010 (S=1) to an average of 0.0037 in subsequent forecasts (S≥2). This difference is 
statistically significant at p=0.000 level. The corresponding forecasting errors for less confident 
managers, shown in Panel B of Table 2.3, reduce from the initial 0.0149 (S=1) to 0.0046 in 
subsequent forecasts (S≥2). The difference is also statistically significant at p=0.000 level. When 
I combined forecasting errors by both overconfident and less confident managers, as shown in 
Panel C, a similar pattern of improvement of forecasting accuracy was observed.    
[Insert Table 2.3] 
2.3.4  Empirical results for H1 
To test H1 that overconfident managers are slower than less confident managers to adjust 
their subsequent forecasts, I examined the length of time that managers’ initial forecasting 
behaviors survived in their subsequent forecasts. To do so, I examined the number of forecasting 
experiences that were needed before overconfident managers changed from their first overly 
optimistic forecast to issue a more accurate forecast, or before less confident managers changed 
their initial pessimistic forecast to issue a more accurate forecast. The results were robust to  
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using the number of cumulative quarters until these managers issued their first more accurate 
forecast as an alternative measure. 
As indicated earlier, I defined a forecast as "more accurate" if the absolute value of 
forecasting error was smaller than 50% of the forecasting error for all optimistic forecasts, but 
greater than 25% of the forecasting error for all pessimistic forecasts in the same quarter. 
Therefore, if during the entire tenure with the firm, overconfident managers consistently issued 
forecasts containing errors that were greater than 50% of all optimistic forecasts issued in the 
quarter, and less confident managers consistently issued forecasts containing errors that were  
greater than 25% of all pessimistic forecasts, the time measure before these managers issued a 
more accurate forecast was missing because they never issued a “more accurate” forecast. 
 A total of 31 overconfident managers consistently issued overly optimistic subsequent 
forecasts, while 22 less confident managers consistently issued pessimistic forecasts containing 
larger errors. The remaining 316 managers (including 137 overconfident and 179 less confident 
managers) adjusted by issuing a more accurate subsequent forecast during the sample period.15
Panel A of Table 2.4 presents univariate comparisons of the cumulative number of 
forecasts and quarters that elapsed before these 316 managers issued a more accurate forecast. 
Consistent with H1, I found that overconfident managers issued an average of 2.55 forecasts 
(5.84 quarters) before their first more accurate forecasts. This compares to 2.23 forecasts (5.36 
quarters) for the less confident managers. The statistics in Panel A of Table 2.4 show that the 
difference is significant at conventional levels. 
   
[Insert Table 2.4] 
 
                                                                
15The final sample of 316 managers does not include 199 managers who stop providing subsequent forecasts after 
their first forecasts, and 53 managers who never change their subsequent forecasting behavior.  
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To control for other variables that may change managers’ forecasting behavior, I also used 
a multivariate regression model to examine, among the 316 managers who adjusted by issuing a 
more accurate subsequent forecast, whether it took overconfident managers longer time than less 
confident managers to issue their first more accurate forecasts. The regression model is specified 
in the following equation: 
         TIMEt = β0+ β1 OC_MF + Control variables + εt            (1) 
In the equation, a positive coefficient on the indicator variable, OC_MF, would be consistent 
with the hypothesis that overconfident managers are slower to adjust by issuing their first more 
accurate forecasts than less confident managers.  
Results presented in Panel B of Table 2.4 are generally consistent with H1. Panel B shows 
a positive and significant coefficient on OC_MF, after controlling for other factors that may 
affect managers’ forecasting behaviors. In addition, the coefficients on MF_FREQUENCYt , 
CH_SALESGROWTHt  and CH_HHINDEXt  are negative and significant, suggesting managers 
are slower to adjust (by issuing a more accurate forecast) when they revise their forecasts more 
frequently in the quarter (MF_FREQUENCYt), when firms experience a smaller change in sales 
growth rate (CH_SALESGROWTHt) and face less changes in industry competition intensity 
(CH_HHINDEXt).   
The preceding analyses exclude those managers who have consistently issue forecasts 
with larger errors, i.e., they never improve their forecasting accuracy over their entire tenure 
with the firm during the sample period, because the dependent variable for the time before these 
managers adjust by issuing a more accurate forecast was missing for these managers. However, 
these managers represent the ones who are the slowest to improve. In other words, this suggest 
the data for H1 hypothesis testing is right censored. I then used a survival analysis technique that 
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deals with the right censored data and include these managers in the analysis. Figure 1 compares 
the survival rate of the overly optimistic forecasting behavior of overconfident managers with 
the survival rate of the initial pessimistic forecasting behavior of less confident managers. It 
shows that the survival rate of the initial forecasting bias is significantly higher for the optimistic 
forecasting behavior by overconfident managers than the pessimistic forecasting behavior for 
less confident managers (p=0.09).  
I also used a Cox multivariate regression model to repeat the analysis. The dependent 
variable of the Cox regression model is two dimensional, reflecting both whether managers ever 
changed their initial forecasting behavior by issuing a more accurate subsequent forecast and the 
cumulative experiences or time elapsed until the change.16
2.3.5  Measurement of error feedback and market feedback 
 Untabulated results using this model 
specification indicate that the conclusions drawn from OLS regression shown in Panel B of 
Table 2.4 remain unchanged. 
To examine H2 on managers’ differential responses to feedback with varying degree of 
ambiguity of the causality link between feedback and managers’ prior decisions, I used error 
feedback and market feedback, the two prominent forms of feedback concerning managers’ prior 
forecasting decisions, to proxy less ambiguous and more ambiguous feedback, respectively. I 
estimated error feedback, which is the forecasting error of prior forecasts, as the absolute 
difference between forecasted and actual earnings for the quarter, deflated by the stock price at 
the beginning of the quarter. 
                                                                
16 In the Cox model specification, I define an overconfident manager who consistently issues overly optimistic 
subsequent forecasts as continuing his initial forecasting behavior, and code “continue” as 1; an overconfident 
manager who issues a more accurate subsequent forecast as “discontinue” his initial forecasting behavior and 
“continue” is coded as 0; a less confident manager  who consistently issues subsequent forecasts in the bottom 25% 
of pessimistic forecasts for the quarter as “continue” his initial forecasting behavior, and code “continue” as 1; a 
less confident manager who issues a more accurate subsequent forecast does not continue his initial forecasting 
behavior and code “continue” as 0. 
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Measuring market feedback is more complex because it should capture the magnitude of 
market discounting of the forecast upon its release by an overconfident manager conditional on 
other factors that simultaneously affect stock price. To get a cleaner measure of market feedback, 
I used a benchmark model to estimate the expected three-day cumulative abnormal stock return 
following a forecast release in which all managers were assumed to be homogeneously confident. 
I then estimated the expected cumulative abnormal return in the same window following a 
forecast issued by managers with varying degrees of confidence. The difference in the predicted 
market return from the two regressions is my measure of the market feedback to forecasts issued 
by overconfident and less confident managers.  
Model (1) in Panel D of Appendix 2.2 shows the benchmark expected market return 
model when all managers are assumed to be homogeneously confident. Here the predicted value 
of the market return following a managerial forecast is conditional on contemporaneous factors, 
such as forecast characteristics variables and firm characteristics variables that affect stock 
prices. Consistent with prior studies (Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Waymire, 1984; McNichols, 1989; 
Williams, 1996; Hutton and Stocken, 2009), stock returns following a forecast release are higher 
when the firm issues a forecast of good news (GOOD_NEWS i,t ), when the forecast is more 
accurate (ERROR i,t ), and when the forecasted earnings are positive (PREDICT_LOSS i,t  and 
NEWS i,t* PREDICT_LOSS i,t ). Firms operating in less competitive industries (NEWS 
i,t*HH_INDEX i,t-1 ), with higher liquidity (NEWS i,t* ALTMAN i,t-1) and smaller size 
(LOG_ASSETS i,t-1) also enjoy higher stock returns following a forecast release.  
Model (2) in Panel D of Appendix 2.2 shows the expected market return model where 
managers are heterogeneous in their confidence levels. In this model, I added in the indicator 
variables for managers’ differential confidence level, OC _MF and UC_MF, besides all the other 
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control variables included in model (1). OC_MF is an indicator variable equals 1 if a manager is 
classified as overconfident;  0 otherwise; UC_MF is an indicator variable equals 1 if a manager 
is classified as less confident but made the same magnitude of initial forecasting errors as 
overconfident managers; 0 otherwise. 
The results from Model (2) suggest that the coefficient on good news forecasts by 
overconfident managers (OC_MF * GOOD_NEWS i,t) is negatively and significantly associated 
with the firm’s 3-day stock return upon the forecast release, consistent with earlier evidence that 
the market filters out biases by overconfident managers and the more general evidence that, 
conditional on forecasting accuracy, the market punishes managers for failing to meet or beat 
their own forecasts (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; Matsumoto, 2002; etc.). The coefficient on good 
news forecasts by less confident managers (UC_MF*GOOD_NEWS i,t) is also negative and 
significant, indicating that, conditional on the news, the market punishes managers for issuing 
highly inaccurate yet pessimistic forecasts. The difference between the predicted market return 
from Model (2) and the predicted market return from the benchmark expected return Model (1) 
is the measure of the market feedback to managers, reflecting the magnitude of investors’ 
discounting the credibility of forecasts issued by overconfident or less confident managers. The 
magnitudes and the significance levels of the coefficients on the other variables are similar to 
what were reported in model (1).  
2.3.6  Empirical results for H2 
Hypothesis 2 relates to whether overconfident CEOs respond to error feedback and 
market feedback differently in their subsequent forecasts. The analysis is based on all 
subsequent forecasts managers issued after their first forecasts. This means that managers need 
to first make a decision on whether or not they would continue providing forecasts after their 
initial forecasts containing larger errors. Feng and Koch (2010) show that after receiving an 
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adverse reaction to prior forecasts, managers are more likely to stop providing forecasts in the 
future periods.   
To deal with this potential self-selection bias in examining managers’ subsequent 
forecasting behaviors, I used a two-stage Heckman procedure. In the first stage, I model 
managers’ decisions to continue or stop providing subsequent forecasts as a function of their 
confidence levels and other factors associated with managers’ voluntary forecast decisions 
(Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Feng and Koch, 2010). The first stage 
model is as follows: 
Pr(FORECAST) = β0+β1OC_MF + β2 OPTIMISTICt-1+ β3 ASSETSt-1+ 
β4N_ANALYSTt-1+ β5BM t-1+ β6BETAt-1+ β7STE_EPSt-1  
+β8LITIGATIONt-1+ εt                       (2)         
In the equation, I include the measure of CEO overconfidence (OC_MF), as Ben-David 
et al. (2007) find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to voluntarily provide earnings 
forecasts. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that mangers are more likely to disclose firm-
specific information when there is a higher demand for firm information. They suggest using the 
total number of analysts following the firm to proxy such information demand. The demand for 
firm information is higher when the firm is more heavily followed by analysts. Consistent with 
this, I include the total number of analysts following the firm (N_ANALYSTt) in the model. 
Bartov et al. (2002) and Matsumoto (2002) suggest that managers have a high incentive to issue 
forecasts in order to walk down analysts so that actual earnings realization can beat analyst 
forecasts. I include the expectation gap (EXP_GAPt), which is an indicator variable equals one if 
actual earnings are lower than analysts’ consensus forecasts prior to the actual earnings 
announcements, and 0 otherwise. Skinner (1994), Rogers and Stocken (2005) suggest that firms 
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voluntarily disclose in order to preempt the risk of litigation. Consistent with these studies, I 
include an indicator variable for high litigation industries (LITIGATIONt). It equals 1 if the 
industry of the firm is in one of the following “high litigation” industries: biotech (SIC 2833-
2836), computer (SIC 3570-3577, 7370-7374), electronics (SIC 3600-3674), and retail industry 
(SIC 5200-5961), and 0 otherwise. 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 2.5 suggest that when firms are not heavily 
followed by analysts (N_ANALYSTt-1), are under-valued by the market (BMt-1), and when the 
earnings expectation gap (EPS_GAPt-1) is low, managers are more likely to stop providing 
forecasts.  
[Insert Table 2.5 Panels A and B] 
Based on this forecast prediction model, in the second stage of the Heckman two-step 
procedure, I constructed an inverse Mills ratio to control for the self-selection problem in the 
second stage regression analysis for H2 (Heckman, 1979). I used the following equation to 
model the current forecasting error (ERRORi,t) as a function of the two forms of feedback, 
market feedback (MKT_FBi,t-1) and error feedback (ERROR_FBi,t-1) from the earlier period, and 
run the analyses for overconfident and less confident managers separately.  
ERRORi,t=β0+β1ERROR_FBi,t-1+β2 MKT_FBi,t-1+Control Variables+MILLS i,t+xi+εi,t     (3) 
  In Equation (3), the dependent variable is management forecasting errors (ERRORi,t), 
defined as the absolute difference between the forecasted earnings and actual earnings, deflated 
by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. The greater the value of the forecasting error, 
the less accurate the forecast is.17
                                                                
17 Because this model specification requires that managers issue at least two forecasts, all managers who discontinue 
issuing forecasts after their initial forecasts are dropped in the analysis. 
 Detailed definitions of other control variables in the equation 
are presented in Appendix 2.1. 
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  The main independent variables are the error feedback (ERROR_FBi,t-1) and market 
feedback (MKT_FBi,t-1). With regard to market feedback, prior studies suggest that, depending 
on the direction of the feedback, its effect on an individual’s learning will vary. Annett (1969) 
and Ilgen et al. (1979) show that positive feedback reinforces individuals’ prior decisions when 
they perform the task again, while negative feedback has a corrective effect on individuals’ 
future decisions. Thus I divide the market feedback into positive (POS*MKT_FBi,t-1) and 
negative (NEG*MKT_FBi,t-1) based on the direction of the market feedback measure.18
  Hypothesis 2 predicts that overconfident managers are more likely to respond to error 
feedback than market feedback concerning their prior forecasts. Thus, I expect a positive and 
significant coefficient on the error feedback (ERROR_FBi,t-1) with the magnitude of the 
coefficient less than 1.
 The 
discussion mainly focuses on negative market feedback which has a corrective effect on 
managers’ prior forecasting behavior. 
19
 The results in column (1) of Table 2.5 Panel B generally support H2. More specifically, 
the coefficient on ERROR_FBi,t-1 is positive, significant and less than 1. This is consistent with 
the general efficacy of error feedback in correcting individuals’ prior decisions. However, the 
coefficient on negative market feedback (NEG*MKT_FBi,t-1) is insignificant after controlling for 
 With regard to the market feedback, I expect overconfident managers 
not to respond to the noisier negative market feedback, but to respond to positive market 
feedback because of their attribution bias, Therefore, I expect an insignificant coefficient on the 
negative market feedback (NEG*MKT_FBi,t-1), and a significant positive coefficient on the 
positive market feedback (POS*MKT_FBi,t-1). 
                                                                
18 I did not divide error feedback into positive or negative feedback because the variable is measured in absolute 
terms; in addition, forecasts that contained signed errors that are either positive or negative are inaccurate forecasts. 
19 A coefficient that is equal to one suggests that current forecasting error is equal to prior forecasting error. A beta 
coefficient on prior forecasting error less than one indicates that compared with prior forecasting error, current 
forecasting error is reduced by (1-beta). 
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firm characteristics variables and managers’ monetary incentives to issue biased forecasts. This 
suggests that the corrective effect of negative market feedback is moderated by managers’ 
overconfidence bias and their imbedded attrition bias in attributing noisier negative outcomes to 
environmental factors rather than their own forecasting acumen. As a result, overconfident  
managers do not respond to negative market feedback by correcting their forecasting behavior. 
The coefficient on positive market feedback (POS*MKT_FBi,t-1) is positive but insignificant. 
Column (1) of Panel B also shows that the control for self-selection (MILLSi,t) is highly 
significant, indicating a significant effect of self-selection bias on managers’ subsequent 
forecasting accuracy. Column (1) also shows that forecast errors are larger when the forecasting 
horizon (LOG_HORIZONi,t-1) is longer, and when firms are more closely followed by analysts 
(N_ANALYSTi,t-1), consistent with earlier studies that suggest managers are less accurate in their 
forecasts when the earnings forecasting task is more difficult. Moreover, forecasting errors are 
larger when the news conveyed in the forecasts (NEWS i,t) is good, when earnings are more 
volatile (STD_EPSi,t-1), when the firm is over-valued (BM i,t-1), less liquid (ALTMANi,t-1), and 
when earnings forecasts reflect more of managers’ discretionary judgments (|WACCi,t-1|). The 
two variables, which measure the effects of CEO compensation incentives  
(INCENTIVE_RATIO i,t-1), and their incentives to gain abnormal gain from insider trading 
(PUR_PCT i,t-1)  to issue biased forecasts on current forecasting accuracy are insignificant. 
 To complement the analyses, I next investigated the extent to which less confident 
managers respond to market and error feedback. The results in column (2) of Table 2.5 Panel B 
indicate that, in contrast with the results shown for overconfident managers, less confident 
managers are responsive to negative market feedback and error feedback in improving their 
subsequent forecasting accuracy, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient on both 
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error feedback (ERROR_FBi,t-1) and negative market feedback (NEG*MKT_FBi,t-1).20
Other variables that are significantly associated with subsequent forecasting errors 
mostly hold as discussed earlier for overconfident managers, except for the number of analysts 
following (N_ANALYSTt-1), the news conveyed in the forecast (NEWS i,t) and the liquidity of the 
firm (ALTMANi,t-1).  
 In addition, 
the significance level for error feedback (as shown by the t-statistics of the coefficient) is much 
higher than for market feedback, consistent with the general notion of Bayesian learning that 
individuals are more responsive to feedback in correcting their prior behavior when feedback is 
less ambiguous (error feedback) than when it is ambiguous (market feedback). 
I also conducted the Chow tests to examine whether the slopes of coefficients on the two 
feedback variables in column (1) and (2) are different for overconfident and less confident 
mangers. The test showed that the coefficient on negative market feedback (NEG*MKT_FBi,t-1) 
for overconfident managers is -0.010, which is significantly smaller at p<0.10 level than the 
corresponding coefficient of 0.045 for less confident managers. Similarly, the coefficient on 
error feedback for overconfident managers is 0.384, which is statistically the same at p=0.607 
level as the coefficient of 0.206 for less confident managers. These results together provide 
further support for H2 that although overconfident managers respond to error feedback, their 
attribution biases and the neglect of negative market feedback inhibit their learning and the rate 
at which they improve their subsequent forecasting accuracy. 
2.4  Robustness analyses 
This section reports the results of a variety of untabulated robustness tests of the 
empirical results. First, I repeated the analyses for H2 in Table 2.5 using the intersections of 
                                                                
20 Note that negative market feedback carries a negative value. So a positive coefficient on this variable suggests 
that the more negative the feedback, the more accurate the subsequent forecast will be. 
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different CEO overconfidence measures. I defined CEOs as overconfident if, in addition to 
issuing their first overly optimistic forecasts, they also overinvested in their own firms, or were 
described by the press more in confident terms than in less confident terms. The untabulated 
results for H2 were robust using these alternative CEO overconfidence measures.   
 Second, I repeated the analyses for H1 and H2 by re-defining CEOs as overconfident if 
their first two forecasts issued for the firms were consistently overly optimistic, and classified 
managers as less confident managers if their initial forecasting errors for the first two forecasts 
were of a similar magnitude but erred towards pessimism. This resulted in a smaller number of 
total forecasts issued by these two groups of managers, but the main results remained 
quantitatively the same.21
  Third, I arbitrarily chose the third rather than the first forecast managers issued during 
their tenure and defined them as overconfident if this forecast put them in the top 50% of all 
optimistic forecasts, and less confident if this put them in the bottom 25% of all pessimistic 
forecasts. I then examined forecasting behavior after this forecast for both overconfident and 
less confident managers. The untabulated results using this alternative definition of CEO 
overconfidence suggested that overconfident managers were significantly slower than less 
confident managers to adjust their subsequent forecasting behaviors. When I substituted with the 
second or the fourth forecasts and repeated the analysis, the conclusion remained unchanged. 
 
 
                                                                
21 More specifically, the number of managers who are classified as overconfident reduced from 283 to 84 when the 
series of forecasts used to classify overconfident managers changed from the first one to the first two forecasts that 
are consistently in the top 50% of all optimistic forecasts in the quarter. This represents a 70.3% dropout rate (from 
283 to 84 managers). This dropout rate is significantly lower than the corresponding 84.9% dropout rate (from 285 
to 43) for less confident managers, when the series of the forecasts used to classify less confident managers changed 
from the first one to the first two forecasts that are consistently in the top 25% of all pessimistic forecasts issued in 
the quarter.   
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2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argue that although feedback facilitates managers’ learning in general, 
its effectiveness is conditional on individuals’ attribution biases and the extent of ambiguity of 
the causal link between feedback and individuals’ prior decisions. When managers are 
overconfident, they typically attribute positive feedback to their own input and negative 
feedback to external factors. Such attribution biases would mitigate the effectiveness of 
corrective effect of feedback in adjusting mangers’ future forecasting behavior, which reduces 
the rates at which managers improve their subsequent forecasting accuracy. Consistent with this, 
I find that overconfident managers are slower than their less confident counterparts to improve 
their future forecasting accuracy. I also find that unlike their less confident counterparts who 
would respond to both forms of feedback, overconfident managers would only respond to less 
ambiguous error feedback, but not to more ambiguous market feedback.   
Like any empirical work, this chapter has some limitations. Most notably, the use of the 
first set of forecasts issued by managers to measure CEO overconfidence is clearly an imprecise 
measure of CEOs’ confidence tendencies.  To operationalize managers’ overconfidence, I focus 
on the role of CEOs in firms’ forecasting decisions. This is not meant to imply that CEOs make 
their earnings forecasting decisions independently – not only are they constrained by 
environmental and institutional forces (Lieberson and O’Connor, 1972), but their forecasting 
decisions may also be significantly influenced by the CFOs (Jiang et al., 2010; Yang, 2009). 
However, CEOs clearly play a significant role in forecasting decisions and their levels of 
confidence thus affect the way they perceive the firm’s future performance under uncertainty. 
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Chapter 3: Supply Chain Analysts 
 
 
Chapter 2 examined the effect of managers’ behavioral biases on their forecasting 
accuracy over time. In this chapter, I examine how analysts’ economic rationality concerning 
their portfolio design choices affects the cross-sectional differences in their forecasting accuracy.  
3.1 Introduction 
Analysts’ earnings forecasts are the most common earnings forecasts in financial markets. 
Analyst forecasting accuracy is important for analysts to build their reputation and to improve 
their career prospects (Hong et al., 2003; Jackson, 2005), and it is affected by a variety of firm-
specific and analyst-specific factors. The first important factor that affects analyst forecasting 
accuracy is analysts’ decisions on the firms to cover (“coverage portfolio”) and characteristics 
of firms they include in their portfolios (e.g., Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010).22 Prior 
analyses of analysts’ portfolio coverage decisions have primarily focused on the role of industry 
specialization.23
                                                                
22 Analysts’ choice of the firms to cover and the characteristics of the firms analysts include in their portfolios are a 
combined result of choices made by analysts and their employing brokerage firms. Kini et al. (2009) suggest that 
the extent of analysts’ discretions in their research portfolio choices is likely to reflect the organizational culture of 
analyst brokerage firms, the resources available from the brokerage firms, as well as individual analysts’ decisions 
based on their own preferences, skills, and experience. Therefore, throughout this chapter, when I use the wording 
“analysts’ decisions of their coverage portfolios” and alike, I do not mean that analysts have full discretion in their 
coverage choices. Rather, these choices are jointly determined by individual analysts and analysts’ brokerage firms.  
 Kini, Mian, Rebello, and Venkateswaran (2009) and De Franco, Kothari, and 
Verdi (2009) suggest that when firms in an analyst’s portfolio are subject to common economic 
forces, such as when firms operate in the same industry, the analyst can draw inferences 
concerning one firm from the performance of the other firms in the portfolio. This process 
should improve the analyst’s information acquisition and processing efficiency and her overall 
forecasting accuracy. 
23 For example, Nelson’s Directory of Investment Research lists analysts by industry groups; the Institutional 
Investor and the Wall Street Journal provide annual rankings of analysts by industry.  
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However, an examination of analyst industry portfolio shows that fewer than 40% of all 
analyst-years in the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) from January 1991 to 
December 2008 followed only firms from a single industry at the one-digit standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code level.24
These descriptive statistics raise the following related questions. Why do certain 
brokerage firms assign their analysts to cover firms in multiple industries “when decreased 
breadth is related to improved forecast accuracy” (Ramnath, Rock, and Shane, 2008, p. 45)
 For the remaining 60% of analyst-years who cover firms in 
multiple industries, an average of 33% of the firms these analyst-years follow operate outside 
the industry that an analyst has primary expertise in the year. I define an industry as the one in 
which an analyst has primary expertise in the year if the industry has the largest representation 
among all industries the analyst follows in the same year. I term this industry as the analyst’s 
primary industry in the year.  
25
This chapter proposes a new approach to understanding analyst portfolio design decisions. 
I hypothesize that some analysts extend their coverage portfolios beyond their primary industry 
by including not only a firm, but also one or more of the firm’s major customer firms in their 
portfolios. I define the relation between a firm and one of the firm’s major customers as a 
“supply chain relation”. Further, I define an analyst who issues a forecast for both a firm and 
one or more of the firm’s major customers in the same year as a “supply chain analyst”. Note 
that I define the “supply chain analyst” at the analyst-year level. That is, a supply chain analyst 
may follow a major customer of one or more firms in her portfolio in one year, but may not 
 
and why would analysts include firms outside their primary industry in their coverage portfolios?  
                                                                
24 During this period, all analysts in the I/B/E/S database on average followed 2.27 industries at the one-digit SIC 
code level and 3.48 industries at the two-digit SIC code level.  
25 Ramnath et al. (2008) suggest brokerage firm size as one potential explanation for why analysts working in 
smaller brokerage firms are more likely to experience broader industry coverage. However, they conclude that size 
alone does not explain analyst portfolio decisions. 
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cover any major customer of any of the firms in her portfolio in the next year. My approach 
treats this analyst as a supply chain analyst in the first year but not in the second year.26
The phenomenon of analysts extending their coverage portfolios to include both a firm 
and one or more of the firm’s major customer firms in the same year in their portfolios is not 
uncommon. For example, of all the 83,414 analyst-years covered in I/B/E/S during the sample 
period from 2001-2008, 8.2% are supply chain analyst-years. During the sample period, each 
supply chain analyst covers an average of 19 firms, 15.8% of which are in supply chain 
relations. Of these supply chain relations in analyst portfolio, 22.2% (i.e., 3.6% of 15.8%) 
involve one party in the supply chain relation operating in the analyst primary industry while 
the other party operating outside the analyst primary industry. This evidence suggests that 
analysts may include firms that operate outside their primary industry to build their supply 
chain coverage portfolio. Recall earlier that for all analyst-years in I/B/E/S who cover firms in 
multiple industries, an average of 33% of firms they follow operate outside the analyst industry 
of primary expertise. 1.6% of these firms are either a focal firm or a major customer of a focal 
firm for an analyst in the same year.
 
27
                                                                
26 For example, suppose analyst A covers firms C1, C2 and C3 in year t, and C3 is a major customer of C2. In this 
case, analyst A is a supply chain analyst in year t because of the coverage of the supply chain involving firms C2 
and C3. If analyst A drops the coverage of C3 and only covers firms C1 and C2 in year t+1, this analyst is no 
longer a supply chain analyst in year t+1. 
 
27 While 1.6% looks small, I should note that this percentage can be significantly understated because of the 
limitation in identifying whether a firm is in a supply chain relation for an analyst in the same year. As I will 
discuss in more detail later in Section 3.5, the identification of whether a firm is a focal firm or a major customer 
firm (i.e., firms in supply chain relations) for an analyst relies on whether the firm reported with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) as having major customer relations or whether the firm was reported as a major 
customer of a reporting firm. However, only 9.5% of the firms in I/B/E/S reported having such relations. The 
remaining 90.5% firms in I/B/E/S that did not report having any major customer relation are assumed to be the 
firms that are not in any supply chain relation for any analyst, and are coded as zero in the percentage calculation. 
The number of firms that reported having major customer relations could be further reduced by the anonymity of 
the names of the reported major customers. Ellis, Thomas, and Fee (2010) document that a significant number of 
reporting firms did not disclose the real names of the major customers with the SEC. If I limit the population firms 
to firms that are outside analyst primary industry, but were either reported having major customer relations or were 
reported as a major customer firm (in other words, the total possible number of firms that can be identified as a firm 
in a supply chain relation and operate outside analyst primary industry, then the percentage of firms that are either a 
focal firm or a major customer firm among all firms that are outside analyst primary industry is 12%. 
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In this chapter, I first describe the process by which analysts may design their coverage 
portfolio by including a firm’s supply chain relations in their portfolios in the same year. For 
this purpose, I classify all firms followed by a supply chain analyst in a given year into one of 
the following three categories: “focal firms,” i.e., firms for which the analyst also covers one or 
more major customer firms, “major customers” of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms 
which include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. I then analyze the implications of the 
supply chain portfolio approach in terms of both the benefits and the costs with respect to 
forecast accuracy for the firms in the analyst portfolio. Finally, I examine the economic 
determinants of an analyst’s choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms. 
 In terms of the benefits in forecasting accuracy of analysts’ supply chain portfolio 
approach, I expect supply chain analysts to issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal 
firms and for the major customers of the focal firms than for all remaining “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. I also expect forecasts for the focal firms issued by the supply chain analysts 
(analysts who also cover the firms’ major customers) to be more accurate than forecasts for the 
same focal firms issued by other non-supply chain analysts who do not cover any of the focal 
firms’ major customers. Likewise, I expect the supply chain analysts to issue more accurate 
earnings forecasts for the major customers of the focal firms than non-supply chain analysts 
following the same major customer firms, i.e., other analysts following the same major 
customers but none of the major customers’ suppliers (focal firms).  
I expect this hypothesized superior forecasting accuracy for the focal firms of supply 
chain analysts to stem from the insights that these analysts gain concerning future revenue 
realizations of focal firms by also preparing forecasts for the focal firms’ major customers. Prior 
literature suggests that analysts typically begin their earnings forecasting process by forecasting 
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revenue (Lundholm and Sloan, 2007). The revenue realization of a focal firm, in turn, will 
typically be significantly influenced by the volume of its business with its major customers. 
These major customers’ operations, competitive positions, and organizational health will affect 
their suppliers’ earnings performance. For example, when a major customer of a focal firm 
experiences financial distress, this major customer firm often takes actions, such as delaying or 
stopping payment or cancelling orders, which can have direct negative consequences for the 
earnings performance of the major customer’s supplier (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 
2008). Therefore, when an analyst includes both a focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s 
major customers in her portfolio, the analyst is likely to have better information concerning the 
possible impact of the major customers on the focal firm’s future sales. Such insights will help 
the analyst generate more accurate aggregated revenue and earnings forecasts for the focal firm 
than the same analyst generates for “other” firms for which the analyst does not enjoy such 
insights from the firm’s supply chain.  
At the same time, the nature of the supply chain relation also suggests that the information 
the analyst acquires concerning the focal firm will also provide the analyst with additional 
insights for preparing forecasts for the focal firm’s major customers. This is because purchases 
from the suppliers can be important expenses that influence the major customers’ earnings 
profitability (Banker and Chen, 2006). Therefore, I expect that analysts whose portfolios 
include both a major customer firm and one or more of the major customer’s suppliers will gain 
insights with regard to the likelihood of favorable or unfavorable events concerning the 
suppliers that may have implication on the operational performance of the suppliers’ major 
customers, such as new technology that improves the suppliers’ operational efficiency, strikes, 
or raw material shortages that disrupt the suppliers’ operations. As a result, I expect these 
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analysts will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the major customers than the same 
analysts will issue for “other” firms for which the analysts do not cover any of the firms’ 
suppliers in the analyst portfolio. 
I use a comprehensive dataset by merging two sources of data from 1991 to 2008 to test 
these hypotheses. These two sources include the Compustat customer segment file, which 
includes all the firms that reported with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
having major customer relations, and the I/B/E/S detailed analyst earnings forecast file. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that when an analyst includes both a focal firm and one 
or more of the focal firm’s major customers in the analyst portfolio, the analyst issues 
significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm than (1) the same analyst issues 
for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio (within-analyst), and (2) other analysts issue who only 
follow the same focal firm but none of the focal firm’s major customers (cross-analyst). At the 
same time, I also find that this supply chain analyst issues more accurate earnings forecasts for 
the major customer of the focal firm than (1) the same analyst issues for  “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio (within-analyst), and (2) other analysts who only follow the same major 
customer but none of the major customer’s suppliers (cross-analyst). These differences in 
forecasting accuracy are both economically and statistically significant. For example, as shown 
later in Panel D of Table 3.4, forecasts for the focal firms by a given supply chain analyst are on 
average around 3.0% more accurate than forecasts issued for “other” firms by the same analyst. 
This improvement in forecasting accuracy is approximately four times greater than the 
improved forecasting accuracy associated with an analyst issuing forecasts for firms for which 
the analyst has industry expertise versus for other firms the analyst does not have such expertise.   
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At the same time, I also argue that supply chain analysts’ superior forecasting accuracy for 
the focal firms and the firms’ major customers, as described above, is generally achieved at the 
cost of reduced forecasting accuracy for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. Assuming that a 
fixed amount of resources are available for each individual analyst, by spending more time 
gathering information for the firms in supply chain relations, the analyst reduces the amount of 
time she can commit to “other” firms in her portfolio.28 As a result, her forecasting accuracy for 
“other” firms in the portfolio is likely to be negatively affected. 29
I then examine the overall average forecasting accuracy for all firms in a supply chain 
analyst portfolio. I find that supply chain analysts on average are significantly less accurate at 
 Again, I find empirical 
support for this hypothesis in both within-analyst and cross-analyst analyses. First, earlier I 
documented that for a given supply chain analyst, forecasts for the focal firms and for the focal 
firms’ major customers were more accurate than the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. These findings imply that for a given supply chain analyst, her forecasts for 
“other” firms in her portfolio are significantly less accurate than her forecasts for either the 
focal firms or the focal firms’ major customers (i.e., within-analyst comparison). Second, I find 
that the supply chain analyst is significantly less accurate in her forecasts for “other” firms in 
her portfolio than other non-supply chain analysts who follow these same “other” firms (i.e., 
cross-analyst comparison).  
                                                                
28As I cannot observe the amount of time analysts spend on researching the firms in supply chain relations, I 
assume the amount of time analysts spend on each individual firm is positively associated with analyst forecasting 
accuracy. This assumption seems reasonable, and is consistent with earlier evidence in the literature that analyst 
forecasting accuracy for a firm is positively associated with the level of effort the analyst expends on the firm 
(Jacob et al., 1999). 
29 One limitation in examining the effect of analysts’ supply chain portfolio approach on analyst forecasting 
accuracy in this chapter is that I did not disentangle the effect of analysts’ skills on their forecasting accuracy. It is 
possible supply chain analysts are less accurate for “other” firms in their portfolios because they are less skilled 
than other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firm. If, instead, supply chain analysts are more 
skilled than other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firms, I would expect that supply chain 
analysts are more accurate for “other” firms in their portfolios than other non-supply chain analysts following the 
same “other” firms. That alternative explanation will work against my findings. 
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the portfolio level than other non-supply chain analysts whose portfolios include no supply 
chain relation. Further analyses indicate that on average, supply chain analysts follow 39% 
more firms and 13% more industries than non-supply chain analysts. In addition, 51% of the 
focal firms and the firms’ major customers followed by supply chain analysts are from the same 
industry. This evidence suggests that it is likely that covering a firm’s supply chain relations is 
costly for an analyst because of the additional time the analyst must devote to covering more 
firms that operate outside the analyst’s industry expertise, which results in a more diversified 
coverage portfolio. When the amount of resources supply chain analysts can allocate to each 
firm in their portfolios is significantly less than that for non-supply chain analysts, it is not 
surprising that the level of overall forecasting accuracy at analyst portfolio level for supply 
chain analysts is lower than the level of overall forecasting accuracy for non-supply chain 
analysts.  
 In sum, evidence presented in this chapter indicates that supply chain analysts allocate 
greater resources and more effort to the focal firms and the firms’ major customers than to 
“other” firms in analyst portfolio. As a result, supply chain analysts achieve superior forecasting 
accuracy for these firms. I then examine the economic rationale for the relative importance of 
the focal firms and major customer firms in these analysts’ portfolios.  
Prior studies suggest that analysts achieve multiple objectives in their earnings forecasts. 
On the one hand, analysts seek to issue more accurate earnings forecasts to build their 
reputation and to improve their career prospects in financial markets (Hong et al., 2003; 
Jackson, 2005). On the other hand, analysts also need to generate revenue for their brokerage 
firms either by generating trading commissions or bringing in investment banking businesses 
from the stock of the firms they cover. These objectives may be complementary or conflicting 
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with each other. For example, Hayes (1998) models how analyst incentive to generate trading 
commissions affects analyst decisions in gathering information on a firm. She predicts that 
analysts choose to expend more effort in gathering information for a firm when the expected 
trading commissions generated from the firm are high. As analysts produce more precise 
information about the firm, their earnings forecasts for the firm are more accurate.30
My empirical evidence is consistent with the preceding expectation. In particular, I find 
that an analyst is more likely to choose a firm as a focal firm or a major customer, when the 
potential trading commission generated from the firm is higher than “other” firms in the analyst 
portfolio. In other words, analysts selectively choose the firms in supply chain relations to 
maximize the economic benefits from the efforts they expend on information acquisition for 
these firms. 
 Conversely, 
analysts may sacrifice their forecasting accuracy by strategically issuing optimistically biased 
forecasts to build their relations with firm management in order to gain future underwriting 
business from the firm (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Hong and Kubik, 2003). Therefore, it is 
possible that analysts’ choice of a focal firm and the major customer firm in the portfolio will 
depend on the level of potential revenue these firms can generate for the analysts’ brokerage 
firms. 
By analyzing the determinants and consequences (in the form of benefits and costs) of 
analysts’ supply chain coverage portfolio design, this chapter has important implications for the 
literature on financial analysts. First, this chapter contributes to the literature on analyst 
portfolio design. I propose and test a new approach in which some analysts consider not only 
                                                                
30 Bradshaw (2004), Loh and Mian (2006), and Fang and Yasuda (2009) document that when analysts are more 
accurate in their earnings forecasts for a firm, they are also more likely to use their own forecasts to issue more 
profitable stock recommendations for the firm. It is possible that investors are more likely to trade on an analyst’s 
stock recommendations when the analyst’s stock recommendations are more profitable. As a result, the trading 
commissions the analyst can generate for her brokerage firm would be higher. 
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industry membership, but also a firm’s supply chain relations in designing analyst coverage 
portfolios. I show that by including both a focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s major 
customers in the analyst portfolio, an analyst can improve her earnings forecast accuracy for 
both the focal firm and the firm’s major customers.  
Second, this study provides comprehensive analyses on how analyst portfolio organization 
affects forecasting accuracy for all firms in an analyst’s portfolio. While prior studies provide 
extensive empirical evidence on how firm characteristics and analyst individual characteristics 
may affect analyst earnings forecasting accuracy for individual firms, little research has 
investigated how analyst forecasting accuracy for one firm in an analyst’s portfolio may be 
related to the forecasting accuracy for the other firms in the same analyst portfolio. In addition, 
few studies have examined analyst forecasting accuracy for all firms at the analyst portfolio 
level. I show that analyst forecasting accuracy for the firms in the same portfolio varies 
according to whether or not these firms are in supply chain relations, confirming the importance 
of studying analyst portfolio design.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I first review related 
literature on economic determinants on analyst forecasting accuracy at the firm level. I then 
review related papers on analysts’ economic objectives and the effect of these objectives on 
analyst portfolio choice and their forecasting accuracy. Section 3.3 develops my hypotheses. I 
then describe the methodology and model specifications for hypotheses testing in section 3.4. 
Section 3.5 presents sample construction and descriptions. I report the empirical results in 
section 3.6 and 3.7. Section 3.8 presents result on robustness tests. Section 3.9 concludes the 
chapter.  
49 
 
3.2 Related literature 
In this section, I review two streams of literature related to this chapter. The first stream 
addresses economic determinants of analyst earnings forecasting accuracy. These economic 
determinants are mostly examined at the firm level in the literature. The second stream is 
related to analysts’ economic objectives in their earnings forecasts and the effect of these 
objectives on analyst coverage portfolio choices and their forecasting accuracy.  
3.2.1  Economic determinants of analyst forecasting accuracy 
Accounting literature provides extensive evidence on the economic determinants that 
affect the quality of information analysts acquire about a firm as input for the forecasting task 
and analyst forecasting accuracy. Prior studies mostly focus on the effect of these economic 
determinants on analyst forecasting accuracy for individual firms. These determinants can be 
broadly classified into three categories, which include characteristics of a forecast itself, 
characteristics of a firm’s information environment or the firm a forecast is issued for, and 
characteristics of individuals who issue the forecasts. 
First, characteristics of the forecast itself affect the precision of the information analysts 
acquire about the firm for the forecasting task and analyst forecasting accuracy. One example of 
characteristics of a forecast is forecasting horizon. Prior studies suggest that forecasts with 
longer horizons are less accurate than those with shorter horizons because of higher uncertainty 
associated with earnings realization processes (e.g., Clement and Tse, 2003).  
Second, characteristics of the information environment about a firm affect analyst 
forecasting accuracy. For example, Barniv et al. (2005) examines how a firm’s legal and 
financial reporting environment affects analyst forecasting accuracy. They argue that firms 
operating in a common-law country have stronger investor protection laws and higher-quality 
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financial reporting systems in place than firms operating in a civil-law country. As the market-
based incentives for analysts to produce more informative earnings forecasts for a firm is 
stronger in a common-law country than those in a civil-law country, analysts in the former 
country are more accurate than those in the latter country.  
Characteristics of the firm a forecast is issued for also affect the quality of information 
analysts acquire about the firm and analyst forecasting accuracy. When more analysts follow a 
firm, more pre-disclosure information will be available about the firm, and analysts are more 
accurate in their earnings forecasts for the firm (Waymire, 1985). Using data from the Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF) reports to proxy for the informativeness of a firm’s disclosure, 
Lang and Lundholm (1996) document that when firms provide more informative disclosures, 
analyst forecasts tend to be more accurate.  
Analyst forecasting accuracy is also affected by the uncertainty and the complexity of the 
operation of the firm for which a forecast is issued (e.g., Duru and Reeb, 2002; Clement, 1999; 
Jacob et al., 1999). When information about a firm is more uncertain, analysts tend to be more 
dispersed in their forecasts, and their forecasts are less accurate (Barron et al., 2002). Duru and 
Reeb (2002) investigate analyst forecasting accuracy for firms with international diversification. 
They suggest that international diversification increases a firm’s earnings volatility and the 
complexity of analyst forecasting tasks. As a result, analysts are less accurate in their forecasts 
for these firms. 
Third, characteristics of individual forecasters also affect forecasting accuracy. For 
example, analysts who are more skilled, have more experience, expend more effort gathering 
information about the firm, and have more resources from their brokerage firms are more 
accurate (for example, Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). Clement (1999) examines the joint 
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impact of an analyst’s experience, the complexity of the forecasting task, and available analyst 
resources on analyst forecasting accuracy. He argues that analyst forecasting accuracy is 
affected by the level of effort an analyst devotes to gathering and processing information for the 
firm. The more effort the analyst expends on the forecasting task for a firm, the more accurate 
her earnings forecasts are for the firm. Clement uses the total number of firms and industries 
followed by an analyst to measure the complexity of an analyst’s forecasting task. He argues 
that as the total number of firms and industries an analyst follows increases, the effort the 
analyst can expend on each firm or industry is less, holding the total level of effort constant. As 
a result, the analyst becomes less accurate in her forecasts. Clement also argues that larger 
brokerage firms provide more opportunities for analyst training, have more advanced 
distribution networks for disseminating analyst research reports, have more resources available 
to their analysts, and are able to hire more capable analysts; therefore, analysts in larger 
brokerage firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than those in smaller brokerage firms. 
The empirical evidence in Clement (1999) supports these arguments. In particular, Clement 
(1999) finds that analyst forecasting accuracy is positively associated with analyst forecasting 
experience and the size of the analyst’s employing brokerage firm. Conversely, analyst 
forecasting accuracy is negatively associated with the total number of firms and industries the 
analyst follows.  
Analyst forecasting accuracy is also affected by analysts’ individual behavioral biases. 
Hilary and Menzly (2006) argue that analysts are subject to attribution biases. They document 
that attribution biases lead analysts who have experienced a short-lived success to become 
overconfident in their ability to forecast future earnings. They find that analysts who have  
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predicted earnings more accurately than the median analysts in the previous periods are less 
accurate in their subsequent forecasts. 
Despite all the documented economic or behavioral factors that affect analyst forecasting 
accuracy, the first and fundamental factor that affects analyst forecasting accuracy is analysts’ 
choice of the firms they follow and their decisions on the amount of effort they allocate to each 
firm in their portfolios. These decisions are significantly affected by analysts’ economic 
objectives in their earnings forecasts. 
3.2.2  Analysts’ objectives in their earnings forecasts and their portfolio coverage 
Analysts face different and often competing objectives in their earnings forecasts. On the 
one hand, analysts have incentives to issue accurate earnings forecasts, because more accurate 
analysts are considered more highly skilled, and they are more likely to build up their reputation 
in financial markets and to be hired by larger and higher-status brokerage firms than less 
accurate analysts (Jackson, 2005; Hong and Kubik, 2003). On the other hand, analysts also have 
incentive to bring revenue to their brokerage firms in the form of underwriting business and/or 
trading commissions generated from the stocks of the firms they follow (Hayes, 1998; Lin and 
McNichols, 1998). Prior studies suggest that analysts’ compensation is also positively 
associated with the amount of revenue they generate for their brokerage firms (Groysberg et al., 
2008). 
 These two objectives (i.e., to issue accurate earnings forecasts and to bring revenue to 
their brokerage firms) are both likely to affect how analysts organize their coverage portfolio, 
their choice of the firms to follow, and their overall forecasting accuracy. Prior studies suggest 
that analysts’ research coverage is a combined result of choices made by individual analysts and 
their employing brokerages to fulfill analysts’ personal objectives and the objectives of their 
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organizations; overall, however, analysts’ coverage portfolios are geared toward the overall 
improvement of information acquisition and processing efficiency and forecasting accuracy 
(Kini et al., 2009).  
At the same time, these studies also suggest that because analysts are constrained in their 
resources, the more firms (industries) an analyst follows, the less time the analyst can spend on 
each individual firm (industry), consequently, the less accurate analysts are in their earnings 
forecasts (Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). Therefore, it is important that analysts organize 
the firms in their portfolios to gain synergies in information acquisition and processing. Such 
synergy is generally known as industry effects. Prior studies suggest that when the set of firms 
in an analyst’s portfolio are subject to common industry forces, the analyst can develop an in-
depth understanding of the industry, and enjoy economies of scale in making inferences 
concerning one firm in their portfolios based on the performance information of the other firms 
in the same portfolio, and improve their overall forecasting accuracy (Kini et al., 2009; De 
Franco et al., 2009). Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) provide empirical evidence 
showing that analysts who have industry expertise are significantly more accurate in their 
earnings forecasts than those who do not. 
 Analysts may organize their portfolios using other alternative portfolio designs to 
improve their overall forecasting accuracy. For example, Sonney (2007) suggests that some 
analysts follow firms whose headquarters are geographically close to the analysts. Using 
international forecasts for 15 major European markets, Sonney (2007)  compares forecasting 
accuracy between analysts who follow firms about which they have more local knowledge 
(country specialist) versus those who follow firms from a global industry sector (sector 
specialist). He argues that country specialists are able to produce more accurate earnings 
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forecasts for firms in their portfolios than their sector-specialist peers, because country 
specialists have advantages in their local knowledge about the firms they follow.31
Analysts’ incentives to generate trading commissions from the stock of a firm may also 
help analysts produce more accurate earnings forecasts (e.g., Hayes, 1998; Barth et al., 2001). 
For example, Hayes (1998) suggests that when an analyst is interested in maximizing the 
trading volume generated from her earnings forecasts, the analyst will look for more precise 
information about the firm that induces trading. This is because investors always prefer more 
precise information about the firm, and they are more likely to trade on the more precise 
information analysts produce. As investors increase the volume of their trading based on the 
information produced by the analysts, the amount of trading commissions generated from this 
information will increase. As the information analysts produce is more precise, analyst earnings 
forecasts are more accurate. Barth et al. (2001) focus on analyst coverage of firms with 
substantial intangible assets, most of which are not recognized in the firms’ financial statements. 
They argue that analysts have stronger incentives to expend effort following these firms 
because these analysts are able to generate more informative forecasts for these firms, and their 
forecasts are more likely to generate profitable trading opportunities. As analysts improve the 
quality of the information they produce about the firm, their earnings forecasts are more 
accurate (Clement, 1999). 
   
Other studies suggest that analysts’ objective to be accurate in their earnings forecasts and 
their objective to bring revenue to their brokerage firms are in conflict with each other. These 
                                                                
31 Despite the superior forecasting performance of country specialists, Sonney (2007) notes that a general tendency 
over the last decade has been for European brokerage firms to switch from country-based to more sector-oriented 
structures. He suggests that the reorganization of financial analysis departments towards more sector-oriented 
structures may have been driven by other objectives than the desire to boost the accuracy of earnings forecasts. He 
also suggests other alternative explanations for the trend. For example, when brokerage firms organize analyst 
research by industry, it is easier for them to market analyst research to portfolio managers, who seem to care more 
about industry considerations than international diversification. 
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studies suggest that analysts may sacrifice their objective to issue accurate earnings forecasts to 
their objective to generate revenue for their brokerage firms (Lin and McNichols, 1998; Feng 
and McVay, 2009). For example, analysts may strategically issue optimistically biased forecasts 
so that they can build their relations with firm management to gain future investment banking 
business (Lin and McNichols, 1998).32
In sum, while analysts have incentives to be accurate in their earnings forecasts, their 
organizational objectives may not be wholly geared toward promoting forecasting accuracy. 
Therefore, ultimately analyst portfolio coverage decisions and the decisions on the level of 
effort allocated to each individual firm are driven by analysts’ trading-off different objectives in 
their earnings forecasts.  
   
3.3 Hypotheses development 
In this section, I develop hypotheses concerning the benefits and the costs in terms of 
forecasting accuracy for all firms in the portfolio for analysts taking a supply chain portfolio 
approach by covering both a firm and one or more of the firm’s major customers in the same 
year. For this purpose, I classify all firms followed by a supply chain analyst in a given year 
into one of the following three categories: “focal firms,” i.e., firms for which the analyst also 
covers one or more of the firm’s major customer firms, “major customers” of a focal firm for 
the analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. In 
terms of benefits in analyst forecasting accuracy, I hypothesize that an analyst who follows both 
a focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s major customers issue more accurate earnings 
                                                                
32 Nevertheless, there is some evidence that analysts who are affiliated with brokerage firms that have been 
underwriters of the firms (affiliated analysts) are more accurate in their earnings forecasts than non-affiliated 
analysts. This is because the analyst’s association with investment banking activities helps the analyst generate 
more precise information about the firm. For instance, Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau (2007) find that analysts 
from larger investment banks tend to be more accurate and less biased in their earnings forecasts. Using forecasts 
from the period 1998–2001, Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008) find that investment bank analysts are on average 
more accurate than independent analysts. 
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forecasts for the focal firm than (1) the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst 
portfolios and (2) other non-supply chain analysts issue who follow the same focal firm but 
none of the focal firm’s major customers. Further, I also hypothesize that a supply chain analyst 
issues more accurate earnings forecasts for the major customers of the focal firm than (1) the 
same analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio and (2) other non-supply chain 
analysts issue who follow the same major customers but none of the customers’ suppliers. In 
terms of costs in forecasting accuracy, I expect a supply chain analyst to issue less accurate 
earnings forecasts for “other” firms than other non-supply chain analysts following the same 
“other” firms. I then examine the underlying economic factors that affect analysts’ choices of 
the focal firms and the major customer firms.   
3.3.1  Benefits of supply chain coverage in forecasting accuracy 
Analyst earnings forecasts start with an overall sales growth forecast at the industry level, 
followed by firm-specific adjustments (Lundholm and Sloan, 2007). This forecasting sequence 
suggests that accurate revenue forecasts at the industry and the firm level are important in 
affecting analyst earnings forecasting accuracy.   
The importance of major customers in a focal firm’s revenue and earnings realization has 
been widely suggested in prior studies (e.g., Baiman and Rajan, 2002a, 2002b; Kulp et al., 2004; 
Hertzel et al., 2008). When a major customer of a focal firm expects greater growth, the major 
customer’s future demand for products and services from the focal firm is also likely to be 
greater. By contrast, when the major customer experiences financial distress, the potential 
disruption of the major customer’s operations will negatively affect the future sales and profits 
of the major customer’s focal firm (Hertzel et al., 2008). 
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Major customers also significantly affect their suppliers’ operational strategy and financial 
performance. For example, when a major customer demands more frequent delivery of products 
and services from its focal firm, the focal firm will incur additional costs in serving this major 
customer, which may reduce the focal firm’s profitability (Kaplan and Narayanan, 2001). 
Balakrishnan et al. (1996) suggest that when a major customer implements just-in-time 
inventory management, the focal firm may also need to implement just-in-time production in 
order to meet the customer’s needs. Major customers may also leverage their significant 
bargaining power to demand a lower price and to restrict the focal firm’s total output, in order 
to enhance their own financial performance at the expense of the focal firm (Cooper and 
Slagmulder, 1999; Matsumura and Schloetzer, 2009).33
Therefore, I expect that when an analyst includes both a focal firm and one or more of the 
focal firm’s major customers in the analyst portfolio, the analyst can better gauge the impact of 
the major customers on the focal firm’s future revenue growth, and produce more accurate 
earnings forecasts for the focal firm. For instance, an analyst who issues forecasts for an apparel 
manufacturer may be in a better position to assess the level of the manufacturer’s sales if she 
 Therefore, when an analyst issues 
forecasts for both a focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s major customers, the analyst 
is able to make better judgments on how well the production process of the focal firm is aligned 
with that of the major customers, and how much the focal firm can benefit from the improved 
operational efficiency of the focal firm’s major customers. In addition, the analyst can also 
judge the extent to which the major customers may exercise their bargaining power at the 
expense of the other parties in the supply chain, including, in particular, the suppliers. 
                                                                
33 The presence of a major customer may also benefit a focal firm via cost reduction. For example, focal firms may 
leverage the demand information from major customers and improve their operating efficiency through more 
effective inventory and production management (Kulp et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2000; Baiman and Rajan, 2002a, 
2002b). 
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also issues forecasts for the retail stores that are the major customers of the manufacturer. 
Similarly, an analyst may be able to produce more accurate demand forecasts for a firm in the 
coal mining industry if she also issues forecasts for the firm’s major customers in the utility 
industry. I expect that such a superior forecasting accuracy will be reflected in both within-
analyst and cross-analyst comparisons. With regard to the within-analyst comparison, I expect 
that, for a given supply chain analyst, her forecasts for the focal firms will be more accurate 
than her forecasts for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1a (within-analyst comparison): A given analyst who follows both a focal firm and one 
or more of the focal firm’s major customers will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the 
focal firm than she will for “other” firms in the same analyst portfolio. 
 
I also expect cross-analyst variations of forecasting accuracy for a given focal firm. Such 
a cross-analyst analysis complements the within-analyst comparison of forecasting accuracy for 
a given supply chain analyst. In particular, while the within-analyst comparison controls for 
unobservable individual analyst characteristics that may affect analyst forecasting accuracy, the 
cross-analyst comparison controls for unobservable individual firm characteristics that may 
affect analyst forecasting accuracy.  
H1b (cross-analyst comparison): Analysts who follow both a focal firm and one or more 
of the focal firm’s  major customers will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal 
firm than will other analysts who only follow the same  focal firm but none of the focal firm’s 
major customers. 
 
H1a and H1b assume that forecasting accuracy for revenue is a key component in 
determining analyst earnings forecasting accuracy. My H2 hypothesizes that supply chain 
analysts also issue more accurate forecasts for the focal firms’ major customers because these 
analysts have better information on the costs to be incurred by the major customers that are 
related to input from the major customers’ suppliers. 
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Expenses are a critical component of a firm’s earning realization. Analyst forecasting 
accuracy for the expenses to be incurred for the firm would significantly affect the analyst’s 
overall earnings forecasting accuracy for the firm (Lundholm and Sloan, 2007; Banker and 
Chen, 2006). In a supply chain relation, the focal firm is the supplier of the major customer firm. 
This focal firm may play an important role in determining the earnings performance of the 
firm’s major customers. For example, a major customer firm with an established relationship 
with its suppliers would benefit from a dependable source of supplies, as well as the assurance 
of the availability and the quality of the supplies (Fee and Thomas, 2004). Therefore, this major 
customer may take advantage of its relationship with the suppliers by improving the 
effectiveness of its inventory management and operational efficiency, thereby reducing its 
inventory costs and improving its overall earnings performance (Gavirneni et al., 1999; Lee et 
al., 2000). By contrast, when a major customer firm has poor relations with its suppliers, the 
suppliers can impose costs on the major customer firm by failing to supply trade credit, backing 
away from entering into long-term contracts, or delaying shipments. Similarly, when the 
suppliers experience a raw material shortage or raw material price increase, such adverse events 
would affect the major customer firm’s production efficiency, inventory management, final 
product delivery, which would ultimately affect the major customer’s overall costs and earnings 
realizations. Therefore, analysts who issue forecasts for both a major customer firm and one or 
more of the major customer’s suppliers are more likely to have better insights concerning the 
potential impact of suppliers on the major customers’ future costs, and will issue more accurate 
earnings forecasts for the major customers than they will issue for “other” firms in the portfolio 
for which the analysts do not have such supply chain insights. Similar to H1, I expect that the 
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superior forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms is reflected in both within-analyst 
and cross-analyst comparisons. The two resulting parallel hypotheses are as follows: 
H2a (within-analyst comparison): A given analyst who follows both a focal firm and one 
or more of the focal firm’s major customers will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the 
major customer(s) than she will for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. 
 
H2b (cross-analyst comparison): Analysts who follow both a focal firm and one or more 
of the firm’s  major customers will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the major 
customer(s) than will other analysts who only follow the same major customer(s) but not the 
major customer’s focal firm. 
 
3.3.2  Cost of supply chain coverage in forecasting accuracy 
Hypotheses H1 and H2 suggest that an analysts issues more accurate earnings forecasts 
for both the focal firm and the focal firm’s major customer by following both parties in the 
supply chain than (a) the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio, and (b) 
other non-supply chain analysts following the same firm issue. I expect that this analyst will 
also incur costs for taking such a portfolio approach. Prior research suggests that analyst 
forecasting accuracy is a function of the level of effort analysts devote to the forecasting task 
(e.g., Clement, 1999; Barth et al., 2001). This means that to achieve the superior forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firm and the firm’s major customer(s), supply chain analysts must have 
spent significant time and resources on information acquisition for these firms. The inclusion of  
a firm’s supply chain may result in additional firms in the analyst portfolio. Assuming a fixed 
level of total effort analysts expend on forecasting tasks, this means that the average amount of 
effort the analysts can expend on collecting and analyzing information for “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio will be accordingly reduced.34
                                                                
34 One limitation of this assumption is that it does not discriminate differences in analyst forecasting abilities and 
the effect of analyst ability on analyst forecasting accuracy. An alternative assumption  to hold the total level of 
effort and the total number of firms analysts follow constant by taking a supply chain portfolio will lead to the 
same hypothesis. In particular, when an analyst replaces a non-supply chain firm in her portfolio with a supply 
chain firm in a year and spend a lot more time and resources on the firms in the supply chain, the amount of time 
and resources this analyst can spend on other non-supply chain firms in the portfolio will be less on average less, 
 As the amount of time and effort an analyst 
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spends on a firm reduces, her forecasts for the firm would be less accurate (Jacob et al., 1999). 
Therefore, I expect that the superior forecasting accuracy for the focal firm and the firm’s major 
customers for supply chain analysts is achieved at the expense of reduced forecasting accuracy 
for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. Again, this hypothesis has two implications. First, I 
expect that for a given supply chain analyst, her forecasts for “other” firms in the portfolio will 
be less accurate than her forecasts for the focal firm or the focal firm’s major customer (i.e., 
within-analyst comparison). These are examined in hypotheses H1a and H2a, where I expect 
that a supply chain analyst issues more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm or for the 
focal firm’s major customer than the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the analyst 
portfolio. Second, I also expect cross-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy for a given 
“other” firm, stated as follows: 
H3:  (cross-analyst comparison): Analysts who follow both a focal firm and one or more 
of the focal firm’s major customers will issue less accurate earnings forecasts for “other” 
firm(s) in the analyst portfolio than will other non-supply chain analysts who only follow the 
same “other” firm(s). 
 
3.3.3  Determinants of analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms 
To the extent that supply chain analysts achieve superior forecasting accuracy for both a 
focal firm and the focal firm’s major customer firms at the expense of reduced forecasting 
accuracy for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio, the focal firm and the firm’s major customers 
must be relatively more important than “other” firms in the same portfolio. My next hypothesis 
examines how analysts select a firm as the focal firm or the major customer in the portfolio.35
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
holding the total number of firms and the amount of available resources the same. As a result, her forecasts for 
“other” firms in the portfolio will be less accurate. The implication of this assumption on the overall forecasting 
accuracy at the analyst portfolio level is unclear. 
  
35 An analyst may cover a focal firm first and then choose to follow the focal firm’s major customer to establish a 
supply chain portfolio. Alternatively, the analyst may follow the major customer firm first and then extend to 
include the firm’s supplier (i.e., the focal firm), or initiate the coverage of both the focal firm and the firm’s major 
customer firm at the same time. This chapter does not differentiate the analyst’s decision sequence of the firms in 
the supply chain relation.   
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Prior research suggests that analysts’ incentive to acquire information on a firm is 
significantly affected by their economic objectives in their earnings forecasts (e.g., O’Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990; Hayes, 1998; Mikhail et al., 1999; Jackson, 2005). For example, Hayes (1998) 
suggests that the precision of the information analysts produce about a firm and their earnings 
forecasting accuracy is significantly affected by analysts’ economic objectives in their earnings 
forecasts. Hayes suggests that when analysts have higher incentives to generate trading 
commissions for their brokerage firms from the stock of the firm the analysts follow, these 
analysts will allocate more effort to acquire more precise information about the firm. This is 
because investors will make their trading decisions based on the precision of the information 
analysts produce. As analysts improve the precision of the information they produce about a 
firm, analyst earnings forecasts for the firm are more accurate.36
 Following Hayes (1998), I expect that when a firm has higher potential to generate 
revenue for the analysts’ brokerage firms in the form of trading commissions, analysts are more 
likely to spend more effort acquiring information on the firm and produce more precise 
information about the firm by choosing the firm as a focal firm or as a major customer firm, and 
cover the other parties in the firm’s supply chain. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
  
H4:  (within-analyst comparison): A given analyst is more likely to choose a firm as a 
focal firm or as a major customer firm and follow one or more of the other parties in the firm’s 
supply chain, when the firm has greater potential to bring in more trading commissions to the 
analyst’s brokerage firm.  
 
3.4  Estimation equations and variable definitions 
In this section, I first discuss the model used for testing H1-H3. These three hypotheses 
examine the effect of analysts’ supply chain portfolio coverage on analyst forecasting accuracy.  
                                                                
36 By contrast, Lin and McNichols (1998) suggest that when analysts have higher incentives to establish an 
investment banking relation with a firm, analysts are less accurate in their earnings forecasts because these analysts 
may intentionally issue more favorable earnings forecasts for the firm to curry favor with firm management and 
build “management relation”. 
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I then discuss the model for testing H4, which estimates the economic determinants of analysts’ 
choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms.  
3.4.1   Model specifications for testing H1-H3 concerning analyst forecasting accuracy 
H1a tests the within-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy for a given supply chain 
analyst between the focal firms and “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. I used the regression 
model shown below to test this hypothesis. The data used for the model include all annual and 
quarterly forecasts issued by supply chain analysts for the focal firms and “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio over the sample period from 1991 to 2008.37
To address this concern, I used the two-step approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973), a 
method that is widely used in empirical analyses of financial panel datasets, to control for the 
effect of individual analyst characteristics on analyst forecasting accuracy. In the first step of 
the method, I ran a cross-sectional regression for each analyst-year to obtain estimates of the 
coefficients on the independent variables. In the second step, I used the series of the coefficient 
estimates to calculate the mean estimates for the independent variables and standard errors of 
these estimates. To deal with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation among the coefficient 
estimates, I used the adjusted Newey-West (1987) standard errors of the estimates to calculate 
the t-statistics for the significance level of the independent variables.  The regression model is 
specified as follows: 
 The panel dataset includes 
earnings forecasts issued for different firms by the same analysts, which implies that 
correlations related to individual analyst characteristics are present in the data. Overlooking 
such correlations could result in underestimation of the standard errors, which, in turn, could 
cause spurious inflation of the corresponding t-statistics (Petersen, 2009).  
                                                                
37 In the robustness test section discussed later, the results still hold when I examined annual forecasts or quarterly 
forecasts separately.  
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In equation (1) the dependent variable is analyst earnings forecasting error, 
FORECAST_ERROR. Following prior studies, I measure analyst forecasting accuracy using the 
following formula: 
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where tjAFE , is the mean of absolute earnings forecasting errors ( tjiAFE ,, ) using all 
forecasts issued for firm j in year t for quarterly forecasts and annual forecasts separately. I 
calculated the absolute earnings forecasting error, tjiAFE ,,  as =tjiAFE ,,  | tjitji EPSF ,,,, − |, where tjiF ,, is 
the forecasted quarterly or annual earnings issued by analyst i for firm j in year t, and tjiEPS ,,  is 
the corresponding actual earnings per share announced by firm j in year t. This measurement 
controls for firm effects and year effects that may cause systematic differences in forecasting 
accuracy (Clement, 1999). It represents a proportional forecast error for each individual forecast 
relative to the average forecast error for a firm in a fiscal year. The smaller the value of this 
measure, the more accurate is a forecast.38
The primary independent variable in equation (1) is FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN, which is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 for forecasts issued for a focal firm and 0 for forecasts issued 
by the same analyst for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. A negative coefficient on 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN would support H1a, suggesting that for a given supply chain analyst, 
 A negative value of this measure represents above-
average forecasting performance, while a positive value of this measure represents below-
average forecasting performance.  
                                                                
38 I also used the ranked forecast error and the absolute forecast error scaled by assets per share at the beginning of 
the year as alternative measures for earnings forecasting error. Regression analyses using these two alternative 
measures yielded similar results. The robustness test section in section 3.6.9 presents the details.  
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her average forecasting error is smaller for focal firms than her average forecasting error for 
“other” firms in the analyst portfolio.39
The remaining independent variables in equation (1) are controls on individual forecast 
characteristics, analysts’ firm-specific characteristics, and firm characteristics that may affect 
analyst forecasting accuracy. These variables are discussed below.  
  
O'Brien (1988) suggests that earnings are more difficult to forecast when the forecasting 
horizon is longer because there is more uncertainty in the earnings realization process. To 
control for this effect, I included HORIZON in the model, which is the number of lag days 
between the date a forecast is issued and the date on which the actual earnings per share (EPS) 
is announced.  
Jacob et al. (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001) document that analysts with industry expertise 
in a particular industry issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the firms in the industry than 
the analysts issue for other firms without such industry expertise. I used an indicator variable 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY that equals 1 if a forecast is issued for a firm that is in an industry that 
has the largest representation among all the firms the analyst follows in the same year. I termed 
this industry as the analyst’s primary industry as a measure for the analyst’s industry 
                                                                
39 To the extent that following both a focal firm and the focal firm’s major customers gives analysts information 
advantage with regard to the focal firm’s future revenue growth, it is possible that for a given analyst, the greater the 
number of major customers of a focal firm that an analyst covers, or the more important the major customers are in 
contributing to the annual sales of the focal firm, the more precise the analyst’s information about the focal firm’s 
future revenue realization will be, and the more accurate the analyst is in her forecasts for the focal firm. To test this 
conjecture, I replaced the indicator variable FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN with two different variables to measure the 
extent to which an analyst follows the major customers of a focal firm. NUMBER_CUSTOMER was the total 
number of customers of a focal firm that an analyst followed; if the analyst followed none of the firm’s major 
customers, NUMBER_CUSTOMER was coded as zero. PCT_SALES proxied the importance of the major customers 
in contributing to the focal firm’s annual total sales. It was the aggregate total sales made to the major customers of 
the focal firm divided by the total sales of the focal firm in the year. If the analyst followed none of the firm’s major 
customers, it was coded as 0. Untabulated results show a negative and significant coefficient on 
NUMBER_CUSTOMER and PCT_SALES, respectively, suggesting that the more major customers of a focal firm an 
analyst follows, or the more the major customers contribute to the total sales of the focal firm, the more accurate the 
analyst is in her earnings forecasts for the focal firm.   
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expertise.40
Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1997) document a “learning by doing” effect. They show 
that analyst earnings forecasts become more accurate as the analyst’s firm-specific forecasting 
experience increases. I used YEAR_EXP to measure an analyst’s firm-specific forecasting 
experience. It indicates the number of years an analyst has been following the firm.  
 Adding this variable in the model helps examine the additional contribution of an 
analyst’s supply chain coverage in explaining variations on analyst forecasting accuracy that is 
beyond the explanatory power of the analyst’s industry expertise. I also added an interaction 
term FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN * PRIMARY_INDUSTRY in the model to examine whether an 
analyst issues more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firms for which the analyst has 
both industry expertise and supply chain knowledge than she issues for firms for which she 
does not have both expertise.  
Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Bamber and Cheon (1998) suggest that analysts are less 
accurate in their earnings forecasts for firms that face greater uncertainty concerning earnings 
realization. These authors suggest that analyst earnings forecasting dispersion (DISPERSION), 
which represents the extent of disagreement among analysts concerning their expectations of 
the possible effects of future events on a firm’s earnings realization, captures the extent of a 
firm’s earnings uncertainty. DISPERSION is measured as the standard deviation of analyst 
forecasting errors for fiscal year t, calculated for quarterly forecasts and annual forecasts 
separately. The greater the value is, the greater is the uncertainty concerning a firm’s earnings 
realization.  
                                                                
40 In comparison, Gilson et al. (2001) define an analyst as an industry specialist if the analyst follows at least five 
firms in the same industry. Jacob et al. (1999) measure the extent of an analyst’s industry specializations based on 
the percentage of companies followed by the analyst with the same two-digit SIC code. Considering an average of 
67% of firms each analyst follows in I/B/E/S is from the same industry, I assumed that each analyst has a primary 
industry in which she is specialized. I also replaced the indicator variable, PRIMARY_INDUSTRY with the 
percentage of the total number of firms that are in the same industry at the one-digit SIC relative to the total 
number of firms an analyst follows in the same year, as in Jacob et al. (1999), to measure an analyst’s industry 
specialization in the regression analyses. The results are quantitatively the same. 
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Analyst forecasting accuracy is also dependent on the amount of information available to 
an analyst about the firms she follows (Atiase, 1985; King, Pownall, and Waymire, 1990). Prior 
studies have documented that analysts are more accurate in their earnings forecasts for a firm 
when the firm is also followed by a greater number of other analysts because of the additional 
information other analysts will generate about the firm. I used NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW 
to measure the total number of analysts following a firm during fiscal year t. I expect forecasts 
to be more accurate for firms that are covered by a greater number of other analysts. 
The same model specification was used to test H2a on the within-analyst differences in 
forecasting accuracy for major customer firms versus for “other” firms the same supply chain 
analyst follows in a year. In the model, I replaced the indicator variable 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN with CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN, where 
CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN equals 1 if a forecast is issued for a focal firm’s major customer 
firm, and 0 for forecasts issued for “other” firms in the same analyst portfolio. 
I used a modified model specification to test H1b, H2b, and H3 concerning the cross-
analyst differences in forecasting accuracy between supply chain analysts and other non-supply 
chain analysts following the same firm. In the model, I used an indicator variable 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST that equals 1 if a forecast is issued by a supply chain analyst and 0 
if a forecast is issued by a non-supply chain analyst. In addition, because the model estimates 
cross-analyst forecasting accuracy for a given firm, I ran a Fama-MacBeth regression for each 
individual firm-year rather than for each analyst-year and adjusted the standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates using Newey-West’s (1987) method. I also excluded firm characteristics 
variables, but included analyst and brokerage firm characteristics in the model. These included 
variables are the total number of industries at the one-digit SIC code level that an analyst 
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follows in a given year (NUMBER_SIC1) and the log value of the total number of analysts hired 
by the analyst’s employing brokerage firm (LOG_BROKER_SIZE). These two variables control 
for the effect of the complexity of an analyst’s portfolio and the extent of support an analyst 
receives from her brokerage firm (Clement, 1999).  
3.4.2   Model specification for testing H4 concerning analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the 
major customer firms  
 
Hypothesis H4 predicts that an analyst is more likely to choose a firm as the focal firm or 
as the major customer firm, and follow one or more of the other parties in the firm’s supply 
chain when the firm can generate more profitable trading commissions for the analyst’s 
brokerage firm.  
To test H4, I pooled all the firms each supply chain analyst follows in the same year over 
the sample period and used a conditional logit model to estimate equation (3). The model is 
estimated conditional on that one or more of the firms in an analyst portfolio are in a supply 
chain relation as a focal firm or as the focal firm’s major customer firm. Based on Johnson, 
Ryan, and Tian (2009), the conditional logistic regression model provides consistent parameter 
estimates for factors that affect the probability that a firm will be chosen as a focal firm or a 
major customer firm.  
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(3) 
In the regression equation (3), the dependent variable, FIRMS_SUPPLY_CHAIN, is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if for analyst i, firm j is a focal firm in year t, with one or more 
of the firm’s major customers also followed by the same analyst during the same year. 
FIRMS_SUPPLY_CHAIN also equals 1 if firm j is a major customer firm for analyst i in year t, 
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with one or more of the major customer’s suppliers also followed by the same analyst during 
the year. FIRMS_SUPPLY_CHAIN equals 0 for the remaining “other” firms followed by analyst 
i in year t. 
The right-hand side of equation (3) includes economic factors based on prior literature 
that may affect an analyst’s choice of firms to follow and the amount of effort the analyst would 
expend on gathering information for the firm. Hayes (1998), Michaely and Womack (1999), 
Barth et al. (2001) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006) suggest that analysts are more likely to follow a 
firm when the potential revenue a firm may bring to the analyst’s brokerage firm is high. 
Following these studies, I used an indicator variable INVESTMENT_BANKING that equals 1 if 
an analyst’s brokerage firm has been an underwriter for issuance of equity for the firm during 
the three years before and after the forecast year and 0 otherwise.41
Equation (3) also includes other firm characteristics that prior research suggests may 
affect analysts’ incentives to follow a firm. For example, O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) argue 
that if there are economies of scale in learning about firms' operations in the same industry (for 
example, because information about technologies or productions is common across firms), then 
 This variable measures the 
likelihood that the firm may bring in underwriting fees for the analyst’s brokerage firm. I also 
used LOG_TRADINGVALUE, which is the log value of the total trading value of the firm (in 
thousands of dollars) during the prior year. This variable captures the potential trading 
commissions that the firm could potentially bring to the analyst brokerage firm. The greater the 
value of LOG_TRADINGVALUE, the higher the potential trading commissions that the firm 
could generate.   
                                                                
41 Alternatively, I defined INVESTMENT_BANKING equals 1 if during the three years before the forecast year, the 
analyst’s brokerage firm has been an underwriter for the issuance of equity for the firm and 0 otherwise. The 
results remain statistically the same. The results also hold when I define whether a brokerage firm has an 
investment banking relationship with the firm using the three years after the forecast year as an alternative window. 
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the return for analysts’ effort in information acquisition on the firm will increase with the total 
number of other firms in the industry. Therefore, I included LOG_ NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1, 
which is the log value of the total number of other firms in the firm’s industry at the one-digit 
SIC code level. I expect LOG_ NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1 to be positively associated with the 
likelihood of a firm being chosen as a focal firm or a major customer firm.  
I also included an indicator variable, PRIMARY_INDUSTRY, to measure whether or not a 
firm is in an industry in which the analyst has expertise. I expect an analyst is more likely to 
choose a firm as a focal firm or a major customer firm when the analyst already has expertise in 
the firm’s industry, because the analyst can make the best use of her industry knowledge about 
the firm and the cost to follow the firm’s supply chain is lower. 
Barth et al. (2001) suggest that analysts are more likely to follow firms with higher 
growth and greater information asymmetry. They suggest that analysts are more likely to 
produce more informative earnings forecasts for these firms and investors are more likely to 
trade on the information analysts produce for these firms. Therefore, I included 
SALE_GROWTH to capture the firm’s total sales growth in the current year relative to the prior 
year, and used the market-to-book ratio (MARKET_TO_BOOK) to proxy for a firm’s growth 
opportunity. Following Barth et al. (2001), I also included AD_RATIO and RD_RATIO to 
capture a firm’s technology and brand name as the proxies for the amount of the firm’s 
intangible assets. These two measures are the ratios of advertising expenses (AD_RATIO) and 
research and development expenses (RD_RATIO) to the total sales in the year, respectively. In 
addition, Lang and Lunhdolm (1996) suggest that analysts are likely to cover more profitable 
firms. Therefore, I also included return on assets (ROA) as an additional control variable in the 
model.  
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3.5  Sample construction and summary statistics 
I constructed the sample by merging two sources of data. The first source was the 
Compustat customer segment file, which identified the firms that reported having major 
customer relations. The second was the analysts’ detailed earnings forecast data from I/B/E/S. 
Data construction for each source is discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
3.5.1   Major customer data and identification of firms’ supply chains  
I obtained data on supplier-customer relationships from the Compustat customer segment 
file, a subset of the Compustat segment database that records the identity of, and sales to, a 
firm’s major customers based on the firm’s original annual filing with the SEC. SFAS No. 14 
(FASB 1975) requires firms to report financial information for any industry segment that 
comprises more than 10% of the reporting firm’s consolidated yearly sales, assets, or profit. In 
addition, the name of any customer representing more than 10% of the total sales of the 
reporting firm must be disclosed.  
However, the Compustat customer segment file only reports a permanent firm identifier 
code (GVKEY) for each reporting firm, but not for the reported major customer firm. In addition, 
the names of the major customer firms in this file are not reported in a standard format. For 
example, the name of the same customer company is often not reported consistently by different  
reporting firms or even by the same reporting firm in different years.42
To link each name of the reported major customer firm with a unique permanent firm 
identifier, and to merge with analyst forecast data for the reported customer, I used an algorithm 
 Some firms may even 
report a subsidiary or division as a major customer rather than its parent company.  
                                                                
42 For example, some firms may report its major customer as “GE” in one year and as “General Electric” in another 
year. This major customer may also be reported by some firms as “General Electric Company.” Some other firms 
may report the subsidiary “GE Health” as its major customer, rather than its parent company of  “GE” In such 
cases, discretion is required in judging whether “GE”, “General Electric”, “General Electric Company” or “GE 
health” all refer to the same company. 
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similar to that in Fee and Thomas (2004) and Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2009). This algorithm 
compares the number and the order of the letters for the name of each major customer firm 
reported in the customer segment file with the company names listed in the historical Center for 
Research in Security Price (CRSP) company name database. Based on the output from the 
algorithm, I retained the first three most closely matched historical company names from CRSP 
for each reported major customer firm. I then visually inspected the reported name of the major 
customer firm from Compustat and the three matched names from CRSP, and determined a 
distinct permanent firm identifier for the reported major customer firm. For those reported 
major customer firms whose names were not well matched with the names from CRSP, I first 
searched the reported names of the major customer firms in Google43 or the Directory of 
Corporate Affiliations, and determined if the reported major customer was a subsidiary of a 
public parent company. If the reported major customer firm was confirmed to be a valid 
subsidiary of a public company, I then used the permanent identifier of the parent company as 
the identification code for the disclosed major customer firm; otherwise, I assumed the reported 
major customer did not have a valid firm identifier and discarded the focal firm – major 
customer pair.44
                                                                
43 When using Google to search the parent company of a subsidiary, I used the subsidiary’s name as shown in the 
Compustat customer segment file, together with other key words such as “parent,” “subsidiary,” “division,” etc. to 
identify the name of the parent company and the corresponding CRSP firm identification code. 
 The above procedures yielded a total of 50,678 focal firm-major customer 
firm paired relations during the sample period from 1991-2008. 26,330 of these pairs had firm 
identification codes for both the focal firm and the paired major customer firm, representing a 
total of 19,068 reporting firm-years for 4,736 distinct reporting firms. 
44 In making these judgments, I have attempted to be conservative. For example, for firms with uncertain 
abbreviations, the customer is not matched with any firm identifier. These firms are excluded from later analyses. 
This conservative approach implies that the number of reporting firm-customer pairs with valid permanent firm 
identifiers for both the focal firm and the reported major customer may be understated. 
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3.5.2   Analyst forecast data and identification of supply chain analysts   
The sample of analyst earnings forecasts comes from the I/B/E/S detailed analyst forecast 
file for the period from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2008. Following prior studies (e.g., Ke 
and Yu, 2006; Sonney, 2007), I retained only those forecasts that were issued for firms in the 
U.S., and had values for the actual earnings as well as the reported earnings announcement date, 
I/B/E/S ticker, analyst code, and broker code. I excluded forecasts issued for those firms that are 
followed by fewer than three analysts in a fiscal year because comparisons of forecasting 
performance among different analysts are not reliable for thinly covered firms (e.g., Ke and Yu, 
2006; Sonney, 2007). To reduce possible outlier effects, I also deleted forecasts for which the 
absolute forecasting errors were greater than three times the standard deviation of the absolute 
forecast error of the forecast calculated using all forecasts issued for the firm in the same fiscal 
year (e.g., Clement, 1999; Ke and Yu, 2006; Sonney, 2007).  
I then used the identification codes for both the focal firms and their major customers 
discussed at the end of section 3.5.1 to merge with the analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S. Of the 
total 26,330 pairs of supply chain relations that had firm identification codes for both a focal 
firm and the firm’s reported major customer firm, only 13,047 pairs of supply chain relations 
had analyst forecast data from I/B/E/S for both the focal firm and the reported major customer 
firm. These 13,047 pairs of supply chain relations represent 9,372 distinct reporting firm-years. 
44.0% of the pairs have both the focal firm and the firm’s reported major customer in the same 
industry at the one-digit SIC level.  
Among the 9,372 distinct reporting firm-years that have analyst forecast data for both the 
reporting firm and its reported major customer firm, I identified 1,176 reporting firm-years that 
are followed by 2,696 analysts who issued forecasts for both the reporting firm and one or more 
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of the focal firm’s reported major customer firms in the same year. I labeled these analysts as 
“supply chain analysts” for the year.  
Based on the individual analyst identity code (i.e., “ANALYS” in I/B/E/S) for these supply 
chain analysts, I retrieved all forecasts issued by these analysts in the same year over the sample 
period. I classified all forecasts each supply chain analyst issued in the fiscal year into one of 
the three categories: forecasts for the focal firms, for the major customers of the focal firms, and 
for all “other” firms in the analyst portfolio in the same year. I then kept the firm identification 
code (“TICKER”) for each focal firm, the major customer firm, and “other” firms in the analyst 
portfolio, and retrieved all forecasts issued for these firms in separate files. 
3.5.3   Descriptive statistics on supply chain analysts and firms in their portfolios   
Table 3.1 reports year-by-year distribution of the number of firms for two samples. 
Column (1) reports the distribution of the total number of the reporting firms that reported 
having major customer relations, and have analyst forecast data available for both the reporting 
firms and the reported major customer firms in I/B/E/S. Firms reported in this sample represent 
the maximum possible number of firms that could be identified as the focal firms. Column (1) 
shows that the number of firms that reported having major customer relations first increased 
from 672 in 1991 to 868 in 1996, and then declined steadily from 766 in 1997 to 72 in 2008. 
One potential explanation for the decline is that an increasing number of firms since the late 
1990s have chosen to keep real names of their major customers anonymous when these firms 
filed with the SEC (Ellis et al., 2009).45
                                                                
45 Ellis et al. (2010) show that firms systematically choose not to disclose the names of their major customers to 
discourage competition when the proprietary costs associated with disclosure are high and when firms operate in 
less competitive industries where strategic interactions among rivals are more prevalent. Ellis et al. (2010) also 
indicate that based on their conversations with the SEC, although firms are required to comply with SFAS No. 14 
to disclose the names of their major customers, the SEC is unlikely to take enforcement action against the firms 
that fail to comply with such disclosure requirements. However, the SEC may request that firms remedy this 
reporting deficiency.  
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[Insert Table 3.1] 
Columns (2)-(5) report the distribution of the number of focal firms, major customer firms, 
and “other” firms followed by supply chain analysts.46
Next, Table 3.2 reports the corresponding industry distribution (at the one-digit SIC code 
level) for the firms reported in Table 3.1. Column (1) of Table 3.2 shows that of the firms that 
reported having major customer relations and also have analyst forecast data for both the focal 
firm and the paired firm’s major customer, the durable manufacturing industry has the largest 
representation and the agriculture production industry has the least representation. The 
remaining columns of Table 3.2 report the industry distribution of the firms followed by supply 
chain analysts, including the focal firms in column (2), the major customers of the focal firms in 
column (3), and “other” firms in column (4). The numbers in parentheses in column (2) report 
the percentage of the focal firms in each industry. The figures show that the industry 
distribution of the focal firms followed by supply chain analysts is similar to what was reported 
in column (1) but with a much smaller total number of firms in each industry. The industry 
 Column (2) of Table 3.1 shows that the 
number of focal firms followed by supply chain analysts was relatively stable between 89 and 
119 from 1991 to 1998, and then steadily decreased after 1998 – a pattern that is similar to the 
pattern for the reporting firms in column (1). Column (2) also shows that of the maximum 
possible number of firm-years that could be identified as focal firms in column (1), 12.5% 
(1,176 of the 9,372 total firms in column (1)) of these firms are followed by supply chain 
analysts. Columns (3) and (4) report the year-by-year distribution of the total number of the 
major customers of the focal firms, and “other” firms in supply chain analysts’ portfolios, 
respectively. They show a similar pattern as for the focal firms.  
                                                                
46 The three groups in the classification were not mutually exclusive. For example, a firm that was classified as a 
focal firm may also be classified as a major customer firm. A total of 42 firms were categorized as both a focal firm 
and a major customer. Excluding these 42 firms in the empirical analyses does not change the results. 
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distribution for the major customer firms and all other firms in columns (3) and (4) shows a 
similar pattern as in column (2). 
[Insert Table 3.2] 
3.5.4   Descriptive statistics on supply chain analysts’ portfolios 
To describe the portfolio characteristics of supply chain analysts, I used all the other non-
supply chain analysts who follow the same focal firms but do not follow the firms’ major 
customers as a benchmark. Table 3.3 shows that of a total of 9,235 analyst-years following 
1,176 focal firm-years, 29.2% (2,696 of the total 9,235 analyst-years) of these analysts are 
supply chain analysts. 
[Insert Table 3.3] 
Column (1) of Table 3.3 shows that for all analysts (including both supply chain analysts 
and non-supply chain analysts) following the focal firms, the mean number of supply chain 
relations (i.e., the mean number of focal firm-major customer pairs) in the analyst’s portfolio is 
0.77. This means that for the analysts following the focal firms, on average, each analyst has 
0.77 pair of focal firm-major customer relations in the portfolio. A significant percentage 
(72.1%) of the firms these analysts follow is in the analysts’ primary industry. However, only 16% 
of analysts exclusively follow firms from a single industry at the one-digit SIC code level, with 
the remaining 84% of analysts following firms from more than one industry. This percentage is 
much higher than the corresponding 60% for all analysts in I/B/E/S. This evidence seems to 
suggest that on average, analysts following firms that have major customer relations tend to 
have a more diversified industry portfolio than the population analysts covered in I/B/E/S. Table 
3.3 also shows that on average, analysts following the focal firms cover a mean of 15.35 firms 
in 2.96 (4.74) industries at the one- (two-) digit SIC code level. The analysts’ employing 
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brokerage firms hire a mean number of 54.98 analysts, covering 8.74 industries at the one-digit 
SIC code level.47
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.3 compare portfolio characteristics for supply chain 
analysts versus the other analysts following only the same focal firms but none of the firms’ 
major customers. The descriptive statistics show that supply chain analysts follow a mean of 
2.63 supply chain relations, versus 0 for the other analysts (by definition). 68.7% of the firms 
supply chain analysts follow are in the analyst’s primary industry; this is in contrast with 73.6% 
for other non-supply chain analysts following the same focal firms. This difference is 
statistically significant at p<0.01 level. In addition, only 10.3% of the supply chain analysts 
follow firms from a single industry at the one-digit SIC code level. This percentage is 
significantly lower (at the p<0.01 level) than the corresponding 18.4% for other non-supply 
chain analysts. These statistics provide preliminary evidence that supply chain analysts are 
more diversified in their industry coverage than non-supply chain analysts. Moreover, supply 
chain analysts follow a mean of 19.14 firms from 3.22 industries at the one-digit SIC level, 
which is 39% and 13% more than the corresponding 13.78 firms and 2.85 industries for other 
non-supply chain analysts. Both of the differences are statistically significant at the p<0.01 
level. This result seems to suggest that supply chain analysts increase the total number of firms 
and industries in their portfolios in order to maintain their supply chain coverage. Table 3.3 also 
shows that the brokerage houses employing supply chain analysts hire a significantly greater 
number of analysts and have more comprehensive industry coverage than the brokerage houses 
that employ the other non-supply chain analysts.  
 
                                                                
47 Note that column (2) and column (3) in the last row of Table 3.3 report a total number of 973 distinct supply 
chain analysts and 2,536 distinct other analysts. These two numbers do not add up to the total number of 2,857 
distinct analysts following the focal firms in column (1) because I have defined supply chain analyst at the analyst-
year level. An analyst may be a supply chain analyst in one year, but may not be a supply chain analyst in another 
year. 
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More detailed analyses on how analysts may organize supply chain relations in their 
portfolios and how different supply chain portfolio organization affects analyst forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firms and the focal firms’ major customers are presented in Appendix 3.2. 
In this Appendix, I further classified each supply chain analyst into one of the four groups. I 
based the classification on the distinct number of major customers each analyst follows for a 
focal firm and the distinct number of focal firms each analyst follows for a major customer firm 
in the same analyst portfolio. The first category includes “analysts with one (focal firm) to one 
(major customer) relation,” indicating that for every focal firm in the analyst portfolio, the 
analyst follows only one major customer for each focal firm. The other three categories include 
analysts with “one-to-many relation,” “many-to-one relation,” and “hybrid relation.” These 
three categories refer to those analysts if the analyst follows more than one major customer for 
at least one focal firm in the analyst portfolio (“one-to-many relation”), more than one focal 
firm for at least one focal firm’s major customer (“many-to-one relation”), or a combination of 
the above two categories (“hybrid relation”).  
Appendix 3.2 Panel A shows that 1,746 of the 2,696 (64.8%) supply chain analysts are 
classified into the “one-to-one relation” category, with the remaining 950 analysts (35.2%) 
distributed in the other three categories. Panel B of Appendix 3.2 shows that as a supply chain 
analyst increases the total number of major customers of a focal firm in her portfolio, her 
forecasting accuracy for the focal firm marginally improves. Panel C of Appendix 3.2 shows 
that as a supply chain analyst increases the number of suppliers of the major customer in her 
portfolio, her forecasting accuracy for the major customer also marginally improves. Overall, 
the evidence presented in Appendix 3.2 is generally consistent with the argument that as supply 
chain analysts acquire more information about the focal firm’s major customers, their forecasts 
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for the focal firms become more accurate. Similarly, the more information these analysts 
acquire about the suppliers of the major customer, their earnings forecasts for the major 
customer firm are more accurate. 
3.6  Empirical results 
In this section, I present the univariate and the multivariate regression analyses used for 
hypotheses testing. I first present the results on the benefits to analysts taking a supply chain 
portfolio approach in terms of their forecasting accuracy for the focal firms and the firms’ major 
customers in subsection 3.6.1 to 3.6.4. I then present the corresponding empirical results on the 
costs to these analysts of taking a supply chain portfolio approach by examining their 
forecasting accuracy for “other” firms in the portfolio in subsection 3.6.5. Subsection 3.6.6 
discusses the empirical results on analyst forecasting accuracy at the portfolio level. Subsection 
3.6.7 presents the results for testing H4 on the economic determinants of analysts’ choice of the 
focal firms and the major customer firms. Subsection 3.6.8 and 3.6.9 present results for 
additional analyses and robustness tests. 
3.6.1  Tests of H1a: within-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the focal firms  
 
To conduct within-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for a given supply chain 
analyst, I retrieved all 449,171 forecasts issued by supply chain analysts over the sample period. 
The sample included 44,377 forecasts for the 1,176 focal firm-years, 44,036 forecasts for the 
742 major customer-years, and 360,758 forecasts for the 15,066 “other” firm-years.  
H1a examines the within-analyst comparison of forecasting accuracy for a given supply 
chain analyst between the focal firms and “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. It predicts that 
supply chain analysts will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firms than they 
will for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. To test this hypothesis, I stacked all forecasts 
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supply chain analysts issued for the focal firms and “other” firms in their portfolios. The sample 
included a total of 405,135 forecasts (i.e., 44,377+360,758), with 49.75% (201,557 of 405,135) 
being annual forecasts and the other 50.25% (203,578 of 405,135) being quarterly forecasts.48
Panel A of Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
multivariate regression analyses for H1a. Panel A shows that forecasts issued for the focal firms 
(FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN) represent 11% of this sample. The remaining 89% of the forecasts 
are issued for “other” firms in supply chain analysts’ portfolios. In addition, 74% of the 
forecasts are issued for firms in which analysts have primary industry expertise.  
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 presents the Pearson correlations for the variables used in the 
multivariate analyses. Recall that I measured forecasting accuracy (FORECAST_ERROR) as the 
percentage of the absolute forecasting error for each individual forecast relative to the average 
absolute forecast error that is calculated using all forecasts issued for the firm in the same fiscal 
year. The smaller the value of the forecasting error, the more accurate is the forecast. As 
expected, the indicator variable FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN is negatively and significantly 
correlated with FORECAST_ERROR. The correlations of the other variables are generally 
consistent with prior studies (e.g., Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999). For example, forecasts 
are more accurate when analysts have industry expertise in the firm (PRIMARY_INDUSTRY) 
and have greater forecasting experience with the firm (YEAR_EXP). Conversely, forecasts are 
less accurate when the forecasting horizon (HORIZON) is longer and when analysts are more 
dispersed in their expectations of the firm’s future earnings prospects (DISPERSION).  
Panel B also shows a negatively significant correlation coefficient between 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN and PRIMARY_INDUSTRY, suggesting that firms that are in an 
                                                                
48 As I will discuss in the robustness section, testing the hypotheses using the quarterly and annual forecasts 
separately yields quantitatively the same results.  
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analyst’s primary industry are less likely to be a focal firm; in addition, the correlation 
coefficient between FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN and YEAR_EXP is positive and significant, 
suggesting that analysts with more firm-specific experience are more likely to include the focal 
firm’s major customer firms in their portfolios. FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN is negatively and 
significantly correlated with NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW, suggesting that analysts are more 
likely to follow a focal firm’s customer firms when the focal firm is followed by fewer other 
analysts. Because these correlations are pair-wise, the coefficient sign may differ in the 
multivariate analyses. Overall, the results in the correlation table seems to suggest that analysts 
are more likely to follow a firm’s supply chain when the analyst has more experience with the 
firm and when the information produced by the analyst is likely to be more informative because 
of the  information asymmetry for the firm.  
 Panel C of Table 3.4 presents the descriptive statistics on the forecasting accuracy for all 
firms included in supply chain analysts’ portfolios. The first row of Panel A of Table 3.4 shows 
that the mean (median) forecasting error for all forecasts issued by supply chain analysts is 
0.0003 (-0.0289). The second row shows that when forecasts are issued for firms that are in an 
analyst’s primary industry, the mean (median) forecasting error is -0.0011 (-0.0309), which is 
significantly smaller than the corresponding mean (median) forecasting error of 0.0045  
(-0.0220) for firms in which the analyst does not primary industry expertise.   
I then partitioned all the forecasts issued by supply chain analysts in the same year into 
three groups: forecasts issued for focal firms, for major customer firms, and for all remaining 
“other” firms in the analyst portfolio. Row (4) shows that the mean (median) forecasting error 
for the focal firms is -0.0189 (-0.0484), which is statistically smaller (at the p<0.01 level) than 
the corresponding mean (median) forecasting error of 0.0033 (-0.0250) for “other” firms shown 
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in Row (6). This result provides preliminary evidence that forecasts are more accurate for the 
focal firms than for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. The comparison between the 
forecasting errors for the major customers and for “other” firms in the portfolio will be 
discussed in Section 3.6.4, which examines H2b concerning the within-analyst differences in 
forecasting accuracy for the major customers versus “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. 
 Panel D of Table 3.4 presents the Fama-MacBeth multivariate regression results for 
testing H1a. As discussed in the model specification section, to generate the Fama-MacBeth 
regression estimates, I ran a cross-sectional regression analysis for each of the 2,696 supply 
chain analyst-years. I then reported the average value of the coefficient estimates from the 
2,696 cross-sectional regressions. The t-statistics reported in the table are based on the Newey-
West (1987) adjusted standard errors of the series of the coefficient estimates.  
 Consistent with H1a, both columns (1) and (2) report a significantly negative coefficient 
on the indicator variable, FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN, with a mean coefficient of -3.357 and -
3.020, respectively. This suggests that for a given supply chain analyst, forecasts for the focal 
firms are on average around 3% more accurate than forecasts the same analyst issues for “other” 
firms in the portfolio. The mean coefficient on the indicator variable PRIMARY_INDUSTRY is 
negative and marginally significant. This result is consistent with earlier studies that analysts 
are on average more accurate for firms that are in an industry that the analysts have industry 
expertise than for those that the analysts do not have industry expertise. For the other control 
variables, the coefficients on analyst forecasting horizon (HORIZON) and forecast dispersion 
(DISPERSION) are both significant with the predicted signs. However, analysts’ prior 
forecasting experiences (YEAR_EXP) and the number of analysts following the firm 
(NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW) are insignificant. Column (2) also shows a significant 
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coefficient on the interactive term of analysts’ supply chain coverage and analyst industry 
expertise (FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN * PRIMARY_INDUSTRY), suggesting that analysts who 
have both industry expertise and supply chain knowledge for the focal firm are significantly 
more accurate than other firms in which the analyst does not have such dual expertise. 
3.6.2  Tests of H1b: cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the focal firms  
 
H1b examines the cross-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy for a given focal firm. 
The hypothesis predicts that for a given focal firm, analysts who follow both a focal firm and at 
least one of the firm’s major customers will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal 
firm than will other non-supply chain analysts who follow the same focal firm but none of the 
focal firm’s major customers.  
To test H1b, I retrieved all forecasts issued for the 1,176 focal firm-years over the sample 
period. The sample included a total of 134,956 forecasts issued by all analysts following the 
same focal firms. 46.78% (63,136 of 134,956) of these forecasts were annual forecasts and the 
remaining 53.22% (71,820 of 134,956) were quarterly forecasts.  
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the multivariate regression analyses for 
H1b are presented in Panel A of Table 3.5. Panel A shows that of all the forecasts issued for the 
focal firms, 33% are by supply chain analysts. The remaining 67% are issued by other non-
supply chain analysts. In addition, the majority (75%) of the forecasts for the focal firms are 
issued by analysts who have primary industry expertise in the focal firms.  
[Insert Table 3.5] 
The Pearson correlations for the variables used in the multivariate analyses are presented 
in Panel B of Table 3.5. As expected, the indicator variable SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST is 
negatively and significantly correlated with FORECAST_ERROR. Forecasts are more accurate 
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when an analyst has a less diversified portfolio in terms of the number of industries the analyst 
follows (NUMBER_SIC1), and when the analyst receives more resources from her employing 
brokerage firm (LOG_BROKER_SIZE). The correlations of the other variables are consistent 
with those presented earlier.  
In addition, Panel B also shows positive correlation coefficients between 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST and YEAR_EXP, NO_SIC1, and LOG_BROKER_SIZE. These 
correlation coefficients are consistent with the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.3. They 
suggest that supply chain analysts may have more firm-specific experience, be employed by 
larger brokerage firms, and have more diversified industry coverage in their portfolios than 
non-supply chain analysts. 
Panel C of Table 3.5 shows the univariate test results for analyst forecasting errors for the 
focal firms. Row (1) shows that the mean (median) forecasting error for the focal firms is -
0.0017 (-0.0342). When the focal firm is in an analyst’s primary industry, the mean (median)  
forecasting error is -0.0034 (-0.0313), which is statistically indifferent from the corresponding 
forecasting error of -0.0012 (-0.0348) when the focal firm is not in the analyst’s primary 
industry.  
 The remainder of the table compares the forecasting errors for the focal firms of supply 
chain analysts versus those of other non-supply chain analysts who follow the same focal firms 
but not the firms’ major customers. Row (2) shows that the mean (median) forecasting error for 
supply chain analysts is -0.0189 (-0.0484), which is statistically smaller at the p<0.01 level than 
the corresponding forecasting error of 0.0066 (-0.0264) shown in Row (3) for the other non-
supply chain analysts. The outperformance in forecasting accuracy by supply chain analysts for 
the focal firms is significant whether or not the firm is in the analyst’s primary industry. 
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Panel D of Table 3.5 presents the Fama-MacBeth multivariate regression results for 
testing H1b. Consistent with H1b, column (1) shows a negative and significant coefficient of -
3.861 on the indicator variable SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST. This suggests that for a given 
focal firm, supply chain analysts are on average 3.861% more accurate than non-supply chain 
analysts who only follow the same focal firm but none of the focal firm’s major customers. 
When I added an interactive term of SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST * PRIMARY_INDUSTRY in 
column (2), the coefficient on SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST remains negative and marginally 
significant. In addition, the coefficient on the interaction term, SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST * 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY, is negative, but insignificant.  
 For the other control variables, Panel D shows a positive and significant coefficient on 
HORIZON, suggesting that forecasts with a longer horizon are less accurate as a result of more 
uncertainty in firms’ earnings realization. The coefficients on YEAR_EXP and 
LOG_BROKER_SIZE are both negative and significant, consistent with earlier studies that 
suggest that analysts with more firm-specific forecasting experience and receive more resources 
from their employing brokerage firms are significantly more accurate. The coefficients on 
NUMBER_SIC1 is positive and significant, consistent with earlier studies that analysts are less 
accurate when they are more diversified in their industry converge portfolio (Clement, 1999). 
 Overall, the results shown in Table 3.5 supports H1b, which suggests that for a given 
focal firm, analysts who follow both a focal firm and one or more of the firm’s major customers 
issue significantly more accurate earnings forecasts than other non-supply chain analysts issue 
who follow only the same focal firm but none of the focal firm’s major customers.  
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3.6.3  Tests of H2a: within-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the major customer 
firms 
 
H2a examines the within-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy between major 
customer firms and “other” firms in a given supply chain analyst’s portfolio. The hypothesis 
predicts that supply chain analysts will issue more accurate earnings forecasts for the major 
customers of the focal firms than they will for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio.  
The sample included all the 404,794 forecasts issued for the major and “other” firms by 
each of the 2,696 supply chain analyst-years. 49.60% (200,795 of 404,794) of these forecasts 
are annual forecasts and the other 50.40% (203,999 of 404,794) are quarterly forecasts. In 
addition, 10.8% of these forecasts were issued for the major customer firms, with the 
remaining 89.2% being issued by the same analysts for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. 
Earlier in Table 3.4 Panel C, I showed that the mean (median) forecasting error for the 
major customer firms (Row 5) was -0.0061 (-0.0386), compared with the mean (median) 
forecasting error of 0.0033 (-0.0250) for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. The differences  
are statistically significant for both the mean and median forecasting error at the conventional 
p-values.49
Table 3.6 provides the Fama-MacBeth multivariate regression results for testing H2b 
based on 2,696 cross-sectional regressions for each analyst-year. Consistent with H2b, both 
columns (1) and (2) report a negative and marginally significant coefficient on the indicator 
variable CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN, with an estimated coefficient of -1.193 and -1.273, 
respectively. This indicates that for a given supply chain analyst, her earnings forecasts for the 
major customers of the focal firms are on average around 1.2% more accurate than her forecasts 
for “other” firms in the same portfolio. The interactive term of SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST * 
  
                                                                
49 The descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients on the variables used in H2a testing are similar to those 
presented in Table 3.4 Panel B. Therefore, they are not tabulated. 
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PRIMARY_INDUSTRY in column (2) is insignificant. The effects of the control variables on 
analyst forecasting accuracy are generally consistent with those presented for H1a hypothesis 
testing.  
[Insert Table 3.6] 
3.6.4  Tests of H2b: cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms 
 
H2b examines the cross-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy for a given major 
customer of a focal firm. It predicts that supply chain analysts will issue more accurate earnings 
forecasts for the major customer than will other analysts who follow the same major customer 
firm but none of the major customer firm’s suppliers.  
To test this hypothesis, I retrieved all the 182,330 forecasts issued for the 742 major 
customer firm-years. 87,546 (48.02%) of these forecasts are annual forecasts and the remaining 
94,784 (51.98%) are quarterly forecasts. In addition, 24.1% of these forecasts were issued by 
supply chain analysts. 
Panel A of Table 3.7 shows the univariate analyses of analyst forecasting accuracy for the 
major customers. Row (1) of Panel A shows that the mean (median) forecasting error for the 
major customer firms is -0.0006 (-0.0360). Row 1.1 shows that when the major customer is in 
an analyst’s primary industry, the mean (median) forecasting error is -0.0017 (-0.0370). Row 
1.2 shows that when the major customer is not in the analyst’s primary industry, the mean 
(median) forecasting error is 0.0025 (-0.0330). The differences are statistically insignificant at 
the conventional p-values for either the mean or the median value of the forecasting error. 
[Insert Table 3.7] 
I also compared the forecasting errors for the major customers of supply chain analysts 
versus those of other analysts who follow the same major customers but none of the major 
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customers’ suppliers. In particular, Row (2) shows that the mean (median) forecasting error for 
the major customer firms of supply chain analysts is -0.0061 (-0.0386); in contrast, Row (3) 
shows the corresponding mean (median) forecasting error of the other analysts is 0.0010           
(-0.0353). The difference is statistically significant for both the mean and the median value at 
the conventional p-values. Panel A of Table 3.7 also shows that the superior forecasting 
performance for the major customers by supply chain analysts holds whether or not the major 
customer is in the analyst’s primary industry. 
The descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients of the variables used in the 
multivariate analyses are very similar to what were presented in Table 3.5, and are not presented. 
As expected, the indicator variable SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST and FORECAST_ERROR are 
negatively and significantly correlated.   
Panel B of Table 3.7 presents the Fama-MacBeth regression results for H2b testing. 
Consistent with H2a, column (1) of Panel B shows that the coefficient on 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST is -1.180, which is significant at the p<0.10 level. When I 
introduced the interaction term of SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANLAYST * PRIMARY_INDUSTRY, the 
coefficient on SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST remains negative and marginally significant. The 
sign and the statistical significance level of the other variables are generally consistent with 
those reported in Table 3.5 Panel D. 
In sum, my results in general support H2b, which predicts that for a given major customer, 
supply chain analysts issue more accurate in their earnings forecasts than other non-supply 
chain analysts issue who follow only the same major customer but none of the major 
customer’s suppliers.  
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3.6.5  Tests of H3: cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for “other” firms 
The results for H1 and H2 suggest that supply chain analysts achieve superior forecasting 
accuracy for both the focal firms and the focal firms’ major customers. This implies that these 
analysts must have spent a lot of their time gathering information for the firms in the supply 
chain. Assuming a fixed total amount of effort analysts would expend on the forecasting tasks 
and that the number of firms these analysts follow increases as a result of including additional 
firms in the firm’s supply chain, it is expected that the average amount of time these analysts 
can spend on ”other” firms in their portfolios is less. As a result, their forecasting accuracy for 
“other” firms will suffer. H3 hypothesizes that for a given “other" firm, supply chain analysts 
will issue significantly less accurate earnings forecasts than will other non-supply chain 
analysts following the same “other” firms. 
To test H3, I pooled all 2,154,615 forecasts issued for the 15,066 “other” firm-years over 
the sample period, including 996,943 (46.27%) annual forecasts and 1,157,672 (53.73%) 
quarterly forecasts. Forecasts issued by supply chain analysts represented 16.7% of this sample. 
Panel A of Table 3.8 shows the univariate analyses of the difference in forecasting 
accuracy for “other” firms of supply chain analysts versus of other non-supply chain analysts. 
Row (1) shows that the mean (median) forecasting error for “other” firms is -0.0088 (-0.0402). 
When these firms are in the analyst’s primary industry, the mean (median) forecasting error is -
0.0098 (-0.0419). When these firms are not in the analyst’s primary industry, the corresponding 
mean (median) forecasting error is -0.0056 (-0.0347). The difference is statistically significant 
for both the mean and the median value at the conventional levels. 
[Insert Table 3.8] 
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I then compared the forecasting errors for these firms of supply chain analysts versus 
those of the other non-supply chain analysts. Row (2) shows that the mean (median) forecasting 
error for “other” firms of supply chain analysts is 0.0033 (-0.0250), which is significantly larger 
than the corresponding error of -0.0113 (-0.0432) of the other analysts shown in Row (3) at the 
p<0.01 level. The inferior forecasting performance for these “other” firms by supply chain 
analysts holds whether or not these firms are in the analyst’s primary industry. 
Panel B of Table 3.8 presents the Fama-MacBeth multivariate regression analyses for 
testing H3. Consistent with H3, Panel B shows a positive and marginally significant coefficient 
of 1.419 and 1.428 on SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST  in columns (1) and (2) respectively. This 
result suggests that supply chain analysts issue significantly less accurate earnings forecasts for 
“other” firms than other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firms issue. 
Results for all the other control variables are generally consistent with those reported in the 
earlier sections. 
3.6.6  Additional analyses on forecasting accuracy at the analyst portfolio level 
The above analyses suggest that analysts benefit in their forecasting accuracy for both the 
focal firms and the firms’ major customers by taking a supply chain portfolio approach. 
However, supply chain analysts issue significantly less accurate earnings forecasts for “other” 
firms in their portfolios than other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firms 
issue. This section examines whether analysts benefit in their forecasting accuracy at the 
portfolio level by taking a supply chain portfolio approach. 
To examine the overall forecasting accuracy at the portfolio level for supply chain 
analysts, I stacked all forecasts used in the cross-analyst analyses for the focal firms, the major 
customers of the focal firms, and “other” firms. I ran the Fama-MacBeth regression analyses 
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based on a cross-sectional regression for each firm-year. My main variable of interests is the 
indicator variable, SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST that equals 1 if a forecast is issued by a supply 
chain analyst for a focal firm, a major customer firm, or an “other” firm in the analyst portfolio 
in the same year, and 0 if a forecast is issued by all other non-supply chain analysts.  
Untabulated results suggest the coefficient on SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST is positive and 
significant, suggesting that supply chain analysts are significantly less accurate at the portfolio 
level than other non-supply chain analysts. This result is consistent with earlier descriptive 
statistics shown in Table 3.3 that supply chain analysts follow significantly more firms from a 
more diversified industry at the one-digit SIC level than other non-supply chain analysts follow. 
This implies that when the amount of attention supply chain analysts can allocate to each firm 
in their portfolios is significantly less than the corresponding amount of attention devoted by 
other non-supply chain analysts, supply chain analysts will issue significantly less accurate 
earnings forecasts for all firms in the portfolio than will non-supply chain analysts.  
However, despite an average lower level of attention to each firm in the portfolio, the 
findings that supply chain analysts are significantly more accurate for both the focal firms and 
the firms’ major customers than other non-supply chain analysts following the same firms 
implies the relative importance of the focal firms and the major customer firms in supply chain 
analysts’ portfolios.  
3.6.7  Tests of H4: analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms 
H4 examines the economic factors that affect analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the 
major customer firms in the portfolio. The hypothesis predicts that when a firm has higher 
potential to bring more profitable trading commissions to an analyst’s brokerage firm, the 
analyst is more likely to expend effort on acquiring more precise information for the firm by 
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covering the other parties in the firm’s supply chain. The improvement of the information 
quality about the firm helps the analyst improve her forecasting accuracy for the firm.  
To test this hypothesis, I started with 50,059 analyst-firm-year observations, which 
represent all firm-years followed by supply chain analysts over the sample period. The 
requirement for the financial and trading data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP reduced the 
number of observations to 31,616 analyst-firm-years.  
Panel A of Table 3.9 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the regression 
model for H4 testing. I used INVESTMENT_BANKING and LOG_TRADINGVALUE to 
measure the potential revenue a firm may bring to an analyst’s brokerage firm. Column (1) 
shows that the frequency that the analyst’s brokerage firm is the underwriter for equity issuance 
for the focal firms and the major customers is 0.0032, which is statistically higher than  the 
corresponding frequency of 0.0013 for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio (t=3.56, p=0.004). 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE, a proxy for the potential trading commission fees that the focal firms 
and the major customer firms are likely to generate is 17.225, which is significantly greater (t = 
14.52, p<0.01) than the corresponding value of 16.824 for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio.  
[Insert Table 3.9] 
 Panel A also shows that the log value of the number of firms in the industry of the focal 
firms and the major customer firms (LOG_NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1) is 6.876, which is 
significantly larger at the p<0.01 than the corresponding value of 6.715 for “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. The percentage of the focal firms and the major customer firms that are both 
in the analyst’s primary industry is 73.0%, which is significantly lower at the p-value<0.01 
level than 75.6% for “other” firms in the portfolio. Surprisingly, focal firms and the major 
customer firms experience a lower growth rate (SALE_GROWTH), have a smaller market-to-
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book ratio (MARKET_TO_BOOK), are less profitable (ROA), and have lower levels of 
intangible assets (RD_RATIO and AD_RATIO) than “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. 
Panel B of Table 3.9 shows the Pearson correlation for the variables used in the regression 
analyses. SUPPLY_CHAIN_FIRMS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a focal firm, 
or a major customer firm, 0 for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. As expected, 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_FIRMS is positively significantly correlated with LOG_TRADINGVALUE 
and LOG_NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1. SUPPLY_CHAIN_FIRMS is insignificantly correlated with 
INVESTMENT_BANKING.   
Panel C of Table 3.9 present the conditional logit multivariate regression results and the 
marginal effects of one unit change of each independent variable in the full model in column (3)  
on the probability that a firm is chosen to be a focal firm or a major customer firm.  
Column (1) shows that the coefficient on analysts’ economic incentives to generate 
investment banking business (INVESTMENT_BANKING) is positive, but insignificant. Column 
(2) shows that the coefficient on LOG_TRADINGVALUE is positive and significant. Column (3) 
included both of the analysts’ incentive measures, INVESTMENT_BANKING and 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE, as well as other firm characteristics as additional explanatory 
variables of analysts’ choice of the focal firms and major customer firms. Column (3) shows 
that the coefficient on INVESTMENT_BANKING remains insignificant, and the coefficient on 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE remains positive and significant. The analysis on the marginal effect 
suggests that a one percent increase of the total trading volume for the stock of a firm increases 
the probability that the firm is chosen to be a focal firm or a major customer firm by 
approximately 0.01%, holding all other variables at the mean value. 
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Column (3) also shows that the coefficient on the total number of other firms in the firm’s 
industry (LOG_ NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1) is still positively significant. The insignificant 
coefficient on INVESTMENT_BANKING is consistent with Hayes (1998) and Lin and 
McNichols (1998) that when a firm is more likely to bring in underwriting business to the 
analysts’ brokerage firms, the analysts may sacrifice their forecasting accuracy for the firm and 
issue optimistically biased earnings forecasts to build their relations with firm management. 
Therefore, these analysts are less likely to expend the effort to get more precise firm-specific 
information by covering the other parties in the firm’s supply chain.  
The negative and significant coefficient on PRIMARY_INDUSTRY is surprising at first, 
however, the sign of this coefficient is consistent with earlier evidence that supply chain 
portfolio diversifies the analyst’s industry coverage. Surprisingly, firms that are over-valued 
(MARKET_TO_BOOK), more profitable (ROA), experiencing a higher growth 
(SALE_GROWTH), and having higher levels of intangible assets (AD_RATIO and RD_RATIO) 
are less likely to be chosen as the focal firms or the major customer firms. These characteristics, 
however, are consistent with the industry clustering of the focal firms and the major customers 
in the manufacturing industry as shown in Table 3.2. It is possible that these firms tend to be 
more established firms, with lower growth opportunities, lower profitability, and invest less 
heavily in intangible assets.  
 Overall, analysts’ incentive to generate trading commission for their brokerage firms is 
one of the key drivers of the analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms. 
This is consistent with earlier studies that suggest that analysts have higher incentives to acquire 
more precise firm-specific information when the potential trading commissions generated from 
the firm is high (Hayes, 1998). By covering the other parties in the firm’s supply chain, analysts 
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are able to generate more precise information about the firm; as a result, their forecasts for the 
firm are more accurate than in the absence of such supply chain information.  
3.6.8  Additional analyses on market reaction to supply chain analysts’ forecasts releases  
The above evidence suggests that an analyst’s supply chain portfolio design helps explain 
variations of her forecasting accuracy for the firms in her portfolio. Such a portfolio design is 
driven by the analyst’s economic incentive to generate trading commissions for her brokerage 
firm. My next question examined the extent to which supply chain analysts build their 
forecasting reputation on the firms in supply chain relations in their portfolios. Specifically, I 
examined the extent to which investors incorporate the implication of analysts’ supply chain 
portfolio approach on their forecasting accuracy for different firms within the same portfolio. I 
expect that if investors were to use all information concerning analyst forecast accuracy when 
reacting to a forecast release, investors would incorporate the effect of analyst’s portfolio choice 
in their response to the forecast release based on the expected analyst forecast accuracy for the 
firm. 
I used a valuation model similar to Bonner et al. (2003) and investigated the return 
response to all forecasts issued by supply chain analysts, controlling for the magnitude of the 
forecast revision relative to prior analysts’ consensus forecasts. I expect if the market reacts to a 
forecast release issued by a supply chain analyst as if the analyst’s supply chain portfolio 
approach matters on the expected forecasting accuracy for the firms in the analyst portfolio, 
then stock return upon the forecast release would be greater for the focal firm and the focal 
firm’s major customers because of greater expected forecasting accuracy for these firms than 
for “other” firms. 
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Untabulated results suggest that, after controlling for the sign and the magnitude of 
forecast revisions relative to prior analysts’ consensus forecasts, investors’ reaction in the short 
window (-1, +1) surrounding a forecast release by supply chain analysts is not significantly 
different between focal firms, major customers of the focal firms, and “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. In other words, the finding seems to indicate that investors’ reaction to the 
forecasts issued by supply chain analysts is not fixated on the expected analyst forecasting 
accuracy for different firms in the same portfolio.  
3.6.9  Robustness tests  
This section reports a variety of untabulated robustness tests of the empirical results. First, 
as discussed earlier, the sample contains multiple observations for each analyst or each firm. In 
this chapter, when I test the hypotheses, my main analyses used the Fama-MacBeth regression 
approach to estimate a cross-sectional regression for each analyst-year or firm-year separately. 
An alternative approach is to use all observations in a grand regression estimation, but use the 
generalized method-of-moments (GMM) estimator developed by Keane and Runkle (1998) to 
adjust the standard errors for both aggregate individual-specific or firm-specific effects (e.g., 
Bonner et al., 2003). Untabulated results suggest the statistical power for the outperformance in 
forecasting accuracy for the focal firms and the focal firms’ major customers for analysts taking 
a supply chain portfolio approach is much stronger in both within-analyst and cross-analyst 
analyses than the results reported using the Fama and MacBeth’s approach. 
Second, I used two alternative measures of forecasting accuracy and repeated the 
regression analyses for H1 to H3. One measure follows Hong et al. (2000) and Hong and Kubik 
(2003). It is an adjusted ranked score of the absolute forecast error using all forecasts issued for 
a firm in the same fiscal year based on the following formula: 
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where RANK_ERROR is the rank of the absolute value of the forecast error for each 
forecast. RANK_ERROR receives the lowest rank value of 1 if the absolute forecast error is the 
smallest among all forecasts issued for a firm in the same fiscal year. NUMBER_FORECAST  is 
the total number of forecasts issued for the firm over the fiscal year. The value of 
PCT_ERROR_RANK ranges from zero to 100, with the most accurate forecast receiving a value 
of zero, and the least accurate forecast receiving the highest value of 100.  
The other measure of forecasting error is the absolute forecast error scaled by assets per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year (Cheong and Thomas, 2010). Untabulated results show 
that when I used both of these two alternative forecasting accuracy measures, the results for H1-
H3 hypotheses testing remain unchanged.   
Third, I used a continuous variable to measure analysts’ supply chain coverage. In 
particular, I replaced the indicator variable that represents whether or not an analyst follows 
both a focal firm and one or more of the firm’s major customers with the total number of major 
customers of a focal firm the analyst follows in the regression analyses for the forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firms. Similarly, I also replaced the indicator variable with the total 
number of suppliers of a major customer that the analyst follows in the regression analyses for 
the forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms. The results are robust to these alternative 
measures.  
Fourth, following Ke and Yu (2006), I ruled out an alternative explanation that the 
superior forecasting accuracy for the focal firms for supply chain analysts was driven by 
analysts’ being strategic in their forecasts to gain more favorable access to management. I 
included three additional indicator variables in equation (1) to represent analysts’ being 
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strategic in their forecasts.50
Fifth, as the majority (75%) of the focal firms and major customer firms in the sample that 
supply chain analysts followed are from the same industry at the one digit SIC level, it is 
possible that these analysts may gain additional benefit in their forecasting accuracy for both 
the focal firms and the firms’ major customers by having both supply chain expertise and 
industry expertise for these firms. To test whether supply chain analysts are more accurate for 
the focal firms and the major customer firms when these firms are in the same industry, I added 
an indicator variable SAME_SIC1 that equals 1 if at least one of major customer is in the same 
industry at the one-digit SIC level as the major customer’s focal firm, 0 otherwise. I also added 
an interaction term between the indicator variable FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN and SAME_SIC1 
(FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN * SAME_SIC1) in the cross-analyst analyses of forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firms using the Fama-MacBeth approach. I followed the same approach 
when analyzing whether supply chain analysts are more accurate for the major customers firms 
if the major customers firms and at least one of the major customer’s focal firms are in the same 
industry.  Specifically, I defined SAME_SIC1 as 1 if at least one of the major customer’s focal 
firms is in the same industry at the one-digit SIC level as major customer firm, 0 otherwise. I 
also added the interaction term between the two indicator variables, SAME_SIC1 and 
 Untabulated results show that even after controlling for analysts’ 
potentially biased pattern in their forecasts, my main results still hold. The three indicator 
variables for analyst forecast bias pattern are all positive and significant, which is consistent 
with Ke and Yu’s (2006) finding that when analysts follow initial optimism and later pessimism, 
they can gain better access to management so that their future forecasts are more accurate.  
                                                                
50 I followed Ke and Yu (2006) and classified an analyst’s forecasting bias into four categories. I coded OO as 1 if 
the analyst’s first and last forecast issued for the fiscal period were both optimistic (i.e., the forecasted earning was 
greater than the realized earning), and 0 otherwise. OP equaled 1 if the analyst’s earnings forecast changed from 
initial optimism to later pessimism within the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. PO represented analysts’ bias pattern in 
their earnings forecasts by switching from initial pessimism to later optimism. Finally, PP denoted the analysts 
whose first and last earnings forecasts were always pessimistic. 
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CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN  (CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN * SAME_SIC1), to analyze 
the forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms. The results suggest that the signs of 
these terms are negative, but the coefficients are not significant. 
Sixth, I partitioned the sample into pre- and post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and 
repeated the regression analyses on analyst forecasting accuracy for H1 to H3. Untabulated 
results suggest that while the results hold in both periods, the magnitude of the outperformance 
in forecasting accuracy for supply chain analysts for both the focal firms and the firms’ major 
customers is greater in the post-Regulation FD period than in the pre-Regulation FD period, 
confirming that covering both a focal firm and the focal firm’s major customers gives analysts 
insights in producing more accurate earning s forecasts for both the focal firm and the firm’s 
major customer firms, and  such information advantage is more salient after fair disclosure 
regulation was imposed. 
Seventh, I also performed the tests by separating analyst forecasts based on the forecast 
horizon, and re-examined whether the results would be different between quarterly and annual 
forecasts. I find consistent evidence in both annual and quarterly forecasts.  
Lastly, I built a two-stage Heckman model to address the selection bias of analysts’ choice 
of the focal firms or their major customers (Heckman, 1979). Specifically, in the first step, I 
first computed an inverse Mills ratio from a probit regression model based on Equation (3) and 
estimated the probability that a firm was chosen to be a focal firm or the firm’s major customer 
firm. I then included the computed inverse Mills ratio as an additional explanatory variable to 
re-estimate equation (1). My main results remain unchanged. 
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3.7  Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between analysts’ supply chain coverage portfolio 
and their forecasting accuracy. Specifically, I focus on the impact of analyst decisions to include 
one or more of the major customers of a focal firm in their portfolios on analyst forecasting 
accuracy. I find that an analyst who follows both a focal firm and one or more of the focal 
firm’s major customers issues significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm 
and for the firm’s major customer than (1) the same analyst issues for “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio, and (2) other analysts issue who only follow the same firm but not the other 
parties in the firm’s supply chain. These results are robust after controlling for known 
determinants that affect analyst forecasting accuracy and after correcting for potential self-
selection bias using the inverse Mills ratio approach. I also find that supply chain analysts issue 
significantly less accurate earnings forecasts for ”other” firms in their portfolios than all other 
non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firms issue. When I examine the overall 
forecasting accuracy for supply chain analysts at the portfolio level, I find that supply chain 
analysts are on average less accurate than other non-supply chain analysts. This result is 
consistent with the finding that supply chain analysts cover significant more firms in a more 
diversified industry than all other analysts cover. It is possible analysts expend more effort to 
cover additional firms from a more diversified industry in order to maintain their supply chain 
coverage portfolio. This finding echoes the conclusion drawn from H1 to H3 concerning the 
relative importance of the focal firms and the major customers in supply chain analysts’ 
portfolios.  
To examine the economic factors that influence an analyst’s choice of the focal firms and 
the major customer firms, I find that the focal firms and the firms’ major customers are more 
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likely to generate a high level of trading commission fees for the analyst’s brokerage firm, are 
larger, and operate in industries with a greater number of peer firms, than “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. Overall, the evidence in this chapter suggests that analysts organize their  
coverage portfolios to achieve both their personal objective to be accurate in their earnings 
forecasts and their objective to generate revenue for their brokerage firms.  
 Some caveats are in place. First, in this chapter, I did not disentangle the effect of analyst 
skills on analyst forecasting accuracy. It is possible that analysts who are more skilled and have 
more experience self select to be a supply chain analyst, as well as self determine the number of 
firms and industries they follow. Indeed, the Fama and MacBeth’s approach was used in this 
chapter to mitigate the concern on the effect of individual analyst differences on analyst 
forecasting accuracy. Nevertheless, the potential effect of self-selection (skills, ability, and 
individual knowledge etc.) warrants further investigation. 
Second, in examining analyst forecasting accuracy for the major customers, I assume that 
purchase from suppliers can be important costs for the major customers and analysts benefit in 
their earnings forecasts for the suppliers’ major customers by also preparing issuing forecasts 
for the suppliers. However, as I have discussed in section 4.1, SFAS No. 14 (FASB 1975) 
requires firms to disclose the names of their major customer firms, but not their suppliers. As a 
result, I determined major customer firms’ suppliers by inverting the reporting firm–major 
customer relations based on the information provided in the Compustat customer segment file. 
In other words, the suppliers of the major customers are not identified from a universe of the 
suppliers of the major customers, and the identified suppliers may not be the major suppliers for 
the major customer firms. This implies that the influence of the identified supplier firms on the 
costs incurred by the major customers may not be significant, and the insights analysts gain 
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from issuing forecasts for the supplier firms may not be significant in their earnings forecasting 
task for the suppliers’ major customers. This limitation would work against finding empirical 
support for H2.  
Third, in examining analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms, I 
assume that investors’ more active trading on the stock of the firm can be attributed to analysts’ 
producing more informative and more precise earnings information for the firm. I also assume 
that more active investors’ trading will generate more trading commission fees for the analyst’s 
brokerage firms. While prior studies provided empirical evidence that analysts who produce 
more precise and accurate earnings forecasts also produce more profitable stock 
recommendations (e.g., Ertimur et al., 2007), the direct empirical evidence is lacking 
concerning whether supply chain analysts also generate more trading commissions from their 
more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firms and the major customer firms. These and 
others are left for future research. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation includes two essays that examine earnings forecasting accuracy. These 
two essays, presented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, focus on the effects of individual forecasters’ 
behavioral biases and their economic rationality on their forecasting accuracy. 
In particular, Chapter 2 examines the effect of managers’ behavioral biases on their 
forecasting accuracy over time. I examine how managers’ overconfidence and attribution biases 
affect the way they process feedback information concerning their prior forecasts. I find that 
overconfident managers improve their forecasting accuracy over time in response to feedback 
concerning their prior forecasts, but they do so more slowly than their less confident peers. I 
also find that overconfident managers only respond to less ambiguous feedback in the form of 
forecasting errors, but they do not respond to more ambiguous market feedback. Their less 
confident counterparts, on the other hand, respond both to less ambiguous error feedback and 
also to more ambiguous market feedback. Overall, the evidence from Chapter 2 is consistent 
with the combined effect of managers’ overconfidence and attribution biases inhibiting the 
improvement of management forecasting accuracy over time.  
Chapter 3 examines analysts’ portfolio organization design and the effect of such 
portfolio design on analyst forecasting accuracy. In Chapter 3, I propose that some analysts 
organize their coverage portfolios through a firm’s supply chain relations by including both a 
focal firm and one or more of the focal firm’s major customer firms in the portfolio. I argue that 
when analysts issue forecasts for both a focal firm and the focal firm’s major customers, the 
insights they have about both parties in the firm’s supply chain provide the analysts with the  
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information advantages to produce more accurate earnings forecasts for both the focal firm and 
the focal firm’s major customers.  
My empirical evidence supports my expectations. In particular, I find that an analyst 
who follows both a focal firm and one more of the focal firm’s major customers issues 
significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firm and the firm’s major customers 
than the same analyst issues for  “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. In addition, this analyst 
also issue significantly more accurate earnings forecasts for the focal firms and the focal firms’ 
major customers than other non-supply chain analysts issue who only follow the same firms but 
not the other parties in the firms’ supply chains. At the same time, I also find that the supply 
chain analyst issues significantly less accurate earnings forecasts for “other” firms in the analyst 
portfolio than other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” firms. This evidence 
suggests the relative importance of the focal firms and the major customer firms in the supply 
chain analyst’s portfolio. It is possible that the supply chain analyst may have sacrificed her 
forecasting accuracy for “other” firms in the portfolio to achieve her superior forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firms and the major customer firms.  
I next provide a rational explanation for an analyst’s choice of the focal firms and the 
firms’ major customers in the portfolio. I find that an analyst is more likely to choose a firm as 
the focal firm and follow one or more of the focal firm’s major customers, or as a major 
customer and follow one or more of the major customer’s suppliers, when the potential to 
generate trading commissions from the stock of the firm is higher, and when the firm operates 
in an industry segment that has a larger number of other peer firms. This result suggests that 
supply chain analysts rationally make their portfolio design choices to achieve their economic 
objective to bring revenue to their brokerage firms.  
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Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 provide empirical support for the perspective that 
earnings forecasting accuracy is affected by both individuals’ behavioral biases as well as their 
economic rationality. Such effects are reflected in both cross-sectional and time-series analyses 
of earnings forecasting accuracy. 
As Chapter 3 is the first study that connects the concept of analysts’ supply chain 
portfolio approach with cross-sectional variations of analyst earnings forecasting accuracy, a 
number of interesting yet unanswered questions in this area remain for future research. For 
example, recent studies have suggested that analysts issuing more accurate earnings forecasts 
also issue more profitable stock recommendations (e.g., Loh and Mian, 2006). Considering the 
evidence shown in Chapter 3 that supply chain analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts 
for the focal firms and the focal firms’ major customers than other non-supply chain analysts 
following the same firms issue, it would be interesting to examine whether supply chain 
analysts will generate more profitable stock recommendations for the firms in supply chain 
relations than they will generate for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. Another issue 
concerns analyst reputations. Do analysts build their reputation for issuing profitable stock 
recommendation for a selective number of firms in their portfolios or for the overall 
profitability of the recommendations for all the firms in the analyst portfolio? Moreover, given 
some analysts choose to be specialized in a firm’s supply chain relations, while other analysts 
choose to be specialized in a particular industry, do we observe analysts switching from one 
specialization to another specialization? If so, why do some analysts switch their portfolio 
designs and what is the effect of such switching on analyst forecasting performance? Broader 
questions such as factors that drive analyst portfolio design decisions and the extent to which 
analyst expertise in one specialization (e.g., industry specialization, country specialization, or 
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supply chain specialization) is portable to another specialization are also intriguing. These and 
other issues are left to future research.  
107 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Aboody, D., and R. Kasznik. 2000. CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate 
Voluntary Disclosures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (3): 73–100.  
 
Ajinkya, B.B., Gift, M.J., 1984. Corporate Managers' Earnings Forecasts and Symmetrical 
Adjustments of Market Expectations. Journal of Accounting Research 22: 425-444. 
 
Altman, Edward I., 1968. Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis, and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy. Journal of Finance, 23(4): 589-609. 
 
Anderson, J., 1983. The Architecture of Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Anderson, C., Berdahl, J.L., 2002. The Experience of Power: Examining the Effects of Power 
on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83: 1362 
 
Annett, J., 1969. Feedback and Human Behavior. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books. 
 
Anilowski, C., Feng, M., Skinner, D.J, 2007. Does Earnings Guidance Affect Market Returns? 
The Nature and Information Content of Aggregate Earnings Guidance. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 44: 36–63. 
 
Arrow, K., 1962. Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. R. R. 
Nelson (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, NJ. 
 
Atiase, R., 1985. Predisclosure Information, Firm Capitalization, and Security Price Behavior 
around Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research, 21-36. 
  
Baiman, S., Rajan, M., 2002a. The Role of Information and Opportunism in the Choice of 
Buyer-supplier Relationships. Journal of Accounting Research 40: 247-278. 
 
Baiman, S., Rajan., M., 2002b. Incentive Issues in Inter-firm Relationships. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 27: 213-238. 
 
Baginski S.P., M. Hassell, 1990. The Market Interpretation of Management Forecasts as a 
Predictor of Subsequent Financial Analyst Forecast Revision. The Accounting Review 65: 175–
190. 
 
Baginski, S.P., Hassell, J.M., Hillison, W.A., 2000. Voluntary Causal Disclosures: Tendencies 
and Capital Market Reaction. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 15: 371-389. 
 
Baginski, S.P., Hassell, J.M., Kimbrough, M.D., 2004. Why Do Managers Explain Their 
Earnings Forecasts? Journal of Accounting Research 42: 1-29. 
 
108 
 
Balakrishnan, R., Linsmeier, T., Venkatachalam., M., 1996. Financial Benefits from JIT 
Adoption: Effects of Customer Concentration and Cost Structure. The Accounting Review 71: 
183-205. 
 
Bamber, L., Y. Cheon., 1998. Discretionary Management Earnings Forecast Disclosures: 
Antecedents and Consequences of Forecast Venue and Forecast Specificity Choices. Journal of 
Accounting Research 36: 167–190. 
 
Banker, R., Chen, L., 2006. Predicting Earnings Using a Model Based on Cost Variability and 
Cost Stickiness. The Accounting Review 81: 285-307. 
 
Barniv, Rain, Wayne B. Thomas and Mark Myring, 2005. The Association between the Legal 
and Financial Reporting Environments and Forecast Performance of Individual Analysts. 
Contemporary Accounting Research, 22(4): 727–758.   
 
Barron, O., D. Byard and O. Kim, 2002. Changes in analysts’ information around earnings 
announcements. The Accounting Review 77, 821 – 846.  
 
Barth, M., Kasznik, R., McNichols, M., 2001. Analyst Coverage and Intangible Assets. Journal 
of Accounting Research 39: 1-34. 
 
Bartov, E., Givoly, D., Hayn, C., 2002. The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Earnings  
Expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33: 173-204. 
 
Ben-David, I., Graham, J.R., Harvey, C.R., 2007. Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate 
Policies. Working Paper, University of Chicago. 
 
Bergstresser, D., Philippon, T., 2005. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management. Journal of 
Financial Economics 80: 511-529. 
 
Bettman, J. and B. Weitz. 1983. Attributions in the board room: Causal reasoning in corporate 
annual reports. Administrative Science Quarterly 28: 165-183.  
 
Beyer, A., Cohen, D.A., Lys, T.Z., Walther, B.R., 2010. The Financial Reporting Environment: 
Review of the Recent Literature. Working paper, Stanford University. 
 
Billett, M.T., Qian, Y., 2008. Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self-
Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers. Management Science 54: 1037-1051 
 
Bonner, S., R. Libby, Nelson, M., 1997. Audit Category Knowledge as a Precondition to  
Learning from Experience. Accounting, Organizations and Society 22(5): 387–410. 
 
Bonner, S.E., Hugon, A., Walther, B.R., 2003. Investor Reaction to Celebrity Analysts: The 
Case of Earnings Forecast Revisions. Journal of Accounting Research 45: 481-513. 
 
 
109 
 
Bradshaw, M., 2004. How do Analysts Use Their Earnings Forecasts in Generating Stock 
Recommendations?. The Accounting Review 79: 25–50. 
  
Brown, L., Rozeff, M., 1978. The Superiority of Analyst Forecasts as Measures of Expectations: 
Evidence from Earnings. Journal of Finance 33: 1-16. 
 
Brown, L., Richardson, G., Schwager, S., 1987. An Information Interpretation of Financial 
Analyst Superiority in Forecasting Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research: 49-67. 
 
Brown, L.D., Hagerman, R.L., Griffin, P.A., Zmijewski, M.E., 1987. Security Analyst 
Superiority Relative to Univariate Time Series Models in Forecasting Quarterly Earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 9: 61-87. 
 
Camerer, C., 1995. Individual Decision Making. In: Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E. (ed.): Handbook of 
Experimental Economics: 587-703. 
 
Cheong, F.S., Thomas, J.K., 2010. Why do EPS Forecast Error and Dispersion not Vary with 
Scale? Implications for Analyst and Managerial Behavior. Journal of Accounting Research. 
Forthcoming. 
 
Clarke, J., Khorana, A., Patel, A., Rau, P.R., 2007. The impact of All-Star analyst job changes 
on their coverage choices and subsequent investment banking deal flow. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 84(3): 713-737. 
 
Clement, M.B., 1999. Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Do ability, Resources, and portfolio 
Complexity Matter? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27: 285-303. 
 
Clement, M., Tse. S., 2003. Do Investors Respond to Analysts' Forecast Revisions as if Forecast 
Accuracy is All that Matters?. The Accounting Review 78, 227-249. 
  
Cooper, R., Slagmulder, R., 1999. Supply Chain Development for the Lean Enterprise: 
Interorganizational Cost Management Portland, OR: Productivity Press.  
 
Core, J., Guay, W., 2002. Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their 
Sensitivities to Price and Volatility. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 613-630. 
 
Cotter, J., Tuna, I., Wysocki, P.D., Callen, J.L., 2006. Expectations Management and Beatable 
Targets: How Do Analysts React to Explicit Earnings Guidance? Contemporary Accounting 
Research 23: 593–628. 
 
De Franco, G., Kothari, S.P., Verdi, R.S., 2009. The Benefits of Financial Statement 
Comparability. Working paper, University of Toronto. 
 
Dimson, E. 1979. Risk Measurement When Shares are Subject to Infrequent Trading. Journal 
of Financial Economics: 5: 263-278.  
 
110 
 
 
Duru, A., Reeb, D.M., 2002. International Diversification and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and 
Bias. The Accounting Review 77: 415-433. 
 
Einhorn, H.J., Hogarth, R.M., 1978. Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of 
Validity. Psychological Review 85: 395–416. 
 
Ellis, J.A., Fee, C.E., Thomas, S.E., 2010. Product Market Competition and the Disclosure of 
Information about Customers. Working paper, University of Pittsburgh. 
 
Ertimur, Y., Sunder, J., Sunder, S., 2007. Measure for Measure: The Relation between Forecast 
Accuracy and Recommendation Profitability of Analysts. Journal of Accounting Research 45: 
567-606. 
  
Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D., 1973. Risk, Return and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests. Journal of 
Political Economy 81: 607-63. 
 
Fang, L., Yasuda, A., 2009. The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Mechanism in 
Sell-Side Research. The Review of Financial Studies 22: 3735-3777. 
  
Fee, C.E., Thomas, S., 2004. Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, 
Supplier, and Rival firms. Journal of Financial Economics 74: 423-460. 
 
Feng, M., Mcvay, S., 2010. Analysts’ Incentives to Overweight Management Guidance When 
Revising Their Short Term Earnings Forecasts. The Accounting Review. Forthcoming. 
 
Feng, M., Koch, A., 2010. Once Bitten, Twice Shy: The Relation Between Outcomes of 
Earnings Guidance and Management Guidance Strategy. The Accounting Review. Forthcoming. 
 
Frankel, R., Lee., C., 1998. Accounting Valuation, Market Expectation, and Cross-Sectional 
Stock Returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25, 283-320. 
  
Fried, D., Givoly, D., 1982. Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: A Better Surrogate for 
Market Expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 4: 85–107. 
 
Frost, C.A., 1997. Disclosure Policy Choices of UK Firms Receiving Modified Audit Reports. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 23: 163–187. 
 
Gavirneni, S., Kapuschinski, R., Tayur., S., 1999. Value of Information in Capacitated Supply 
Chain. Management Science 45: 16-24. 
  
Gilson, S.C., Healy, P.M., Noe, C.F., Palepu, K.G., 2001. Analyst Specialization and 
Conglomerate Stock Breakups. Journal of Accounting Research 39: 565-582. 
 
Givoly, D., Lakonishok, J., 1984. Properties of Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings: A Review and 
Analysis of the Research. Journal of Accounting Literature 3: 117-152. 
111 
 
  
Gong, G., Li, L.Y., Wang, J.J., 2009. Serial Correlation in Management Forecast Errors. 
Working Paper, Pennsylvania State University and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
 
Graham, J., Harvey, C., Rajgopal, S., 2005. The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73. 
 
Groysberg, B., Healy, P., Maber, D., 2008. What Drivers Sell-side Analyst Compensation at 
High-status Investment Banks? Working paper Harvard Business School. 
  
Hilary, G., Menzly, L., 2006. Does Past Success Lead Analysts to Become Overconfident?. 
Management Science 52: 489–500. 
 
Hayes, R., 1998. The Impact of Trading Commission Incentives on Analysts' Stock Coverage 
Decisions and Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 36: 299-320. 
 
Hayward, M. L.A., Hambrick, D.C., 1997. Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large 
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 103-127. 
 
Healy, P.M., Palepu, K.G., 2001. Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the 
Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 31: 405-440. 
 
Heckman, J., 1979. The Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica 47: 153-
162. 
 
Hertzel, M.G., Li, Z., Officerb, M.S., Rodgers, K.J., 2008. Inter-firm Linkages and the Wealth 
Effects of Financial Distress along the Supply Chain. Journal of Financial Economics 87: 374-
387. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., 2001. Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing. Journal of Finance 56: 1533-1597. 
 
Hirst, E., L. Koonce, and S. Venkataraman. 2008. Management Earnings Forecasts: A Review 
and Framework. Accounting Horizons 22 (3): 315–338. 
 
Hoch, S.J., Loewenstein, G.F., 1989. Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Information. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 15: 605-619. 
 
Hogarth, R., Brian J. Gibbs, Craig R. M. McKenzie, and Margaret A. Marquis, 1991. Learning 
from Feedback: Exactingness and Incentives. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition 17: 734-752. 
 
Hong, H., Kubik, J., Solomon, A., 2000. Security Analysts’ Career Concerns and Herding of 
Earnings Forecasts. The Rand Journal of Economics 31, 121-145. 
 
 
112 
 
Hong, H., Kubik, J., 2003. Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and Biased Earnings 
Forecasts. The Journal of Finance 58: 313-352. 
 
Hribar, P., Yang, H., 2007. CEO Overconfidence, Managerial Earnings Forecasts, and Earnings 
Management. Working Paper, University of Iowa and Cornell University. 
 
Huber, G.P., 1991. Organizational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literatures 
Organization Science 2: 88-115. 
 
Hutton, A.P., Stocken, P., 2009. Effect of Reputation on the Credibility of Management 
Forecasts. Working Paper. 
 
Ilgen, D.R., Fisher, C.D., Taylor, M.S., 1979. Consequences of Individual Feedback on  
Behavior in Organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology 64: 349-371. 
 
Jacob, J., Lys, T.Z., Neale, M.A., 1999. Expertise in Forecasting Performance of Security 
Analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 51-82. 
 
Jacob, John, Steve Rock  and David P. Weber, 2008. Do Non-Investment Bank Analysts Make 
Better Earnings Forecasts? Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 23(1): 23–61. 
 
Jackson, A.R., 2005. Trade Generation, Reputation, and Sell-Side Analysts. Journal of Finance 
60: 673–717. 
 
Jennings, R., 1987. Unsystematic Security Price Movements, Management Earning  
Forecasts, and Revisions in Consensus Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts. Journal of  
Accounting Research, 25(1): 90-110. 
 
Jiang, J., Petroni, K., Wang, I., 2010. CFOs and CEOs: Who Has the Most Influence on 
Earnings Management? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3): 513-526. 
 
Jin, L., Kothari, S.P., 2006. Effect of Personal Taxes on Managers' Decisions to Sell Their 
Stock. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46: 23-46. 
 
Johnson, S., Ryan, H., and Tian, Y. 2009. Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The 
Sources of Incentives Matter. Review of Finance, 13(1): 115-145. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky, 1973. A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and 
Probability. Cognitive Psychology 5: 207-232. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky, eds., 2000, Choices, Values, and Frames. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
 
Kasznik, R., Lev, R., 1995. To Warn or Not to Warn: Management Disclosures in the  
Face of an Earnings Surprise. The Accounting Review 70: 113-134. 
 
113 
 
Kaplan, R.S., Narayanan, V.G., 2001. Measuring and Managing Customer Profitability. Journal 
of Cost Management 15: 5-15. 
 
Ke, B., Yu, Y., 2006. The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analyst's Access to 
Management and Survival. Journal of Accounting Research 44: 965-998. 
 
Keane, M., D. Runkle. 1998. Are Financial Analysts’ Forecasts of Corporate Profits Rational?. 
Journal of Political Economy 106: 768–805 
 
King, R., G. Pownall, Waymire, G., 1990. Expectations Adjustment via Timely Management 
Forecasts:  Review, Synthesis, and Suggestions for Future Research. Journal of Accounting 
Literature 9, 113-144. 
  
Kini, O., Mian, S., Rebello, M., Venkateswaran, A., 2009. On the Structure of Analyst Research 
Portfolios and Forecast Accuracy. Journal of Accounting and Research 47(4): 867-909. 
 
Kulp, S., Lee, H., Ofek, E., 2004. Manufacturer Benefits from Information Integration with 
Retail Customers. Management Science 50: 431-444. 
 
Lang, M. and R. Lundholm, 1993. Cross-sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of 
Corporate Disclosure., Journal of Accounting Research 31: 246–271. 
 
Lang, M., Lundholm, R., 1996. Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior. The 
Accounting Review 71: 467-492. 
 
Larwood L., Whittaker, W., 1977. Managerial Myopia: Self-serving Biases in 
Organizational Planning. Journal of Applied Psychology 62: 194–198.  
 
Lee, H., So, K., Tang, C., 2000. The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-level Supply Chain. 
Management Science 46: 626-643. 
 
Lieberson, S., O'Connor, J.F., 1972. Leadership and Organizational Performance: A Study of 
Large Corporations. American Sociological Review 37: 117-130. 
 
Lin, H., McNichols, M., 1998. Underwriting Relationships, Analysts' Earnings Forecasts, and 
Investment Recommendations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 25: 101-128. 
 
Ljungqvist, A., Marston, F., Wilhelm, W.J., 2006. Competing for Securities Underwriting 
Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations. Journal of Finance 61: 301-
340. 
 
Loh, R.K., Mian, G.M., 2006. Do Accurate Earnings Forecasts Facilitate Superior Investment 
Recommendations? Journal of Financial Economics 80, 455–483. 
  
Lundholm, R., Sloan, R., 2007. Equity Valuation and Analysis with eVal. MaGraw-Hill, New 
York, NY. 
114 
 
 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2005. CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment. Journal of 
Finance 60: 2661–2700. 
 
Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2008. Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the 
Market's Reaction. Journal of Financial Economics 89: 20–43. 
 
Matsumoto, D.A.M., 2002. Management's Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises. 
The Accounting Review 77: 483–514. 
 
Matsumura, E.M., Schloetzer, J.D., 2009. Strong Buyers and Inter-Organizational Cost 
Management: Evidence from the Apparel Industry. Working paper, Georgetown University. 
 
McNichols, M., 1989. Evidence of Informational Asymmetries from Management Earnings 
Forecasts and Stock Returns. The Accounting Review 64: 1–27. 
 
Michaely, R., Womack, K.L., 1999. Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter 
Analyst Recommendations. Review of Financial Studies 12: 653-686. 
 
Mikhail, M.B., Walther, B.R., Willis, R.H., 1997. Do Security Analysts Improve their 
Performance with Experience? Journal of Accounting Research 35: 131-157. 
 
Mikhail, M.B., Walther, B.R., Willis, R.H., 1999. Does Forecast Accuracy Matter to Security 
Analysts? The Accounting Review 74: 185-200. 
 
Newey, W. K., and K. D. West, 1987, A Simple Positive Semi-Definite Hetescedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Matrix Estimation, Econometrica 55, 703-708. 
 
Noe, C., 1999. Voluntary Disclosures and Insider Transactions. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 27: 305-327. 
 
O'Brien, P., 1988. Analysts' Forecast as Earnings Expectations. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 10: 53-83. 
 
O'Brien, P., Bhushan, R., 1990. Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership. Journal of 
Accounting Research 28: 55-76. 
 
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing 
Approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22: 435-480. 
 
Postman, L., Brown, D.R., 1952. The Perceptual Consequences of Success and Failure. The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47: 213-221. 
 
Ramnath, S., Rock, S., Shane, P., 2008. The Financial Analyst Forecasting Literature: A 
Taxonomy with Suggestions for Further Research. International Journal of Forecasting 24: 34–
75. 
115 
 
 
Rogers, J.L., Stocken, P., 2005. Credibility of Management Forecasts. The Accounting Review 
80(4): 1233–1260. 
 
Roll, R., 1986. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. Journal of business 59: 197–
216. 
 
Schrand, Catherine M. and Sarah L. C. Zechman., 2010. Executive Overconfidence and the 
Slippery Slope to Fraud, Working paper, University of Pennsylvania and University of Chicago.  
 
Skinner, D. 1994. Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News. Journal of Accounting Research, 
32(1): 38–60. 
 
Skinner, D.J., 1997. Earnings Disclosures and Stockholder Lawsuits. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 23: 249–282. 
 
Sonney, F., 2007. Financial Analysts' Performance: Sector versus Country Specialization. 
Review of Financial Studies 22: 2087-2131. 
 
Svenson, O., 1981. Are We all Less Risky and More Skilful than Our Fellow Drivers?   
Acta Psychologica. 47(2): 143–148. 
 
Trueman, B., 1986. Why do Managers Voluntarily Release Earnings Forecasts? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 8, 53-71.  
  
Waymire, G., 1984. Additional Evidence on the Information Content of Management Earnings 
Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 22: 703-718. 
 
Waymire, G., 1985. Earnings Volatility and Voluntary Management Forecast Disclosure. 
Journal of Accounting Research 23: 268-295. 
 
Williams, P.A., 1996. The Relation Between a Prior Earnings Forecast by Management and 
Analyst Response to a Current Management Forecast. The Accounting Review 71: 103–113. 
 
Yang, H., 2009. Managers' Guidance Behavior and its Effect on Investors and Analysts. 
Dissertation at Johnson School of Management, Cornell University. 
 
  
116 
 
List of Appendices 
 
Appendix 2.1: Definition of variables  
 
VARIABLE NAME 
  
DEFINITIONS 
OVERCONFIDENCE MEASURES 
OC_MFt 
An indicator variable for overconfident managers. It equals 1 if the first forecast places the CEO 
in the top 50% of all optimistic forecasts issued in the same quarter, and 0 otherwise.  
UC_MFt 
An indicator variable for less confident managers. It equals 1 if the first forecast places the CEO 
in the top 25% of all pessimistic forecasts issued in the same quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
OC_MEDIA1t 
An indicator variable for overconfident managers. It equals 1 if prior to issuing his first forecast 
for the firm in his tenure,  the CEO is more often described by major presses such as The New 
York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, and The Economist  in “confident” terms than in 
“less confident” terms. CEOs without press mentions are assigned a value of 0.  
OC_MEDIA2t 
The continuous measure for OC_MEDIA1t, measured as  the difference between the number of 
times a CEO is described by major presses such as The New York Times, Business Week, 
Financial Times, and The Economist in “confident” terms and in “less confident” terms. CEOs 
without press mentions are assigned a value of 0.  
OC_PURt 
An indicator variable for CEO overconfidence. It equals 1 if a CEO whose cumulative net 
purchase of the stock of his own firm is positive before he issued his first forecast for the form in 
his tenure, 0 otherwise. CEOs without any insider trading data are assigned a value of 0.  
FEEDBACK VARIABLES  
MKT_FBt-1 
The difference of the expected buy-and-hold stock return during the three day (-1,1) window 
following the prior  management forecast between a model assuming that managers  are different 
in the degrees of confidence, and another model assuming that all managers are homogenously 
confident. Details are described in the chapter. 
ERROR_FBt-1 
Feedback via prior management forecasting error, calculated as the absolute difference between 
the forecasted earnings and the actual earnings, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the 
quarter.  
CAR-1,1 
Market buy-and-hold stock return during the three day window (-1, 1) following a management 
forecast release. 
MF_FREQUENCYt 
Forecasting frequency, defined as the total number of quarterly forecasts managers issued for the 
fiscal quarter t. 
DIS_CONTINUEt 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the manager continues providing subsequent forecasts, 0 if the 
manager no longer provides any subsequent quarterly management forecast. 
FORECASTS CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES 
OPTIMISTICt 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the forecasted earnings for the quarter is greater than actual 
earnings for the quarter, 0 otherwise.  
ERRORt 
Management forecast error, calculated as the unsigned difference between forecasted earnings 
and the actual earning, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter.  
BIASt 
Management forecast bias, calculated as the signed difference between forecasted earnings and the 
actual earning, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter.  
PREDICT_LOSSt 
An indicator variable equals 1 if the forecasted earnings for quarter t are less than zero; and 0 
otherwise. 
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NEWSt 
News conveyed in management forecasts, calculated as the difference between forecasted earnings 
and the preceding analyst consensus forecasts, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
quarter. 
GOOD_NEWSt 
Equal to the news conveyed in the forecast if the forecasted earnings is greater than the preceding 
analyst consensus forecasts, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, 0 otherwise. 
BAD_NEWSt 
Equal to the news conveyed in the forecast if the forecasted earnings is smaller than the preceding 
analyst consensus forecasts, scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter, 0 otherwise. 
HORIZONt 
Forecasting horizon is equal to the number of lag days between the forecast release date and the 
earnings announcement date. 
EXPt The number of forecasts a manager issued prior to the current forecast. 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLE 
DIV t-1 An indicator equals 1 if declared dividends, and 0 otherwise. 
LONG_TERM_DEBT t-1 Portion of long-term debt out of total debt. 
RD_RATIO t-1  Research and development expense over the total sales. 
REPURCHASE t-1 
 An indicator equals 1 if purchase of common and preferred stock is greater than 1% of equity, 0   
otherwise. 
ROA t-1 
Return on assets, measured as earnings before extraordinary items divided by average total  assets 
at quarter t-1.  
CH_ROAt 
Change of return on assets, calculated as return on assets at quarter t minus return on assets at 
quarter t-1. 
BM t-1 Book to market ratio, measured as the book value of equity, divided by the market value of equity. 
CH_BMt 
Change of the book to market ratio, calculated as the book to market ratio at quarter t minus 
market to book ratio at quarter t-1. 
HH_INDEX t-1 
The Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the firms’ sales 
in the two-digit SIC industry. 
CH_HHINDEXt 
Change in the Herfindahl index, calculated as the index at quarter t minus the index at quarter. 
t-1. 
LOG_ASSETS t-1 Log of one plus total assets. 
CH_LOG ASSETSt  
Change of log assets, calculated as the log of total sale at quarter t minus log of total assets at 
quarter t-1. 
SALES_GROWTH t-1 
Sales growth, calculated as total sales at time quarter t minus the total sales at quarter t-1, scaled 
by total sales at quarter t-1. 
CH_SALEGROWTHt Change of sale growth, calculated as the sale growth at quarter t minus sale growth at quarter t-1. 
ALTMAN t-1 
The Altman Z score (1968), computed as [1.2*working capital /total assets – 1.4*retained 
earnings/total assets + 3.3 * operating income/total assets + 0.6*market value of equity/total 
liability + sales/total assets] at the beginning of quarter t. 
CH_ALTMANt 
Change of  the Altman score, calculated as the Altman Z at quarter t minus the Altman Z score at 
quarter t-1. 
118 
 
|WACC t-1| 
Working capital accruals, measured as the absolute value of [increase in account receivable + 
increase in inventory + decrease in account payable + decrease in income tax payable + net 
change in other accrued liabilities / lag total assets ] at the beginning of quarter t. 
LITIGATION t-1 
An indicator variable set to 1 for litigious industries, including Biotechnology (SIC 2833 - 2836), 
Computer Hardware (SIC 3570 - 3577), Electronics (SIC 3600 - 3674), Retailing (SIC 5200 - 
5961), and Computer Software (SIC 7371 to 7379), and 0 otherwise. 
N_ANALYST t-1 Number of individual analysts issuing forecasts for the firm in quarter t-1. 
STD_EPS t-1 
Standard deviation of earnings per share over the past 16 quarters ending one quarter before the 
end of quarter t, scaled by the assets per share at the beginning of quarter t. 
BETA t-1 
Firm risk, measured by the Dimson (1979) beta estimates. It is obtained by summing the slope 
coefficients on the two lagged and contemporaneous returns based on the CAPM model.  
INCENTIVE_RATIO t-1 
Following Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), incentive ratio measures pay-for-performance 
sensitivity for CEOs for the period when they issue forecasts. I calculate ONEPCT as the total 
change in value of the CEO’s stock and stock option portfolio in response to a 1% change in the 
stock price using the method described by Core and Guay (2002), and then calculate pay-for-
performance sensitivity as ONEPCT/(ONEPCT+ Salary + Bonus). 
PUR_PCTt-1 
The cumulative percentage of stock purchased by the CEO in the year prior to issuing the 
forecasts relative to the market value at the beginning of the quarter.  
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Appendix 2.2: 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for overconfident CEOs using alternative CEO overconfidence 
measures 
 
Variables 
Overconfident  CEO 
(N=283) 
Less confident CEOs 
(N=285) t-test statistics 
(one-tailed P-value) Mean Mean 
OC_PUR 0.063 0.025 2.22** (0.015) 
OC_MEDIA1 0.111 0.067 1.81** (0.035) 
OC_MEDIA2 0.217 0.089 1.76** (0.039) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the proportion of overconfident and less confident CEOs 
using the alternative CEO overconfidence measures. All other variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. 
The t-test of mean of the variable uses the pooled method when the underlying variances are equal and 
the satterthwaite method when they are unequal. Absolute values of the t-test statistics are reported. 
One-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on firm policies for overconfident CEOs 
Variables 
Overconfident  
CEOs 
Less confident 
CEOs t-test statistics 
(two-tailed P-value) Mean Mean 
ROA 0.021 0.031 -2.12** (0.03) 
DIV 0.404 0.430 -1.95* (0.054) 
LONG_TERM_DEBT 0.777 0.744 4.02*** (0.001) 
RD_RATIO 0.014 0.012 2.67*** (0.008) 
REPURCHASE 0.3370 0.313 1.86* (0.062) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on different dimensions of corporate policies between firms 
with overconfident CEOs and firms with less confident CEOs. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 2.1. The t-test of mean of the variable uses the pooled method when the underlying variances 
are equal and the satterthwaite method when they are unequal. Absolute values of the t-test statistics are 
reported. Two-tailed p-values are reported in parentheses.  
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Panel C: Logit regression - Are overconfident CEOs more likely to issue optimistic 
subsequent forecasts?  
 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable:  OPTIMISTICt  (1,0) 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT 
-0.754*** -0.956*** 
(-25.98) (-3.21) 
OC_MF 
0.225*** 0.144* 
(2.99) (1.70) 
NEWSt 
0.146 3.515** 
(0.30) (2.28) 
BIASt-1 
 16.703 
 (1.15) 
EXPt 
 -0.007 
 (-1.02) 
CEO_AGEt 
 0.006* 
 (1.89) 
LOG_HORIZONt 
 -0.014 
 (-0.30) 
SALE_GROWTHt-1 
 -0.379** 
 (-2.33) 
BMt-1 
 0.532*** 
 (5.21) 
HHINDEX t-1 
 0.000 
 (0.11) 
LOG_ASSETSt-1 
 -0.052** 
 (-2.20) 
ALTMANt-1 
 0.040 
 (0.58) 
|WACCt-1| 
 -1.616* 
 (-1.92) 
Observations 6357 5681 
Psudo R-squared 0.011 0.0236 
 
This table reports regression results on the probability that overconfident CEOs issue optimistically biased 
subsequent forecasts. Variable definitions are presented in Appendix 2.1. The sample starts with a total 
number of 8,052 quarterly management forecasts issued from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2008 by 1,695 
CEOs. A total of 6,357 forecasts are retained after excluding 1,695 observations that are the first forecast 
managers issued for their firms. The standard errors are clustered by firm to reduce heteroscedasticity.  
 
t statistics in parentheses  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Panel D: Does the market recognize the forecasting biases by overconfident CEOs? 
(Model Specifications for Market Feedback Measurement) 
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: CAR-1,+1 
coefficients t-statistics coefficients t-statistics 
Model (1)   Model (2) 
CONSTATNT -0.006 (-0.22) -0.004 (-0.15) 
OC_MF   -0.014* (-1.76) 
OC_MF * GOOD_NEWS i,t   -0.334** (-2.17) 
OC_MF * BAD_NEWS i,t   0.103 (0.19) 
UC_MF   -0.003 (-0.38) 
UC_MF *GOOD_NEWS i,t   -1.620** (-2.47) 
UC_MF * BAD_NEWSt   -0.880* (1.64) 
GOOD_NEWS i,t 3.608*** (9.49) 4.687*** (8.61) 
BAD_NEWS i,t 5.678*** (17.91) 5.807*** (14.51) 
ERROR i,t -0.317*** (-2.82) -0.312*** (-2.74) 
MF_FREQUENCY i,t 0.002 (1.52) 0.002 (1.52) 
NEWS i,t * PREDICT_LOSS i,t -4.983*** (-14.31) -4.378*** (-10.36) 
NEWS i,t * LOG_HORIZON i,t -0.016*** (-2.71) -0.016** (-2.48) 
NEWS i,t* ROA i,t-1 -0.410 (-0.24) 0.541 (0.31) 
NEWS i,t* SALE_GROWTH 
 
-0.416 (-0.53) -0.725 (-0.78) 
NEWS i,t * BM i,t-1 0.073 (0.83) -0.168 (-1.09) 
NEWS i,t * HH_INDEX i,t-1 0.093*** (3.47) 0.085*** (3.12) 
NEWS i,t* LOG_ASSETS i,t-1 -0.116 (-1.06) 0.083 (0.62) 
NEWS i,t* ALTMAN i,t-1 0.105*** (3.15) 0.120*** (3.55) 
NEWS i,t* BETA i,t-1 -0.073 (-0.79) -0.036 (-0.32) 
PREDICT_LOSS i,t -0.023*** (-3.45) -0.020*** (-3.02) 
LOG_HORIZON i,t 0.015*** (6.67) 0.015*** (6.63) 
ROA i,t-1 -0.002 (-0.05) -0.002 (-0.03) 
SALE_GROWTH i,t-1 0.010 (1.55) 0.011 (1.62) 
BM i,t-1 0.040*** (6.18) 0.039*** (6.03) 
HH_INDEXi,t-1 -0.000 (-1.33) -0.000 (-1.34) 
LOG_ASSETS i,t-1 -0.009** (-2.51) -0.009** (-2.47) 
ALTMAN i,t-1 -0.001 (-1.58) -0.001* (-1.67) 
BETA i,t-1 0.001 (0.96) 0.002 (1.10) 
Observations 5921  5921  
Firm fixed effects yes  yes  
Adjusted R-square 0.1397  0.1408  
 
This table presents fixed-firm effects model to generate the market feedback measure for overconfident and less 
confident CEOs. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1% 
and 99% to mitigate outliers. Variables with interaction terms are demeaned to reduce multicollinearity among 
the variables. The sample includes all 8,052 quarterly forecasts observations from January 1, 1994 till December 
31, 2008.  
 
t-statistics is in parentheses; * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix 3.1: Definition of variables 
 
Variable Name  Definition 
Dependent variable 
FORECAST_ERROR 
Proportional absolute earnings forecasting accuracy, measured by 
the absolute earnings forecast error scaled by the mean earnings 
forecast error using all earnings forecasts issued for a firm during 
the same fiscal year. Annual forecasts and quarterly forecasts are 
calculated separately. 
PCT_ERROR_RANK 
 A ranked score based on the absolute forecast error using all 
forecasts issued for a firm during the same fiscal year. The most 
accurate forecast receives a ranked score of 0, and the least accurate 
forecast receives a ranked score of 100. Annual forecasts and 
quarterly forecasts are calculated separately. 
FIRMS _SUPPLY_CHAIN 
 An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is a focal firm or the 
focal firm’s major customer in the same year, and 0 for other firms 
in the same analyst’s portfolio. 
ANALYSTS’ SUPPLY CHAIN COVERAGE VARIABLES 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST 
  
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a forecast is issued by a supply 
chain analyst who issues forecasts for both a focal firm and at least 
one of the firm’s major customer, and 0 for forecasts issued for the 
same firm by other analysts, who do not issue forecasts for the 
firm’s supply chain.  
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN 
  
An indicator variable that equals 1 if for a given supply chain 
analyst, a forecast is issued for a focal firm, with at least one of the 
firm’s major customers also followed by the same analyst, and 0 for 
forecasts issued for other firms followed by the same analyst. 
CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN 
 An indicator variable that equals 1 if for a given supply chain 
analyst, a forecast is issued for a focal firm’s major customer, with 
at least one of the firm’s suppliers also followed by the same 
analyst, and 0 for forecasts issued for other firms followed by the 
same analyst. 
NUMBER_CUSTOMER  
For the focal firm followed by a supply chain analyst, the total 
number of the major customers of the focal firm that the analyst 
follows. If an analyst follows none of the major customers of the 
focal firm, the variable is coded as 0. 
PCT_SALES  
For the focal firm followed by a supply chain analyst, the 
aggregated total sales made to the focal firm’s major customers, 
deflated by the total sales of the focal firm in the fiscal year. If an 
analyst does not follow any of the major customers of the focal 
firm, the variable is coded as 0. 
FORECASTS AND ANALYST CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY  
An indicator that equals 1 if the industry has the largest 
representation among all firms in an analyst’s coverage portfolio in 
a given year, and 0 for all the other industries the analyst follows in 
the year. 
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DISPERSION  
Analyst forecasting dispersion. It is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the proportional forecasting errors using all forecasts 
issued for a firm in the same fiscal year.  
NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW  The number of analysts who have issued forecasts for a firm during the same fiscal year.  
HORIZON  
Log value of forecasting horizon, calculated as the number of lag 
days between the date a forecast is issued and the date at which the 
corresponding actual earning is announced. 
NUMBER_FORECAST  Number of forecast issued for the fiscal year, calculated for the annual forecast and quarterly forecast separately. 
YEAR_EXP  Number of years’ experience with the firm, calculated as the number of years an analyst has been issuing forecasts for a firm. 
NUMBER_SIC1  The total number of industries at the one-digit SIC code level for which an analyst issues forecasts during a fiscal year. 
LOG_BROKER_SIZE  The log value of the total number of analysts that the brokerage firm employs during a fiscal year. 
FIRM CHARACTERISTICS VARIABLES 
INVESTMENT_BANKING 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm has appointed the 
brokerage firm as an underwriter for the firm’s equity issuance 
during the three years before or three years after the year in which 
an analyst follows the firm. 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE  Log of total trading value in the year, calculated as the cumulative trading volume * trading price. 
LOG_MV  Log value of the total market value of the firm. 
LOG_ NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1  Log of the total number of firms in the industry at the one-digit SIC code level. 
SALE_GROWTH  Sales growth rate, measured as total sales at year t minus total sales at year t-1, scaled by the total sales at year t-1. 
MARKET_TO_BOOK  Market to book ratio at the beginning of the year t. 
ROA  Return on assets for year t-1. 
AD_RATIO  The ratio of advertising expense to total sales at year t-1. Missing value of advertising expense is replaced with zero. 
RD_RATIO  
The ratio of research and development expense to total sales at year 
t-1. Missing value of research and development expense is replaced 
with zero. 
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Appendix 3.2 
This appendix describes in more details how analysts may organize their supply chain 
relations in different ways in their portfolios. I classified supply chain analysts into four groups, 
based on the number of major customers of a focal firm they cover and the complexity of the 
supply chain relations in their portfolios.  
 
The first group of supply chain analysts is labeled as “Analysts with one (focal firm)-to-one 
(major customer) relation.” For this group of analysts, each supply relation in their portfolios has 
one distinct focal firm paired with one distinct major customer. In other words, for each of the 
focal firm the analyst follows, she only covers one major customer of the focal firm.   
 
The second group of supply chain analysts is labeled as “Analysts with one (focal firm)-to-
many (major customers) relations.” In the one-to-many group, one single focal firm may be 
paired with two or more than two major customers. As long as analysts have one-to-many 
relation(s) in their supply chain portfolio, but not many-to-one relation(s) as I discuss below, they 
are classified in the second group. 
 
The third group of supply chain analysts is labeled as “Analysts with many (focal firms)-to-
one (major customer) relations.” In the many-to-one group, multiple focal firms share the same 
major customer. As long as analysts have many-to-one relation(s) in their supply chain portfolio, 
but not one-to-many relations(s) as I discuss above, they are classified in the third group. 
 
The last group of supply chain analysts is labeled as “Analysts with one-to-many and 
many-to-one relations.” In this group, analysts’ supply chain portfolio includes both one-to-many 
relation(s) and many-to-one relation(s). 
 
Panel (A) of Appendix 3.2 compares these four groups of analysts along a number of 
dimensions. Column (1) reports the descriptive statistics for analysts with the one-to-one relation. 
This group of analysts has 1,746 observations, representing 64.8% of all analyst-year 
observations (1,746 of 2,696) in my sample period. The average number of supply chain 
relations covered by these analysts is 1.11. These analysts follow an average of 18.52 firms from 
2.85 industries at the one- digit SIC code level. The employers (the brokerage firms) of these 
analysts hire an average of 61.64 analysts, and cover 9.02 industries.  
 
Column (2) of Panel A includes analysts with the one-to-many relation. This group of 
analysts represents 12.4% of all observations (335 of 2,696). The average number of supply 
chain relations covered by these analysts is 3.80,51
 
 which is higher than the corresponding 1.1 
supply chain relations followed by analysts who take the “one-to-one” approach (column 1). 
These analysts follow an average of 19.62 firms from 3.41 industries at the one-digit SIC code 
level. The employers of these analysts hire an average of 54.7 analysts, and cover 9.07 industries.  
Column (3) includes those analysts with the many-to-one relation. It shows that this group 
                                                                
51 Here, each focal-customer pair is counted as one supply chain relation. For instance, if Firm A has two major 
customers, Firms B and C, and if an analyst follows Firms A, B, and C, this analyst has two supply chain relations 
in her portfolio (one is Firm A-Firm B relation, and the other is Firm B-Firm C relation). 
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of analysts represents 6.5% of all observations (176 of 2,696). The average number of supply 
chains followed by these analysts is 2.08. The average number of firms these analysts follow and 
the number of analysts their employers hire is similar to the analysts with the “one-to-many 
relation” reported in column (2).  
 
Column (4) includes those analysts with a combination of one-to-many and many-to-one 
relations. These analysts cover the most complicated supply chain relations. Not surprisingly, 
column (4) shows that these analysts cover 7.71 supply chain relations, which is the greatest 
among all supply chain analysts. In addition, they also cover more firms (20.91 firms) from more 
industries (3.32 industries at the one-digit SIC code level).  
 
To the extent that analysts get better information about the future sales growth for the focal 
firms by following the focal firms’ major customers, I expect that the more major customers of a 
focal firm that analysts follow, the more accurate their earnings forecasts for the focal firm will be. 
Panel B of Appendix 3.2 provides evidence on the implications of different supply chain portfolio 
designs on forecasting accuracy for the focal firms. Row 1 suggests that, on average, the 
forecasting errors for all focal firms are -0.0189. Forecasts for focal firms are most accurate at  
-0.0299 (Row 3) when analysts follow more than one of the focal firm’s major customers (i.e., the 
one-to-many relation), although the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels, 
except when I compare the forecasting accuracy for the focal firms between analysts “with one-
to-many relation” and analysts “within both one-to-many and many-to-one relation”. 
 
Panel C of Appendix 3.2 provides evidence on the difference in corresponding forecasting 
accuracy for the major customers of the focal firms. Row 1 suggests that the average forecasting 
error for the major customers is -0.0061. The average forecasting error for the major customers is 
most accurate at -0.0153 in Row 4 when analysts follow more than one supplier (focal firm) of 
the major customer. But the difference of the forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms 
between group 3 in Row 4 and other analysts in the other three groups is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
 
Overall, the evidence is generally consistent with my argument that analysts issue more 
accurate earnings forecasts if they have more information about the parties in the supply chain, 
either by covering more major customers of a focal firm, or by covering more focal firms of a 
major customer.
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Panel A: Descriptive statistics on different ways analysts organize their supply chain portfolios  
 This table describes the four different ways analysts organize supply chain relations in their portfolios. The statistics are analyzed at the individual 
analyst portfolio level. The columns below define four categories that analysts organize their supply chain relations based on the number of major 
customers of a focal firm they cover and the complexity of the supply chain relations in the their portfolios. 
 
1. One(focal firm)-to-One(customer) 
Relation 
 
Each supply relation in analyst portfolios has one distinct focal firm paired with one distinct major 
customer. In other words, for each of the focal firm the analysts follow, they only covers one major 
customer of the focal firm. 
2. One-to-Many Relation 
One single focal firm may be paired with two or more than two major customers. As long as analysts 
have one-to-many relation(s) in their supply chain portfolio, but not many-to-one relation(s) as I 
discussed below, they are classified in this group. 
3. Many-to-One Relation 
In the many-to-one relation, multiple focal firms share the same major customer. As long as analysts 
have many-to-one relation(s) in their supply chain portfolio, but not one-to-many relations(s) as I 
discussed above, they are classified in this group. 
4. Hybrid Relation In this group, analysts’ supply chain portfolio includes both one-to-many relation(s) and many-
to-one relation(s). 
 
 
Descriptive Items 
Analysts with 
one-to-one 
relation 
 
(1) 
Analysts with 
one-to-many 
relation 
 
(2) 
Analysts many-
to-one relation 
 
 
(3) 
Analysts with 
hybrid relation 
 
 
(4) 
All 
 
 
 
(5) 
Number of observations (analyst-year) 1,746 335 176 439 2,696 
Mean number of supply chain relation followed in each 
analyst’s portfolio  
 (each focal firm-customer pair is counted as one) 
1.11 3.80 2.08 7.71 2.63 
Mean number of firms followed in each analyst’s portfolio 18.52 19.62 19.95 20.91 19.14 
Mean number of industries followed in each analyst’s portfolio 
(the one-digit SIC code level) 2.85 3.41 3.10 3.32 3.22 
Mean number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm 61.64 54.70 53.45 56.11 59.35 
Number of industries followed by the brokerage firm  
(the one-digit SIC code level) 9.02 9.07 8.80 9.15 9.03 
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Panel B: Forecasting accuracy for the focal firms with different supply chain portfolio 
designs 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the forecasting accuracy for the focal firms followed by supply 
chain analysts. The table provides detailed analyses of the forecasting error for the focal firms based on the 
four ways that supply chain analysts organize their supply chain portfolios.  
 
Row  Organization category FORECAST_ERROR (focal firms) 
1 All focal firms -0.0189  
2 Focal firms with one-to-one relation -0.0228  
3 Focal firms with one-to-many relation -0.0299  
4 Focal firms with many-to-one relation -0.0190  
5 hybrid relation -0.0124  
 T-test for (3)-(2) 0.47 
 T-test for (3)-(4) -0.73 
 T-test for (3)-(5) -1.71 * 
 Distinct number of focal firms 428 
 Number of observations 44,377 
 
 
Panel C: Forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms with different supply chain portfolio designs 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the forecasting accuracy for the major customers of the focal 
firms by supply chain analysts. The table provides detailed analyses of the forecasting error for the major 
customers firms based on the four ways that supply chain analysts organize their supply chain portfolios. 
 
Row  Organization category FORECAST_ERROR (major customer) 
1 All major customer firms -0.0061 
2 Focal firms with one-to-one relation -0.0035 
3 Focal firms with one-to-many relation -0.0013 
4 Hybrid relation -0.0153  
5 Focal firms with one-to-many and many-to-one relation -0.0085 
 T-test for (4)-(2) -1.06 
 T-test for (4)-(3) -0.91  
 T-test for (4)-(5) -0.58 
 Distinct number of major customers 221 
 Number of observations 44,036 
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Table 2.1: Sample screening procedures 
  
Procedures 
Number of 
observations 
  (1) Initial quarterly forecasts from the First Call CIG database 
(January 1, 1994 to December 2008) after excluding: 
 22,954 
a.    Currency not in USD  
b. Duplicate observations 
c.    Forecasts unrelated to EPS 
  
d.   Multiple guidance per quarter (keep the first forecast in the   
       quarter) 
  
e.    Forecasts made after the fiscal quarter   
f.    Stale forecasts longer than 90 days prior to the quarter end   
g.   Forecasts with missing actual quarterly earnings to calculate   
       forecasting error 
h.   Forecasts issued before the actual earnings announcement for  
      the last quarter                                                        
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Forecasts without the return data to calculate the market reaction  
surrounding the issuance of the forecasts  
 
(945)  
 
 
 
(3) Forecasts without prior analysts’ consensus forecasts (8,705)  
(4) Forecasts with mergers and acquisitions announcements after the 
analysts’ consensus forecasts 
 
(261) 
 
(5) Firm quarters without the Compustat financial data (169) 12,827 
(6) Firms without CEO information from the Execucomp (3,659)  
(7) Firm-quarters with dual CEO and CEO turnover in the  quarter (1,116)   8,052 
(8) Observations used in Appendix 2.1 Panels C and D, representing 
a total of 1,681 distinct CEOs in 1,246 firms.   8,052 
(9) Delete forecasts issued by managers whose initial forecasts are 
more accurate, and keep all forecasts issued by the total 568 
overconfident and  less confident  CEOs (observations used in 
Table 2.2, Table 2.3, Table 2.5, including 1,176 forecasts issued 
by 283 overconfident managers, 1,306 forecasts for 285  less 
confident managers). 
(5,570) 2,482 
(10) For 2,482 forecasts issued by 568 managers, 369 CEOs continue 
issuing forecasts after their first forecasts. 316 CEOs have 
adjusted and issue more accurate subsequent forecasts 
(observations used in Table 2.4). 
 316 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the first forecasts issued by overconfident CEOs and less 
confident CEOs 
 
Variables 
Forecasts by overconfident 
CEOs 
(N=283) 
Forecasts by less 
confident CEOs 
(N=285) t-test statistics 
(two-tailed P-value) 
Mean median Mean median 
BIASt 0.010 0.004 -0.015 -0.003 
6.562*** 
(0.000) 
ERRORt 0.0101 0.0046 0.0149 0.0033 
-1.252 
(0.211) 
NEWSt -0.005 -0.001 -0.0105 -0.0007 
1.172 
(0.241) 
HORIZONt 45.0601 52 42.9754 52 
1.004 
(0.315) 
CAR-1,+1 -0.0539 -0.0356 -0.003 0.0032 
-5.493*** 
(0.000) 
STD_EPSt 0.7767 0.5862 0.4427 0.5609 
-0.905 
(0.365) 
SALE_GROWTHt -0.010 -0.024 0.057 0.030 
-3.420*** 
(0.001) 
BMt 0.676 0.594 0.569 0.492 
2.648*** 
(0.008) 
HH_INDEXt 4.064 0.183 2.781 0.065 
1.514 
(0.131) 
ASSETSt 7704.69 1384.17 7226.26 1337.52 
0.546 
(0.584) 
ALTMANt 2.348 2.277 3.108 1.517 
 -2.612*** 
(0.009) 
BETAt 1.396 1.160 1.591 1.378 
-1.76* 
(0.080) 
|WACCt| 0.0239 0.0144 0.0303 0.0156 
-2.147** 
(0.032) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the first forecasts issued by overconfident and less confident 
CEOs. The t-test for the mean of the variables uses the pooled method when the underlying variances are 
equal and the satterthwaite method when they are unequal. The values of the t-test statistics are reported 
with the corresponding p-value in the parentheses. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. Each of the 
continuous variables is winsorized at 1% and 99%  to mitigate outliers. The sample includes all quarterly 
management forecasts from January 1994 - December 2008. 
 
P-values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Panel B: Descriptive statistics for all forecasts after the first forecasts by overconfident 
and less confident CEOs 
 
Variables 
Overconfident CEOs 
(N=893 firm quarter 
forecasts) 
Less confident CEOs 
(N=1021 firm quarter 
forecasts) t-test statistics 
(two-tailed P-value) 
Mean median Mean Median 
BIASt 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.002 -0.0009 
2.573*** 
(0.010) 
ERRORt 0.0046 0.0017 0.0037 0.0016 
1.928**  
(0.054) 
CAR-1,+1 -0.003 -0.0006 -0.004 0.0001 
0.089  
(0.929) 
NEWSt -0.0028 -0.0006 -0.0045 -0.0004 
0.471  
(0.637) 
STD_EPSt 0.7804 0.635 0.5807 0.5809 
1.077 
(0.281) 
HORIZONt 56.4244 64 54.2772 62 
2.315**  
(0.020) 
SALE_GROWTHt 0.0345 0.0231 0.0315 0.0242 
0.335  
(0.737) 
BMt 0.5245 0.4415 0.499 0.4262 
1.559  
(0.119) 
HHINDEX t 5.0652 0.2928 3.1868 0.0729 
3.803*** 
(0.000) 
ASSETSt 6953.92 1429.47 7001.38 1435.00 
-0.043  
(0.965) 
ALTMANt 2.7801 1.6751 3.768 2.1351 
-0.188*** 
(0.000) 
|WACCt| 0.0207 0.013 0.0223 0.0141 
-1.316  
(0.188) 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all subsequent forecasts after excluding the first forecasts issued 
by overconfident and the less confident CEOs. The t-test of the mean value of the variables uses the pooled 
method when the underlying variances are equal and the satterthwaite method when they are unequal. The 
values of the t-test statistics are reported with the corresponding p-value in the parentheses. All variables 
are defined in Appendix 2.1. Each of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate 
outliers. Two-tail p-values are reported. The sample period is from January 1994 - December 2008.  
 
P-value of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2.3: Forecasting errors by overconfident CEOs and less confident CEOs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of forecasting errors using all forecasts issued by overconfident and less confident CEOs based on 
the sequence of each forecast by each manager during their tenure. The t-test of the mean value of the variables uses the pooled method 
when the underlying variances are equal and the satterthwaite method when they are unequal. Variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. Each 
of the continuous variables is winsorized at 1% and 99% to mitigate outliers. The sample period is from January 1994 - December 2008.  
 
p-values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Panel A: Overconfident CEOs 
Variable: Forecasting errors (ERRORt) 
Forecast 
Sequence 
(S) 
S=1 S=2 S=3 S=4 S=5 S=6 S>=7 S>=2 
Test of the difference 
of forecast error 
between the first 
(S=1) and  the 
subsequent forecasts 
(S>=2)  
Mean Error 0.0101 0.0064 0.0056 0.0039 0.0058 0.0036 0.0034 0.0037 6.798*** 
(Median Error) (0.0046) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.000) 
N 283 168 127 100 81 66 351 1914  
Panel B: Less confident  CEOs 
Mean Error 0.0149 0.0056 0.0033 0.0035 0.0042 0.0051 0.0026 0.0046 5.082*** 
(Median Error) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.000) 
N 285 201 145 121 96 79 379 1914  
Panel C: All  CEOs 
Mean Error 0.0125 0.006 0.0045 0.0037 0.0051 0.0047 0.0032 0.0042 7.283*** 
(Median Error) (0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.000) 
N 568 369 272 221 177 145 730 1914  
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Table 2.4: Is learning speed symmetric between overconfident and less confident CEOs? 
Panel A: Descriptive comparison of the time needed by overconfident and less confident CEOs 
to issue their first more accurate forecasts 
 
Variables 
Overconfident CEOs Less confident CEOs t-test statistics (two-tailed P-value) 
N Mean median N Mean Median  
Number of forecasts 137 2.547 2 179 2.226 2 2.99*** (0.003) 
Number of quarters 137 5.84 4 179 5.36 3.5 2.12** (0.035) 
 
This table reports the number of forecasts (quarters) elapsed for overconfident CEOs and less confident 
CEOs from their first overly optimistic or pessimistic forecasts to their first more accurate forecasts. 
Managers need to issue at least one subsequent accurate forecast to be included in the analysis. Of the total 
original number of 283 (285) overconfident (less confident) CEOs, 115 (84) overconfident (less confident) 
CEOs are deleted because they stop providing subsequent forecasts. Another 31 (22) overconfident (less 
confident) CEOs are also excluded because these CEOs have consistently issued overly optimistic (overly 
pessimistic) forecasts during their entire tenure as the CEO of the firm. The resulting 137 (179) 
overconfident (less confident) CEOs represent those CEOs who have issued at least one “more accurate” 
forecast. The values of the t-test statistics are reported with the corresponding two tailed p-value in the 
parentheses. 
 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Panel B: Are overconfident CEOs slower to learn and issue more accurate 
subsequent forecasts? 
 
Independent Variables Dependent variable: Number of forecasts 
CONSTANT 2.243*** (16.55) 
 OC_MF 0.214** (2.20) 
NEWSt 
-0.582 
(-0.71) 
MF_FREQUENCY t 
0.126** 
(2.17) 
CH_ROA t 
-1.183 
(-0.81) 
CH_SALEGROWTH t 
-0.413** 
(-2.00) 
CH_BM t 
0.018 
(0.09) 
CH_HHINDEX t 
0.046** 
(2.09) 
CH_ASSETS t 
-0.148 
(-0.84) 
CH_ALTMAN t 
-0.009 
(-0.35) 
N of observations 262 
Adjusted R-square 0.082 
   
The table present OLS regression for the time elapsed for overconfident CEOs and less confident 
CEOs to issue their first more accurate subsequent forecasts. Variable definitions are as shown in 
Appendix 2.1. The reduced sample from 316 observations to 262 observations reflects missing 
variables for some of independent variables used in the model.  
 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
134 
 
Table 2.5: Heckman two-stage regression on the effect of feedback on subsequent 
forecasting accuracy 
 
Panel A: First stage estimation of the probability that CEOs discontinue providing subsequent 
forecasts  
 
Variables Dependent variable:  Discontinue issuing forecast at quarter t (DISCONTINUEt) 
Constant -1.0390*** (-5.51) 
OC_MF 0.0113 (0.16) 
OPTIMISTICt-1 
0.0836 
(1.11) 
LOG_ASSETSt-1 
0.0168 
(0.70) 
N_ANALYSTt-1 
-0.0293*** 
(-3.92) 
BMt-1 
0.3861*** 
(4.00) 
BETAt-1 
0.0305 
(1.17) 
STD_EPSt-1 
0.0078 
(0.96) 
EPS_GAPt-1 
-4.4167*** 
(-3.99) 
LITIGATIONt-1 
-0.0665 
(-0.86) 
Observations 2047 
 
This table reports the probability that managers discontinue providing subsequent forecasts after their 
initial forecasts. The sample consists of 2,486 forecasting observations from January 1, 1994 until 
December 31, 2008. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a manager discontinue 
providing subsequent forecasts after the first forecast. Other variables definitions are shown in Appendix 
2.1.  
 
Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Panel B: Second stage regression on the effect of feedback on subsequent forecasting 
accuracy  
Independent Variables 
Dependent variable: forecasting error (ERRORt) 
Overconfident CEO 
 
Less confident CEO 
  (1) (2) 
INTERCEPTi,t-1 0.032*** -0.016 (3.02) (-1.17) 
POS * MKT_FBi,t-1 0.001 0.006 (0.12) (0.41) 
NEG * MKT_FBi,t-1 -0.010 0.047*** (-1.21) (3.17) 
ERROR_FBi,t-1 
0.284* 0.205*** 
(1.70) (14.47) 
INCENTIVE_RATIO i,t-1 -0.001 -0.180 (-0.40) (-1.51) 
PUR_PCTi,t-1 0.041 0.031 (0.67) (0.40) 
LOG_HORIZONi,t 0.001*** 0.001* (2.95) (1.76) 
N_ANALYST i,t-1 0.000** -0.000 (2.32) (-1.00) 
EXP i,t 0.000 0.000** (1.07) (2.43) 
CEO_AGEi,t 0.000 -0.000 (0.06) (-1.29) 
NEWS i,t 0.074*** 0.005 (2.88) (0.93) 
STD_EPS i,t-1 -0.000* 0.000*** (-1.81) (2.68) 
SALE_GROWTHi,t-1 0.001 -0.001 (1.35) (-0.77) 
BMt-1 -0.004*** 0.009*** (-3.19) (4.79) 
HHINDEX i,t-1 -0.000 -0.000 (0.58) (-0.35) 
LOG_ASSETS i,t-1 -0.000 -0.001 (-0.56) (-0.83) 
ALTMAN i,t-1 -0.000** -0.000 (-2.01) (1.39) 
|WACC i,t-1| 0.021*** 0.021* (3.00) (1.82) 
MILLS i,t -0.019*** 0.018*** (-7.25) (5.66) 
Observations 772 871 
Clustered by industry Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects included Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117 0.559 
Joint chow test:  F test statistics = 0.50, p =0.607 
column1: _beta[ ERROR_FBi,t-1] =  column2: _beta[ ERROR_FBi,t-1] 
Joint chow test:  F test statistics = 3.07, p =0.047 
column1: _beta[NEG * MKT_FBi,t-1] =  column2: _beta[NEG * MKT_FBi,t-1] 
 
 
 
This table reports individual fixed effects regression on management forecast errors and the two sources of 
feedback concerning their prior forecasts using all quarterly forecasts issued by overconfident and less 
confident CEOs from January 1, 1994 till December 31, 2008. Variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix 2.1. T-statistics are in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%.
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Table 3.1: Year-by-year sample distribution at the firm level 
This table reports the year-by-year distribution of the total number of distinct firms in two samples. Column (1) 
reports the number of firms that reported having major customer relations and have analyst forecast data for both 
the focal firms and the reported major customers. Column (2) to (4) report the total number of firms followed by 
supply chain analysts. These firms are classified into one of the three groups for each supply chain analyst: focal 
firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also covers one or more major customers, major customers of a focal 
firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. The sample is 
derived from a merged sample using the Compustat customer segment file and the I/B/E/S analyst detailed 
forecast data from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 2008. 
 
 
Year 
Base Sample (firms 
that report having 
major customer 
relations and have 
analyst forecast data) 
Firms followed by supply chain analysts 
Number of reporting 
firms 
Total number of 
focal firms 
Total number of 
major customer 
firms 
Total number of 
“other” firms 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1991 672  89   57 1206 
1992 724  92   60 1037 
1993 791 110   71 1266 
1994 781 119   71 1374 
1995 873 101   56 1153 
1996 868 119   69 1317 
1997 766 112   65 1267 
1998 698  91   50 1080 
1999 526  74   39  976 
2000 541  46   36  713 
2001 488  48   37  716 
2002 438  47   35  612 
2003 360  34   23  541 
2004 288  33   24  522 
2005 221  28   21  478 
2006 151  16   15  359 
2007 114  11    7  270 
2008 72   6    6  179 
Total 9,372 1,176 742 15,066 
Number of Distinct firms 2,492 428 221 3,961 
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Table 3.2: Industry distribution at the firm level  
This table reports the industry distribution (at the one-digit SIC code level) for two samples. Column (1) reports the 
industry distribution of the total number of reporting firm-years that reported having major customer relations and 
have analyst forecast data for both the focal firm and the reported major customer firm from January 1, 1991 to 
December 31, 2008. Column (2)-(4) report the industry distribution for all firm-years followed by supply chain 
analysts during the same sample period, and these firms are classified into three groups: focal firms, i.e., for firms for 
which the analysts also cover one or more of the firms’ major customers, major customers of the focal firms for the 
analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analysts’ portfolios. 
 
One-
digit 
SIC 
code 
Industry classification 
Firms that 
reported 
having major 
customer 
relations and 
are covered in 
I/B/E/S 
Firms followed by supply chain analysts 
Reporting 
firms Focal firms 
Major 
customers 
“Other” 
firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
0 Agricultural production 11 0 (0.00%)   3     39 
1 Mining, building and construction products 692   80 (6.80%)  16   1120 
2 Non durable manufacturing 1,526  147 (12.50%) 133  2323 
3 Durable manufacturing   3,664  585 (49.74%) 221   4434 
4 Transportation and communication 844  166 (14.12%) 161  2740 
5 Wholesale, retail 392   47 (4.00%) 106   1287 
6 Finance  316   28 (2.38%)  41   995 
7 Business services           1,529   72 (6.12%)  43   1415 
8 Other services   290   38 (3.23%)  15    672 
9 Non operating establishments 108   13 (1.11%)   3     41 
 Total number of firm-year observations 9,372 1,176 (100%) 742 15,066 
 Total number of distinct firms 2,492 428   221 3,961 
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Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics on characteristics of analysts’ portfolios 
This table provides descriptive statistics on characteristic of analysts’ portfolios. The statistics are reported at the analyst-year level for supply chain 
analysts and other non-supply chain analysts who follow the same focal firms but none of the firms’ major customers. Portfolio descriptive statistics are 
reported in column (1) for all analysts who issue forecasts for the focal firms. Portfolio descriptive statistics for supply chain analysts are reported in 
column (2). Column (3) reports the portfolio characteristics for the analysts following the same focal firms but none of the focal firms’ major customers. 
Column (4) reports the t-test statistics for the difference in portfolio characteristics between the two groups of analysts in column (2) and column (3). Two 
tailed t statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
 
                                                                                
Descriptive Items 
All analysts 
(who follow the 
focal firms) 
Supply chain 
analysts 
(who follow a focal 
firm and its major 
customer) 
Other analysts 
(who follow only 
the same focal 
firm but not its 
major customer) 
t-test statistics 
[(2) - (3)] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean number of supply chain relations included in the portfolio 0.77 2.63 0 42.27 *** 
Mean percentage of firms from the analyst’ primary industry 72.1% 68.7% 73.6% -4.75 *** 
Mean percentage of analysts who follow exclusively firms in one industry 
(the one-digit SIC code level) 16.0% 10.3% 18.4% -10.70 *** 
Mean number of firms followed in the portfolio 15.35 19.14 13.78 16.98 *** 
Mean number of industries followed in the portfolio 
(the one-digit SIC code level) 2.96 3.22 2.85 11.38 *** 
Mean number of industries followed in the portfolio 
(the two-digit SIC code level) 4.74 5.38 4.48 12.15 *** 
Mean number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm 54.98 59.35 53.18 5.32 *** 
Mean number of industries followed by the analyst’s brokerage firm 
(the one-digit SIC code level) 8.74 9.03 8.62 12.24 *** 
Number of analyst-year observations 9,235 2,696 6,539   
Number of distinct analysts 2,857 973 2,536   
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Table 3.4: Within-analyst comparison of earnings forecasting accuracy between the 
focal firms and “other” firms  
 
This table provides related descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation coefficients, and the Fama-MacBeth 
regression results for the within-analyst analyses of analyst forecasting accuracy of  a given supply chain 
analyst for the focal firms and the same analyst issues for “other” firms. Firms followed by each supply 
chain analyst are classified into one of the three groups: focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also 
covers one or more major customers, major customers of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms the 
same analyst follows in the portfolio. Forecasts for the focal firms and “other” firms are used in Panel A, B, 
and D for the analyses of forecasting accuracy between focal firms and “other” firms in the same analyst’s 
portfolio. Panel C provides comprehensive forecasting accuracy analyses for all the three groups of firms. A 
firm is in an analyst’s primary industry if the firm is in the industry that the analyst is primarily specialized 
in, i.e., the industry that has the largest representation among all the industries the analyst follows in the 
same year.  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses on within-analyst comparison of 
forecasting accuracy between the focal firms and “other” firms (N=405,135) 
 
Variables Mean Median  Q1 Q3 STD 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN 0.11 0 0 0 0.31 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY 0.74 1 1 1 0.44 
DISPERSION 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.70 0.23 
NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW 19.96 18 11 27 11.29 
HORIZON 246  187 74 346 208 
YEAR_EXP 3.21 3 2 4 2.42 
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Panel B: Pearson correlation table for the variables used in multivariate analyses (N= 405,135) 
 
FORECAST
_ERROR 
FOCAL 
_SUPPLY 
_CHAIN 
HORIZON PRIMARY_ INDUSRY YEAR_EXP DISPERSION 
NUMBER 
_ANALYS_ 
FOLLOW 
FORECAST_ERROR 1.000              
FOCAL_SUPPLY_ 
CHAIN 
-0.009 1.000      
(<0.001)       
HORIZON 0.054 0.061 1.000     (<0.001) (<0.001)      
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY -0.002 -0.008 -0.011 1.000    (0.046) (<0.001) (<0.001)     
YEAR_EXP -0.053 0.021 0.143 -0.007 1.000   (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)    
DISPERSION 0.020 0.010 0.055 -0.003 0.014 1.000  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 0.037 (<0.001)   
NUMBER_ANALYST_ 
FOLLOW 
-0.056 -0.298 -0.006 0.004 0.092 -0.005 1.000 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.007) (<0.001) (0.002)  
Two tailed p-values are reported in the parentheses.
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics on within-analyst comparison of forecasting accuracy for a 
given supply chain analyst 
 
Row Descriptive items N Mean Median  Q1 Q3 STD 
(1) All forecasts for firms in the portfolio  449,171 0.0003 -0.0289 -0.5113 0.4071 0.6588 
(2) Forecasts for firms in analysts’ primary industry 336,876 -0.0011 -0.0309 -0.5135 0.4059 0.6580 
(3) Forecasts for firms not in analysts’ primary industry 112,295 0.0045 -0.0220 -0.5050 0.4117 0.6611 
(4) Forecasts for focal firms 44,377 -0.0189 -0.0484 -0.5284 0.3855 0.6455 
(5) Forecasts for major customer firms 44,036 -0.0061 -0.0386 -0.5221 0.4000 0.6539 
(6) Forecasts for all “other” firms 360,758 0.0033 -0.0250 -0.5077 0.4107 0.6610 
T-test statistics for mean forecast error:      
(2)-(3)  -2.53 ***   
(4)-(6)  -6.72 ***   
(5)-(6)  -2.86 ***   
Z-test (Wilcoxon-test) statistics for median forecast 
accuracy:  
   
(1)-(2)  -2.29 **   
(4)-(6)  -6.30 ***   
(5)-(6)  -2.60 ***   
Two tailed t-statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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Panel D: Fama-MacBeth regression analyses for within-analyst comparison of forecasting 
accuracy between the focal firms and “other” firms 
 
This table presents the summary results for the Fama-MacBeth regression analyses. The dependent variable is 
forecasting accuracy, measured as a proportional absolute forecast error for a forecast relative to the average 
absolute forecast error using all forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal year. FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a forecast is issued for a focal firm, with one or more of the focal firm’s 
major customer followed by the same analyst in the same year, and 0 for “other” firms in the analyst portfolio. 
The sample comprises all forecasts issued by supply chain analysts for the focal firms and “other” firms. The 
column reports the mean coefficients based on 2,696 regression estimates for each analyst-year using equation 
(1). All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are computed based on the 
adjusted Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation among 
the coefficient estimators. Two tailed t-statistics are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * are marked at the 1%, 
5%, and 10%  significance level respectively based on one-tailed p-value. Definitions of all the other variables 
are in Appendix 3.1.  
  
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: FORECAST_ERROR 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT (+/-) -35.636*** -36.584*** (-7.83) (-8.04) 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN - -3.357** -3.020* (-1.81) (-1.58) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - -0.765* -0.799*  (-1.22) (-1.46) 
FOCAL_SUPPLY_CHAIN  
* PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 
 -1.342** 
 (-2.26) 
HORIZON + 0.161*** 0.161*** (46.91) (45.52) 
YEAR_EXP - -0.674 -0.676 (-1.25) (-1.23) 
DISPERSION + 3.934** 4.519** (1.74) (1.97) 
NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW - -0.004 -0.053 (-0.02) (-0.32) 
Number of observations  2,696 2,696 
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Table 3.5: Cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the focal firms 
This table provides related descriptive statistics, Pearson correlation coefficients, and the Fama-MacBeth 
regression results for the cross-analyst comparison of forecasting accuracy for a given focal firm between 
supply chain analysts and other non-supply chain analysts who follow the same focal firms but none of the focal 
firms’ major customers. The sample includes all forecasts issued for the focal firms over the sample period by 
both supply chain analysts and other analysts. Forecasting accuracy is measured as the proportional absolute 
forecast error for a forecast relative to the average absolute value of forecast error using all forecasts issued for 
a firm in a fiscal year. A focal firm is in an analyst’s primary industry if the firm is in the industry that the 
analyst is primarily specialized in, i.e., the industry that has the largest percentage of firms in the analyst 
portfolio.  
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of variables in multivariate analyses on cross-analyst comparison of forecasting 
accuracy for the focal firms (N= 134,956) 
 
Variables Mean Median  Q1 Q3 STD 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST 0.33 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 
HORIZON 238.22 178 73 336 202.49 
YEAR_EXP 2.67 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.85 
NUMBER_SIC1 2.96 3.00 2.00 4.00 1.33 
NUMBER_ANALYST_BROKER 57.41 46.00 20.00 76.00 49.30 
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Panel B: Pearson correlation for the variables in multivariate analyses on forecasting accuracy for the focal firms (N= 134,956) 
 
 
FORECAST_ 
ERROR 
SUPPLY_ 
CHAIN_ 
ANALYST 
PRIMARY_ 
INDUSTRY HORIZON YEAR_EXP 
NUMBER_ 
SIC1 
LOG 
_BROKER 
_SIZE 
FORECAST_ERROR 1.000       
       
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST -0.010 1.000      (<0.001)       
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY -0.001 -0.028 1.000     (0.851) (<0.001)      
HORIZON 0.328 -0.015 0.007 1.000    (<.0001) (<0.001) (0.014)     
YEAR_EXP -0.005 0.068 0.006 0.015 1.000   (0.050) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)    
NUMBER_SIC1 0.006 0.128 -0.253 -0.022 0.119 1.000  (0.007) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)   
LOG_BROKER_SIZE -0.007 0.120 -0.010 -0.004 0.111 0.071 1 (0.006) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.061) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Two tailed p-values are reported in the parentheses. 
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Panel C: Descriptive statistics on cross-analyst comparison of forecasting accuracy for the 
focal firms  
 
Row Descriptive items Mean Median Q1 Q3 STD 
(1) All forecasts for the focal firms -0.0017 -0.0342 -0.5165 0.4071 0.6604 
(1.1) When in analysts’ primary industries -0.0034 -0.0313 -0.5109 0.4080 0.6541 
(1.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries -0.0012 -0.0348 -0.5183 0.4068 0.6625 
(2) Forecasts by supply chain analyst  -0.0189 -0.0484 -0.5284 0.3855 0.6455 
(2.1) When  in analysts’ primary industries -0.0197 -0.0484 -0.5300 0.3814 0.6431 
(2.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries -0.0166 -0.0486 -0.5260 0.3964 0.6519 
(3) Forecasts by all the other analysts  0.0066 -0.0264 -0.5105 0.4176 0.6674 
(3.1) When in analysts’ primary industries 0.0075 -0.0292 -0.5128 0.4180 0.6713 
(3.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries 0.0036 -0.0185 -0.5021 0.4158 0.6552 
T-test statistics for mean forecast error:   
(1.1)-(1.2)  -0.53 
(2)-(3)  -6.67 *** 
(2.1)-(3.1)  -6.11 *** 
(2.2)-(3.2) -2.75 *** 
Z-test (Wilcoxon-test) statistics for median forecast 
accuracy: 
  
(1.1)-(1.2)  0.78 
(2)-(3)   -5.80 *** 
(2.1)-(3.1)  -4.94 *** 
(2.2)-(3.2) -3.04 *** 
Number of observations 134,956 
Two tailed t-statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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Panel D: Fama-MacBeth regression analyses on cross-analyst comparison of earnings 
forecasting accuracy for the focal firms 
 
This table presents a summary of the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The dependent variable is 
forecasting accuracy, measured as a proportional absolute forecast error relative to the average absolute 
forecast error for a firm in a fiscal year. SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a forecast is issued by an analyst who issues a forecast for both a focal firm and one or more of the focal 
firm’s reported major customers in the same year, and 0 for forecasts issued by analysts who only follow 
the same focal firm, but none of the firm’s major customers. The sample comprises all forecasts issued for 
the focal firms, including forecasts issued by supply chain analysts and other non-supply chain analysts. 
The column reports the mean coefficients based on 1,176 regression estimates for each focal firm-years 
using equation (1). The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are computed based on the adjusted Newey-West (1987) 
standard errors to control for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation among the coefficient estimators. 
All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Two tailed t-statistics are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * 
are marked at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level respectively based on the one-tailed p-value. 
Definitions of all the other variables are in Appendix 3.1.  
 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: FORECAST_ERROR 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT (+/-) -12.860** -9.292 (-1.99) (-1.47) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST - -3.861** -3.829* (-1.71) (-1.65) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST  
* PRIMARY_INDUSTRY 
 
- 
 -3.459 
 (-0.89) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - -0.903 -0.182 (-0.51) (-0.12) 
HORIZON + 0.105*** 0.105*** (20.88) (19.07) 
YEAR_EXP  -1.245* -1.574** (-1.37) (-1.66) 
NUMBER_SIC1 + 0.857 2.130* (1.08) (1.48) 
LOG_BROKER_SIZE - -1.091* -2.344** (-1.63) (-2.09) 
Number of observations  1,176 1,176 
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Table 3.6: Fama-MacBeth regression analyses for within-analyst comparison of 
forecasting accuracy between the major customers and “other” firms 
 
This table presents a summary of the Fama-MacBeth regression results. The dependent variable is the 
forecasting accuracy, measured as a proportional absolute forecast error for a forecast relative to the average 
value of absolute forecast error using all forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal year. 
CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a forecast is issued for a major customer 
with one or more of the customer’s focal firms also followed by the same analyst and 0 for “other” firms in the 
analyst portfolio. Note all firms followed by each supply chain analyst are classified into one of the three groups: 
focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also covers one or more major customers, major customers of a 
focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. The 
sample comprises all forecasts issued by supply chain analysts for the major customers of the focal firms and 
“other” firms in the same analyst portfolio. The column reports the mean coefficients based on 2,696 regression 
estimates for each of the analyst-year using the equation (1).  The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are computed 
based on the adjusted Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for the heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation among the coefficient estimators.  All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. Two tailed t-
statistics are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * are marked at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level 
respectively based on one-tailed p-value. Definitions of all the other variables are in Appendix 3.1. 
 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: 
FORECAST_ERROR 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT (+/-) -13.674 -12.945 (-1.28) (-1.21) 
CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN - -1.193* -1.273** (-1.61) (-1.73) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST  
* PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 
 0.352 
 (0.49) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 0.123 -0.693 (0.03) (-0.15) 
HORIZON + 0.164*** 0.164*** (48.47) (48.49) 
YEAR_EXP - -1.449* -1.421* (-1.60) (-1.55) 
DISPERSION + 0.663*** 0.664*** (8.94) (8.95) 
NUMBER_ANALYST_FOLLOW - -0.821* -0.835* (-1.59) (-1.61) 
Number of observations  2,696 2,696 
 
 
148 
 
Table 3.7: Cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on forecasting accuracy for the major customers  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics on the variables used for analyses of forecasting accuracy for the major 
customers between supply chain analysts and the other analysts who only follow the same major customers but 
none of the customers’ focal firms. The sample comprises all forecasts issued for the major customers of the 
focal firms. Note all firms followed by each supply chain analyst are classified into one of the three groups: 
focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also covers one or more of the major customers, major customers 
of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. 
Forecasting accuracy is measured as the proportional absolute forecasting error for a forecast relative to the 
average absolute forecast error using all forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal year. A major customer is in an 
analyst’s primary industry if the firm is in the industry that the analyst is primarily specialized in, i.e., the 
industry that has the largest percentage of firms in the analyst portfolio.  
 
Row Descriptive items Mean Median Q1 Q3 STD 
(1) All forecasts for the major customer firms -0.0006 -0.0360 -0.5097 0.4038 0.6597 
(1.1) When in analysts’ primary industries -0.0017 -0.0370 -0.5112 0.4030 0.6593 
(1.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries 0.0025 -0.0330 -0.5035 0.4062 0.6608 
(2) Forecasts by supply chain analyst  -0.0061 -0.0386 -0.5221 0.4000 0.6539 
(2.1) When  in analysts’ primary industries -0.0074 -0.0399 -0.5256 0.3972 0.6542 
(2.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries -0.0004 -0.0322 -0.5066 0.4157 0.6524 
(3) Forecasts by all the other analysts  0.0010 -0.0353 -0.5056 0.4046 0.6615 
(3.1) When in analysts’ primary industries 0.0003 -0.0361 -0.5064 0.4046 0.6611 
(3.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries 0.0031 -0.0330 -0.5021 0.4042 0.6627 
T-test statistics for mean forecast error:   
(1.1)-(1.2)  1.18  
(2)-(3)  -1.99 ** 
(2.1)-(3.1)  -1.90 * 
(2.2)-(3.2) -1.75 * 
Z-test (Wilcoxon-test) statistics for median forecast error:   
(1.1)-(1.2)  -0.99  
(2)-(3)  -1.74 * 
(2.1)-(3.1)  -1.88 * 
(2.2)-(3.2) -1.91 * 
Number of observations 182,330 
Two tailed t-statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels. 
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Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression analyses for cross-analyst comparisons of earnings 
forecasting accuracy for the major customer firms 
 
This table presents a summary of the Fama-MacBeth regression for each major customer firm to test H2b 
on the cross-analyst forecasting accuracy for a given major customer between supply chain analysts and 
other analysts who only follow the major customer but none of the firm’s suppliers. The dependent 
variable is forecasting accuracy, measured as a proportional absolute forecast error for a forecast relative 
to the average absolute forecast error using all forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal period. 
CUSTOMER_SUPPLY_CHAIN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a forecast is issued for the major 
customers by an analyst who issues forecasts for both the major customers and one or more of the firm’s 
suppliers in the same year, and 0 otherwise. The sample comprises all forecasts issued for the major 
customers of the focal firms by supply chain analysts and other analysts who only follow the major 
customer but none of the firm’s focal firms. The column reports the mean coefficients estimated from 
742 customer firm-years regression estimates based on the equation as shown in Equation (1). All 
coefficients have been multiplied by 100. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics are computed based on the 
adjusted Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
among the coefficient estimators. Two tailed t-statistics are in the parentheses. ***, **, and * are marked 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level respectively based on the one-tailed p-value. Definitions of 
all the other variables are in Appendix 3.1.  
 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: 
FORECAST_ERROR 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT (+/-) -8.052** -7.872** (-1.95) (-1.89) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST - -1.180* -1.386** (-1.63) (-1.71) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST 
 * PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 
 -0.006 
 (-0.01) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 0.557 0.414 (0.32) (0.25) 
HORIZON + 0.064*** 0.064*** (19.07) (15.67) 
YEAR_EXP - -0.394 -0.432 (0.55) (-0.66) 
NUMBER_SIC1 + 0.463 0.479 (0.64) (0.49) 
LOG_BROKER_SIZE - -0.116 -0.103 (-0.30) (-0.27) 
Number of observations  742 742 
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Table 3.8: Cross-analyst analyses of forecasting accuracy for “other” firms 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on forecasting accuracy for “other” firms  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics to test the cross-analyst differences in forecasting accuracy for a given 
“other” firm between supply chain analysts and other non-supply chain analysts following the same “other” 
firm. The sample includes forecasts issued for “other” firms. Note all firms followed by each supply chain 
analyst are classified into three groups: focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also covers one or more 
of major customers, major customers of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all 
remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. A firm is in an analyst’s primary industry if the firm is in the industry 
that the analyst is primarily specialized in, i.e., the industry that has the largest percentage of firms in the analyst 
portfolio. Two tailed t-statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels. 
 
 
Row Descriptive items Mean Median  Q1 Q3 STD 
(1) All forecasts for “other” firms -0.0088 -0.0402 -0.5160 0.3961 0.6582 
(1.1) When in analysts’ primary industries -0.0098 -0.0419 -0.5165 0.3948 0.6573 
(1.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries -0.0056 -0.0347 -0.5136 0.3999 0.6612 
(2) Forecasts by supply chain analyst  0.0033 -0.0250 -0.5077 0.4107 0.6610 
(2.1) When  in analysts’ primary industries 0.0018 -0.0274 -0.5097 0.4098 0.6603 
(2.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries 0.0077 -0.0166 -0.5005 0.4126 0.6629 
(3) Forecasts by all the other analysts  -0.0113 -0.0432 -0.5173 0.3924 0.6576 
(3.1) When in analysts’ primary industries -0.0120 -0.0443 -0.5179 0.3913 0.6567 
(3.2) When not in analysts’ primary industries -0.0087 -0.0384 -0.5161 0.3964 0.6607 
T-test statistics for mean forecast error:   
(1.1)-(1.2)  -3.89 *** 
(2)-(3)  12.20 *** 
(2.1)-(3.1)  10.04 *** 
(2.2)-(3.2) 6.82 *** 
Wilcoxon-test z-statistics for median forecast error:  
(1.1)-(1.2)  -3.38 *** 
(2)-(3)  12.56 *** 
(2.1)-(3.1)  10.33 *** 
(2.2)-(3.2) 7.05 *** 
Number of observations 2,154,615 
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Panel B: Fama-MacBeth regression analyses on cross-analyst comparison of earnings 
forecasting accuracy for “other” firms  
 
This table presents a summary of the Fama-MacBeth regression for each other firm, which tests H3 on 
the cross-analyst variations of earnings forecasting accuracy for “other” firms between supply chain 
analysts and other non-supply chain analysts who follow the same “other” firm. The sample includes all 
forecasts issued for “other” firms. Note all firms followed by each supply chain analyst are classified 
into one of the three groups: focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst also covers one or more of 
major customers, major customers of a focal firm for the analyst, and “other” firms which include all 
remaining firms in the analyst portfolio. The dependent variable is forecasting accuracy, measured as a 
proportional absolute forecast error for a forecast relative to the average absolute forecast error using all 
forecasts issued for a firm in a fiscal period. SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if a forecast is issued by a supply chain analyst, and 0 for forecasts issued by the other analysts. 
The column reports the mean coefficients based on 15,066 regression estimates for each of other firm-
years using Equation (1). All coefficients have been multiplied by 100. The Fama-MacBeth t-statistics 
are computed based on the adjusted Newey-West (1987) standard errors to control for the 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation among the coefficient estimators. Two tailed t-statistics are in the 
parentheses. ***, **, and * are marked at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  significance level respectively based on 
the one-tailed p-value. Definitions of all the other variables are in Appendix 3.1.  
 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: 
FORECAST_ERROR 
(1) (2) 
INTERCEPT (+/-) -14.352*** -14.664*** (-7.61) (-7.54) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST - 1.419** 1.428** (1.71) (1.70) 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_ANALYST  
* PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - 
 -0.117 
 (-0.43) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY - -0.629* -0.642* (-1.47) (-1.47) 
HORIZON + 0.083 *** 0.076*** (33.39) (30.41) 
YEAR_EXP - -1.869*** -1.869** (-8.19) (-8.19) 
NUMBER_SIC1 + 0.667*** 0.573*** (3.23) (2.97) 
LOG_BROKER_SIZE - -0.746*** -0.735*** (-4.10) (-3.93) 
Number of observations  15,066 15,066 
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Table 3.9: Determinants of analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major 
customer firms 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in analysts’ choice of the focal 
firms and the major customer firms 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses for analysts’ 
choice of the focal firms and the firms’ major customers. Firm characteristics of the focal firms and their 
major customers are reported in column (1). The corresponding firm characteristics for the other firms 
in the analyst coverage portfolio are reported in column (2). Note all firms followed by each supply 
chain analyst are classified into one of the three groups: focal firms, i.e., for firms for which an analyst 
also covers one or more of the major customers, major customers of a focal firm for the analyst, and 
“other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst’s portfolio. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 3.1. Two tailed t-statistics are marked ***, **, and *, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. 
 
Variables  
Focal firms and the 
major customer 
firms 
(1) 
Other firms in the 
portfolio 
(2) 
T-statistics 
(p-value) 
(1)-(2) 
INVESTMENT_BANKING 0.0032 0.0013 3.56*** (<0.01) 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE 17.225 16.824 14.52*** (<0.01) 
LOG_NO_FIRM_SIC1  6.876 6.715 19.29*** (<0.01) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY 0.730 0.756 -4.86*** (<0.01) 
SALE_GROWTH 0.197 0.358 -2.02** (<0.01) 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 2.815 3.265 -3.33*** (<0.01) 
ROA 0.036 0.042 -2.74** (0.01) 
AD_RATIO 0.008 0.012 -1.87* (0.09) 
RD_RATIO 0.088 0.361 -3.12*** (<0.01) 
Number of observations 5,542  26,104  
 
 
 
  
153 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation for the variables in multivariate analyses on analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms 
(N= 31,616) 
 
VARIABLES 
SUPPLY_ 
CHAIN_ 
FIRMS 
INVEST 
MENT_ 
BUSINESS 
LOG_ 
TRADING
_VALUE 
LOG_ 
NUMBER_ 
FIRM_SIC1 
PRIMARY_ 
INDUSTRY 
SALE_ 
GROWTH MB ROA 
AD_ 
RATIO 
RD_ 
RATIO 
SUPPLY_CHAIN_FIRMS 1.000                    
INVESTMENT_BUSINESS 0.001 1.000         (0.813)          
LOG_TRADING_VALUE 0.090 0.030 1.000        (<0.001) (<0.001)         
LOG_NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1 0.111 -0.008 0.077 1.000       (<0.001) (0.164) (<0.001)        
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY 0.001 0.011 0.035 0.151 1.000      (0.888) (0.058) (<0.001) (<0.001)       
SALE_GROWTH -0.006 -0.001 -0.012 0.008 0.004 1.000     (0.350) (0.913) (0.051) (0.159) (0.457)      
MB -0.010 -0.001 0.053 0.012 0.002 0.003 1.000    (0.084) (0.875) (<0.001) (0.042) (0.711) (0.580)     
ROA -0.016 -0.002 0.115 0.042 -0.017 -0.013 0.012 1.000   (0.006) (0.730) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.024) (0.050)    
AD_RATIO -0.010 -0.002 0.015 -0.008 0.007 0.001 0.029 -0.034 1.000  (0.096) (0.737) (0.012) (0.172) (0.214) (0.879) (<0.001) (<0.001)   
RD_RATIO -0.009 -0.001 -0.021 0.001 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.148 0.025 1.000 (0.146) (0.870) (<0.001) (0.926) (0.296) (0.913) (0.662) (<0.001) (<0.001)  
Two tailed p-values are reported in the parentheses. 
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Panel C: Conditional logit regression on determinants of analysts’ choice of the focal firms 
and the major customer firms 
 
This table examines the determinants of analysts’ choice of the focal firms and the major customer firms. 
The dependent variable, SUPPLY_CHAIN_FIRMS equals 1 if a firm is a focal firm or a major customer of 
a focal firm, and 0 for “other” firms in same analyst’s portfolio. The sample comprises 31,616 supply 
chain analyst-firm-years observations over the sample period with the necessary financial data. Note all 
firms followed by each supply chain analyst are classified into one of the three groups: focal firms, i.e., for 
firms for which an analyst also covers at least one major customers, major customers of a focal firm for 
the analyst, and “other” firms which include all remaining firms in the analyst’s portfolio. Definitions of 
the variables are in Appendix 3.1. The z-test statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and *, are 
marked based on one-tailed z-statistics  at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively. Marginal 
effects for each independent variable in the full model are calculated as the change in the probability that a 
firm is chosen to be a focal firm or a major customer firm for a unit change of the independent variables. 
 
Independent variables Predicted sign 
Dependent variable: SUPPLY_CHAIN_ FIRMS 
(1) (2) (3) 
Marginal 
effects 
(4) 
INVESTMENT_BANKING + 0.015  -0.185 -0.00015 (0.04)  (-0.48) 
LOG_TRADINGVALUE +  0.153*** 0.161*** 0.00012  (14.00) (14.15) 
LOG_ NUMBER_FIRM_SIC1 +   0.686*** 0.00051   (13.07) 
PRIMARY_INDUSTRY +   -0.078* -0.00005   (-1.93) 
SALE_GROWTH +   -0.123*** -0.00009   (-3.86) 
MARKET_TO_BOOK +   -0.004** -0.00000   (-1.92) 
ROA +   -0.901*** -0.00067   (-6.46) 
AD_RATIO +   -3.294*** -0.00246   (-3.94) 
RD_RATIO +   -0.042** -0.00003   (-1.65) 
Pseudo-R squared 0.000 0.01 0.033  
Number of observations 27,360 27,334 27,169  
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Figure 2.1: Survival rate for overconfident CEOs versus less confident CEOs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure represents the survival function of the initial forecasting behavior for 168 overconfident CEOs 
and 201 less confident CEOs. The x-axis represents the time dimension of the survival function, measured 
by the cumulative number of quarters since the managers issue their first forecasts. The y-axis is the 
probability of survival of managers’ initial forecasting behavior.  
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Figure 2.2: Timeline of events in the model 
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Analysts’ consensus 
earnings forecasts for 
quarter Q 
Stage 1:  
1. Managers issue their first forecasts 
in their tenure in their own firms 
2. The market responds to the 
management forecasts. Managers 
receive the market feedback 
concerning their forecasts 
3. The forecast is classified as “less 
accurate” or “more accurate” using 
the magnitude of unsigned 
forecasting error.  
4. Only managers who initially issue 
“less accurate” forecasts are retained. 
Actual Earnings for quarter Q 
is realized. Management 
forecast error for the quarter t 
is known. 
Stage 2:  
1. overconfident and less confident managers issue their second forecast 
2. Managers update their beliefs about their forecasting error after receiving the market 
feedback and error feedback and change their forecasting behavior when they issue their 
second forecasts. 
3. The forecast is classified as “less accurate” or “more accurate” relative all forecasts in the 
quarter. 
4. If the forecast is “more accurate”, the lag days between this forecast 2 1+Qy and the first 
forecast 1Qy is the time elapsed between managers’ initial forecasting behavior to the first 
time they issue a more accurate forecasts.  The time measure is used for H1 testing. 
 
All forecasts issued by overconfident and 
less confident managers since this forecast 
are used in the analysis for H2. 
 
The first forecast is used to classify managers into 
overconfident, less confident and other managers 
based on the magnitude and direction of the 
forecasting error. 
The CEO became the 
CEO of the firm at 
time S 
1. Managers  issue their third forecast 
2. Managers update their beliefs about their forecasting error after 
receiving the market feedback and error feedback and change their 
forecasting behavior when they issue their second forecasts. 
3. The forecast is classified as “less accurate” or “more accurate” 
relative all forecasts in the quarter. 
4. If it is a “more accurate” forecast, then record the time between 3 2+Qy  
and
 
1
Qy  as time transpired before the manager issue his first more 
accurate forecasts. The time measure is used for H1 testing. 
 
